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INTRODUCTION
As a rule, the introduction is where the author explains to the reader what the 
book is about. Before I do that, however, I will take the liberty of a brief digression 
of a personal nature. Whenever I’m at some sort of gathering and find I am 
acquainted only with the host, my interactions with other guests go off “without 
a hitch”. I’m not a particularly shy person, so it’s rather easy for me to get to know 
others and to talk to them about more or less serious subjects. Problems begin 
when they ask me what I do for a living. My answer – that I am a psychologist – 
provokes a feeling of unease in my interlocutors. “So you must be observing us and 
analyzing,” I hear. “What do you think about us?” My answer, that I’m not observing 
or analyzing anybody but, just like everybody else, having a beer, chatting about 
Almodóvar’s latest film, Kundera’s books, recent sports events or political happenings, 
isn’t taken at face value by others. It gets worse when the conversation turns to 
questions like “So what is it you do exactly? Do you put people through psycho-
therapy, or devise intelligence tests?” I respond that I’m not a therapist and that I’ve 
never created any intelligence test, and nothing would indicate that I ever will. I 
explain that for many years I have been engaged in the study of social influence 
techniques. When I give a few examples by way of explanation, opinions about me 
are uniformly devastating: I am a guy who sits in a lab and dreams up schemes for 
effectively manipulating people. 
As it is, psychologists concerned with social influence techniques usually aren’t 
thinking up new tricks. Our approach to the subject is just the opposite. The 
metaphor of full-cycle social psychology, applied by Robert Cialdini (1980), would 
seem to be a good illustration of this. The full cycle is a construction under which 
a social influence technique emerges in social life, and after it is “discovered”, 
investigated and described by scientists, it winds up back in that “real life”. So, a 
psychologist interested in these techniques observes the tricks applied by individuals 
whose professions or social roles involve them exerting influence on others. 
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He thus watches the behaviour of a waiter with an interest in his client leaving a 
generous tip, a car salesman focused on getting people to buy automobiles from 
him, door-to-door salespeople determined to leave a set of knives in someone’s 
home and walk out with a fat wallet. Also of interest to the psychologist may be 
those working for charitable causes who are skilled in acquiring donations from 
sponsors, as well as politicians who quickly gain in popularity, which translates into 
votes from constituents. Of equal interest may also be observing a married couple 
in which one partner is able to convince the other to agree to far-reaching concessions.
Every social psychologist has a wealth of opportunities to observe practitioners 
of social influence techniques. I live and work in Wrocław, a city located in the 
centre of Europe – and more precisely in south-west Poland – with around 
700,000 inhabitants. Yesterday I got out of my car, which I had parked around 200 
metres from the Market Square, where I had arranged to meet up with a friend. 
While exiting my car I was approached by a man showing me where I could find 
a place to park, waving at me while I helplessly drove along the kerb in search of 
a free spot. I hadn’t even got out of the car when he offered me “a deal” on some 
car air fresheners. Why not? He was polite and pleasant, he had helped me and he 
also had one of my favourite scents, vanilla. A moment after this transaction and 
after I had closed my car door, a young boy who seemed around 12 years old ran 
up to me, bringing a bucket and an offer to wash my car. I might have taken him 
up on it if it weren’t for the fact that the water in his bucket looked even dirtier 
than the exterior of my vehicle. Besides that, I was probably feeling a bit ‘had’ by 
the air freshener salesman, whose offer wasn’t really that cheap, so I decided I 
wouldn’t just agree to everything people offered me. I set out briskly for the 
Market Square. Along the way I passed by two sellers of a newspaper I usually read 
(I wasn’t enticed, as I had already bought a copy earlier), one seller of another 
newspaper (I didn’t buy it because I don’t care for its politics) and one vagrant 
(I didn’t give him a cent). I did, however, take three flyers (two from language schools 
and one from a glassworks), which I immediately placed in the bin. I always take 
flyers. I know that some people, usually youngsters, are paid by the hour, but others 
are paid for the number of flyers they give out. I think this is a rather thankless and 
poorly paid job. Taking a flyer and throwing it into a bin, which is usually nearby, 
doesn’t cost me a thing. So I usually let people press flyers into my open hand, then 
maybe I take a look at them or not and throw them away immediately. On the way 
to the Market Square I was additionally tempted by storefronts promising incredible 
thrills inside, and a bank tried to talk me into taking out an unbelievably attractive 
loan. Before I had made it to City Hall, I walked by a man who resembled Lenin 
and was standing on a fruit box holding a giant red flag in his hand. At his feet lay 
a prominently displayed hat for tossing money into, and it contained 10- and 
20-zloty banknotes. Obviously, the idea was to prevent someone from thinking 
that they could just toss in some loose change. Not even for a moment did I 
consider throwing anything in there. Next, I encountered a man dressed up in a 
suit and tie who tried to press a business card into my hand while explaining the 
virtues of a central vacuum system, and a painting salesman encouraging me to 
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pick up an image of a beautiful deer in rutting season, saying that I could get it at 
steep discount while helping young artists at the same time. In both cases, I 
managed to not break my stride and avoided closer interaction.
The car fragrance salesman, the owner of a bucket with water, the panhandler, 
the Lenin lookalike, the newspaper salesmen and the deer painting peddler . . . in 
most of these cases, the people involved applied some more or less refined social 
influence technique. These techniques – as the aforementioned “sample of events” 
demonstrates – are relentlessly used by practitioners of social influence. I assume that 
you, the reader, have had experiences similar to mine, even if you live in another 
part of the globe. Regardless of their geographic location, practitioners of social 
influence all want one and the same – they want us to order and purchase various 
things from them, to give money for their causes, to fill in the surveys, questionnaires 
and other forms they put in our faces, to leave them generous tips and to undertake 
all sorts of obligations. We succumb to such pressure – sometimes subtle, sometimes 
less so – dozens or even hundreds of times a day. Quite often, as Daniel Howard 
indicates (1995), practitioners of social influence apply techniques consisting of 
connecting various methods into a chain, which makes it even more difficult to 
defend oneself from undesired social influence. Why do social influence techniques 
work? Why do they work even when we are perfectly aware that someone is 
attempting to influence us? Contrary to appearances, these are very difficult questions. 
The basic question a psychologist who has succeeded in sniffing out some 
particular trick applied by practitioners of social influence must pose concerns the 
actual effectiveness of the technique. For example, does the way a shoe salesman 
usually “can’t find” a pair of shoes in the right size for the customer, but then man-
ages to locate “the last pair” after a few minutes, really increase the chances that the 
customer will buy those shoes? Perhaps he would be equally inclined to buy them 
if the salesman took them out straight away? How to determine this? There is no 
better means than a carefully planned and meticulously performed experiment, or 
even better – a series of experiments. If the results of such empirical studies in fact 
reveal the effectiveness of the trick under analysis, then one of science’s most 
important questions must follow: “Why?” Why is a given technique a successful 
instrument of social influence? Here, the investigator primarily makes use of his 
knowledge about the mechanisms governing people’s reactions. Over the last few 
decades, psychology has made significant strides in this area. 
However, many things remain uncertain, unclear and opaque. This is why there 
may be several potential mechanisms underlying the effectiveness of a particular 
social influence technique. The following series of experiments is thus aimed at 
determining which of them is in fact responsible for a particular trick’s effective-
ness. Uncovering the mechanism thus also leads to the generation of knowledge 
about factors that can enhance, sometimes significantly, the effectiveness of the 
studied behaviour. The precisely verified and described technique now becomes an 
element of psychological knowledge. As such, it is also often propagated during all 
sorts of training sessions, university classes or seminars. It is also sometimes the case 
that a description of the technique can be found in books, such as this one. As a 
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consequence, the technique can become an instrument of social influence for those 
who learn of it thanks to this manuscript. In this way, the circle of social psychology 
described by Robert Cialdini is complete. It has closed. The technique was born 
in real social life and has returned to it. 
The great majority of psychological influences described in this book have 
travelled a similar path: from practice, through detailed empirical and theoretical 
analysis, to practice. It is no different with the techniques that my collaborators and 
I have studied for many years. We thus stake no claim to being the authors of most 
of these tricks. They are not our inventions. They are the creations of anonymous 
practitioners of social influence over thousands of years, individuals who derive all 
sorts of benefits, not only material, from their effectiveness. To obtain a full picture, 
it is necessary to say that, at times (although rarely), psychologists think up social 
influence techniques, or somewhat accidentally uncover them in the course of 
conducting empirical research.
In this book I also describe the results of various experiments by a host of social 
psychologists conducting research around the world. My primary objective is to 
introduce the reader to the current state of knowledge in the area of social influ-
ence techniques. At the same time, however, I devote significant space to research 
conducted by myself and my co-experimenters. I do this not because I feel our 
experiments are more interesting or more important than others; the possibility of 
offering a detailed presentation of one’s own research and thoughts is simply a 
natural privilege enjoyed by every author. I have decided to take advantage of it.
In works dedicated to social influence, various means of organizing the 
presented material have been adopted. The author of one of the most popular 
psychological books, Robert Cialdini (2001), states that six main laws or principles 
of social influence can be distinguished. They are the principles of reciprocation, 
commitment and consistency, social proof, liking, authority and scarcity. Cialdini 
dedicates successive chapters of his best-selling monograph Influence: Science and 
practice to them. This approach allows him to provide a good structure to the pre-
sented material. There is no doubt in my mind that the aforementioned principles 
are of particular significance, and they allow for an excellent explanation of various 
phenomena belonging to the area of social influence. The approach consisting in 
an argument constructed on six rules of social influence does, however, have 
certain flaws. First and foremost, it should be acknowledged that all techniques of 
social influence (or at least the majority of them) can be counted as one of these 
rules. Cialdini himself is of this opinion, but this is not so obvious to many other 
researchers. The framework of the aforementioned six basic rules is a poor fit for 
such techniques as those associated with emotions experienced by people, tech-
niques based on the sudden induction of incogitance or those making use of 
egotistical mechanisms. 
It is also worth noting that Cialdini uses descriptions of various tricks and tech-
niques as specific illustrations of the rules he himself has differentiated, rendering 
the book coherent and believable. The problem is, among researchers there is no 
consensus as to the psychological basis for the effectiveness of particular means of 
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exerting influence on people. In the relevant literature we may observe vigorous 
debate over the psychological mechanisms that underpin the effectiveness of 
assorted social influence techniques. Thus it is often possible to take issue with 
Cialdini’s “classification” of particular techniques. 
In this book, the problem of organizing the content is resolved in a different 
manner. Pride of place is given to descriptions of particular social influence tech-
niques and empirical studies testing their effectiveness. In addition, competing 
interpretations of techniques and research results under discussion are presented, 
and it is my hope that they will assist readers in coming to their own conclusions 
on the accuracy of each of them. 
It is thus time to enumerate the subjects to be addressed in the individual chapters 
of this book. You are presently reading the first of them; it is an introduction to the 
subject of social influence and to the content of this manuscript. Chapter 2 examines 
what are referred to as sequential social influence techniques. They all consist in the 
main request being preceded by a different one. Depending on the particular tech-
nique, the secondary request can be harder or easier to fulfil than the one that follows 
it. The subject’s contact with the initial request – meaning whether he fulfils it, 
attempts to fulfil it or rejects it – influences the probability that he will want to fulfil 
the next one. Research on the effectiveness of sequential techniques and the search 
for mechanisms underlying them have a long and rich tradition in the science of 
psychology, which is why I have devoted many pages to describing them. 
The remaining chapters are shorter. This is not because I feel the techniques 
presented in them are uninteresting, but rather because there is far less empirical 
research concerning them. The third chapter contains a presentation of techniques 
associated with people’s need to satisfy their ego and for self-presentation. 
Individuals undertake all sorts of activities throughout their lives in order to maintain 
self-esteem and to make a positive impression on others. These motivations can, in 
some cases, result in them being more inclined to act on requests, suggestions and 
orders addressed to them. Some social influence techniques are thus grounded in 
just these human needs. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the content and form of messages directed at an individual 
on whom social pressure is being applied. Here I attempt to demonstrate the 
complex role words play in processes of social influence. A specific phrase or an 
individual word appearing in a particular moment of a social interaction can sig-
nificantly affect the reaction of an individual to whom we turn with a request or 
suggestion. The thesis that interpersonal interactions are of a dynamic nature is a 
truism. That this dynamic can find itself under the control of the individual 
forming the request, and thus take the form of a social influence technique, is itself 
not a truism. 
The fifth chapter describes just those techniques in which something out of the 
ordinary occurs when one person asks another for something. Chapter 6 contains 
descriptions of successful influence techniques based on emotional mechanisms. 
Here we can observe just how significant readiness to fulfil a request is on the 
influence of affective states experienced by the addressee of said request. 
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The seventh chapter – “A few more issues and final remarks” – as the term 
would suggest, closes out the book. Alongside a summary, I grant myself the liberty 
of presenting some of my reflections and doubts. I also consider the possibility of 
using psychological knowledge in practice and others of an ethical character, of 
particular importance concerning the exertion of influence on others. That should 
suffice to describe what you, dear Reader, will find in this book. 
There is one more thing that requires clarification, something that with all 
certainty concerns social influence but is not in this work. In the book I focus 
almost exclusively on techniques designed to induce people to behave in a par-
ticular manner. However, I neither present nor analyze techniques for influencing 
cognitive attitudes. It must be stated clearly that such an approach under which 
the researcher is primarily interested in observable behaviours is not, at present, 
the dominant one in psychology. Quite the opposite, we may even say that it is 
“unfashionable”. As jokingly stated in the title of an article by Roy Baumeister, 
Kathleen Vohs and David Funder (2007), contemporary psychology has become 
“a science of self-reports and finger movements”. Since the 1970s there has been 
a steady decline of interest on the part of psychologists in non-verbal human 
behaviour. While writing their article, Baumeister and his colleagues opened up 
the then newest edition (January 2006) of the Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, one of the most influential psychological journals. And what did they 
find? The articles contain descriptions of individuals’ judgements and opinions. 
The contemporary researcher no longer follows in the footsteps of his predecessors, 
introspective types who listened to what subjects had to say; he rather asks them 
to press the appropriate button on a keyboard. The psychologist thus studies 
behaviours . . . consisting of pecking at a keyboard, he explores . . . finger move-
ments! “We have to break up!” cries out Robert Cialdini – the leading researcher 
on altruism and social influence – in the title of his 2009 article. He observes that 
psychology is focusing more and more on explaining behaviours, while ignoring 
the actual causes of those behaviours. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that social 
psychology, in its drive to explain, has lost sight of just what is to be explained. In 
some places psychologists have got themselves into such a quagmire that they are 
only explaining processes of explanation.
The book which you hold in your hands is thus a continuation of Cialdini’s 
appeal “We have to break up!” It focuses on the reality of human behaviour, and 
not on their judgements, opinions or verbal declarations of particular behaviours. 
While this is an unfashionable approach, I follow it in the firm conviction that it 
is a proper one. Experiments studying real human behaviours are difficult to con-
duct, time-consuming and labour intensive. It is far easier to just ask subjects to 
imagine themselves in a situation and say how they would behave . . . simpler, 
quicker, easier . . . but doubts of a fundamental nature arise: do we, in this manner, 
get closer to the truth of human behaviour, or do we get further from that truth? 
One of the most important experiments in the history of social psychology was 
conducted by Stanley Milgram (1974). Milgram demonstrated that in certain 
conditions the majority of participants in an experiment, ostensibly concerning the 
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effect of punishment on learning, can be induced into shocking another participant 
with 450 volts of electricity. However, if we were to ask people how they would 
behave in the same circumstances, hardly anyone would be able to imagine them-
selves in the role of a person zapping another with such a horrendous amount 
of electricity. Things are similar in the case of investigations of social influence 
techniques. In Chapter 5 I describe research concerning the role of touch. As it 
occurs, when an individual is asked to do some favour, such as signing a petition, 
the chances that this request will be fulfilled are greater when we gently grasp this 
person by the arm or forearm. I told my students to imagine a stranger asking them 
to sign a petition, and then asked them whether the fact that this stranger were 
delicately touching their arm at the same time would influence the probability that 
they would agree to do so. They responded that it would obviously have an influ-
ence! But . . . they were convinced that the touch of a stranger would result in 
their refusal to fulfil the request! There are countless examples demonstrating that 
investigations of real human behaviours generate an entirely different picture than 
research on imagined own reactions. 
Thus, in this book I consistently describe research concerning real social behav-
iours, and not work concerning verbal declarations about such behaviours. What is 
more, a clear majority of experiments presented within are field studies in which 
people are studied in their natural environment (in parks, libraries, restaurants, at 
universities or in their own homes) and not in a psychological laboratory. 
Furthermore, in the majority of these experiments, the subjects were unaware that 
they were interacting with psychologists conducting scientific research; they did 
not know that they were participating in an experiment. These facts give us the 
right to be confident in the veracity of the results, and that they demonstrate how 
people really behave in various situations and what conditions their reactions. 
As the author, I obviously bear full responsibility for the content presented in 
this book. However, I would like its readers to be aware that it would not have 
come about without my friends, colleagues and collaborators – and also my students – 
with whom I had countless opportunities to conduct scientific discussions, debates 
and polemics, and from whom I have learned so much. I deeply wish to thank 
them sincerely for their comments, which have helped me to avoid assorted errors, 
vagueness and inaccuracies. I would also like to thank Matthew La Fontaine for his 
strong language support. I’m truly grateful to Routledge and their staff for their 
cooperation and lending their hand at all stages of producing of the book. Thanks 
are due, as well, to Christopher Carpenter, Michael Hogg and one anonymous 
reviewer for their insightful comments on an earlier version of parts of the text and 
to Robert Cialdini and Nicolas Gueguen who expressed opinions about the final 
version of this book. I acknowledge the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, 
whose grants (N N106 327339 and BST WROC/2013/A/02) helped make this 
book possible.
Last but not least, I would also like to thank everyone who has decided to read 
this book. For them (and for myself) I hope the time sacrificed reading it will prove 
well spent.
2
SEQUENTIAL TECHNIQUES  
OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE 
“Honey, are we finally going to paint the walls in the hallway?” a wife asks her 
husband. “Yes, we talked about that already,” the husband replies. “Maybe we can 
remodel the bathroom too, since there’s already going to be such a mess, let’s just 
do it all together?!” 
This sort of conversation is an example of what are referred to as sequential 
techniques of social influence. The wife starts discussing remodelling the bathroom 
only after she has been assured by her husband that the walls in the hallway will 
get painted. Sequential techniques are based in the assumption that we can boost 
the potential of another person’s acceding to our request, succumbing to urging, 
taking advantage of a proposal or carrying out a demand by presenting a different 
request (suggestion, proposal, command) first. Particular techniques assume that the 
initial request will be fulfilled (at least with a verbal declaration, as in the example 
given at the beginning of the chapter), will be rejected or will simply be impos-
sible to be fulfilled. Our presentation of sequential techniques of social influence 
will begin with the first type of situation. 
Foot-in-the-door 
Proverbs highlighting people’s tendency to escalate their demands are seemingly 
present in nearly every culture. In the USA and United Kingdom people say 
“give them an inch, they’ll take a mile”; Germans and Poles – while speaking 
different languages – jointly declare that “give someone a finger, they’ll take your 
whole hand”. Both Hungarians and Spanish speakers are in agreement that “if you 
give someone your hand, they’ll take the entire arm”. The essential idea in all of 
these expressions is the same: if someone convinces us to cede a bit of ground, 
the chances increase that we will take a much larger step back. To look at it from 
a different perspective: if we want someone to agree to fulfil a difficult request, 
we should first ask him to fulfil a clearly simpler one. 
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If we look at these issues from the perspective of social influence techniques and 
their efficacy, is it really the case that if someone has reason to believe a direct request 
will go unfulfilled, the chances of it succeeding can be enhanced by first lodging a 
less serious request? The first to attempt at answering this question were American 
psychologists Jonathan Freedman and Scott Fraser (1966). Their research constitutes 
what were likely history’s first experiments exploring social influence techniques.
The participants in Freedman and Fraser’s experiments (1966) were housewives; 
they were contacted by telephone and asked to allow a few men to enter their 
homes. They were told that the men were members of a consumer’s organization 
and their task was to enumerate and classify all the household products. It turned 
out that only around 22% of those asked gave their consent. The researchers treated 
this group as the control group. The experimental group was comprised of other 
housewives, who were also called by phone but to whom a much simpler request 
was submitted: they were asked to answer a few questions about the kinds of soaps 
they used. The vast majority of women agreed and responded to all of the questions 
given. A few days later, the experimenters called those women again and asked them 
to allow a few men to visit them so they could enumerate and classify the household 
products. It turned out that in this case the women were more inclined to let the 
unfamiliar men into their home than were people in control conditions. In these 
circumstances, consent to a visit from the unknown men was given by 53% of 
respondents. Why was this so? One answer stands out: the women who had previ-
ously answered questions about their consumer behaviours felt their telephone 
interlocutor was someone they were familiar with (or at least represented a 
company they already knew). It is commonly known that people are more likely to 
fulfil the requests of people (and likely institutions) they are familiar with than of 
those they are not. The results obtained by the study should not strike us as unusual, 
all the more so considering that it involved participants letting someone into their 
home, where the element of trust would seem to be crucial. We hasten to mention, 
however, that Freedman and Fraser were testing a hypothesis assuming that the key 
to acquiring consent to the fulfilment of a difficult request is to first convince 
people to perform an easier task. Thus we are faced with a dilemma: does the greater 
percentage of women in the experimental cohort consenting to allowing a group 
of unknown men into their homes result from the fact that the women previously 
fulfilled some request, or rather because they consider those men to constitute 
acquaintances, at least to a certain degree? Freedman and Fraser foresaw this 
ambiguity, and therefore brought two more groups into their experiment’s structure.
In the first of them, the women were asked to give a brief interview. After 
agreeing, they were then told that, in fact, only initial registration was being con-
ducted, and that the interview would be held at a later time. In the case of the 
second group, the experimenter only informed the study participants that a special 
organization had been formed that investigated consumers’ behaviours, and he 
explained that he wanted the women to be aware of that fact. When the women 
from those two groups were again contacted by telephone a few days later and 
asked if they would agree to host a group of men who would enumerate and 
classify all the household products in their home, this request was not fulfilled with 
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significantly greater frequency than in the case of the control group (consent was 
given by around 33% and 28% of women, respectively). We can thus observe that 
the factor increasing pliancy in the face of a serious, difficult request is previous 
submission to a similar, clearly easier request; the mere earlier contact with an 
individual who then formulated a serious request was not enough to generate 
increased compliance. Freedman and Fraser thus proved in this experiment that the 
trick “first a small request, then a big one – the real one” is an effective social influ-
ence technique. They also proposed the name foot-in-the-door for this technique. 
The name would seem to reflect the essence of that technique: in order to enter 
someone’s home (to get a lot), it is first necessary to get the owner’s permission to 
put your foot in the door (to get a little). 
In order to determine whether the results of the study under discussion were 
fully reliable, and also to find answers to a range of other questions, the authors 
conducted another experiment. This time, they started with the assumption that it 
would be relatively difficult to convince the owners of homes located along the 
roadside to give their consent to the installation of large billboards in their yards 
displaying messages to drivers asking them to drive carefully. Indeed, who would 
like to have a giant billboard in their yard, blocking their houses? As it turned out, 
individuals selected at random were quite resistant to the idea; fewer than 17% of 
those questioned gave their consent. In the remaining four study groups, 2 weeks 
before the request to install a billboard was formulated, they were asked for their 
agreement to do something far easier. Participants were asked either to put up a 
small sign or to sign a petition, and the issue was either safe driving or keeping 
California beautiful. It can easily be observed that in the case of two of the groups, 
the first (initial) and the second (main) request addressed the same issue – improving 
road safety. In the case of the remaining two groups, the first request concerned a 
different issue (keeping California beautiful) from the second (road safety). 
Regardless, in two groups we encountered a similarity in the actions required of 
study participants – both cases involved expressing consent to the installation of 
visual propaganda (a sticker in the case of the initial request, and a billboard in the 
case of the target request). In the other two conditions, there was a discrepancy in 
the character of the two tasks given to participants (first to sign a petition, then to 
consent to placing visual propaganda on their property). 
Freedman and Fraser were of course interested in seeing which experimental 
groups would give their consent to placing a billboard in their front yards with 
greater frequency than the control groups. The results of this experiment can be 
reviewed in Table 2.1.
As we can see, in the first group (similar themes, similar nature of tasks), consent 
to putting up a billboard was given by over two-thirds of those asked. In the 
remaining three groups, the percentage of participants agreeing to fulfil the target 
request was lower, yet even this was clearly higher than in the control group. 
The results of this experiment indicate that the “foot-in-the-door” technique is 
at its most effective when both requests are similar in content (in this case, both of 
them concern road traffic safety) and involve similar activity (expressing consent to 
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the presence of visual propaganda). On the other hand, however, it is not necessary 
for any of the aforementioned similarities to be strong in order for the technique 
to succeed (i.e. in order for the addressee’s fulfilment of the target request to be 
more likely than in conditions in which the request is made directly). Increased 
compliance was observed even in situations when both requests concerned differ-
ent issues and required different actions. It is worth emphasizing that the 
aforementioned dissimilarity is not total. Indeed, both requests concern some sort 
of engagement on behalf of the common good. 
What is the psychological mechanism that results in people who fulfilled an 
easier introductory request then being more inclined to fulfil a significantly more 
serious one? Before we try to answer this question, let us consider two details in 
the experimental procedure applied by Freedman and Fraser. First, one fact that 
stands out is that the initial request (sign a petition or put on a sticker) and the 
target request (install a billboard) were formulated by entirely different people. 
What is important and should be emphasized is that the person who requested 
consent to install a billboard behaved as though he had nothing in common with 
the person who had made the introductory request. Second, it should be noted that 
2 weeks passed between the initial and the second request. The first of these facts 
indicates that the “foot-in-the-door” technique does not owe its effectiveness to 
any interpersonal mechanisms (e.g. the establishment of a bond between the 
person formulating the request and the person to whom it is addressed, nor any 
particular obligation resulting from such an interaction that would induce the 
addressee of the request to fulfil further ones). The second of the aforementioned 
facts, however, suggests that the technique under discussion here is not based on 
any sort of short-term mechanism. With these issues in mind, Freedman and Fraser 
took on the assumption that an individual who agrees without being placed under 
pressure (threats, blackmail, offer of financial reward, etc.) to fulfil the first request 
will then begin to view himself as “the kind of person who does this sort of thing, 
who agrees to requests made by strangers, who takes action on things he believes 
in, who cooperates with good causes” (Freedman & Fraser, 1966, p. 201). The 
authors posit the presence of a principle that was later elaborated in full by Daryl 
Bem (1967, 1972) and is presently referred to as self-perception theory.
TABLE 2.1  Percentage of subjects complying with the large request in Freedman and Fraser 
(1966) experiment
Issues Task
Similar N Different N
Similar 76.0 25 47.8 23
Different 47.6 21 47.4 19
One-Contact  16.7 (N = 24)
Source: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1966, vol. 4, p. 201
Copyright 1966 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 
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If you ask a man whether his wife likes soap operas, he might respond “I think 
so, after all, she does watch them all the time”. But what if we pose the same 
question to the wife? If she said, “I think I do, after all, I watch them every day”, 
then it could be said her process of deduction about her own TV preferences is 
exactly the same as her husband’s. In Bem’s opinion, this would be nothing unu-
sual. The answers to questions about what leads to one’s own reactions, decisions 
and choices are generally located in the external world (someone induced us to 
do something, someone forced us, someone offered a large reward, someone did 
a favour for us previously). However, in the absence of such factors, or when they 
are not very convincing as explanations for our own reactions, we come to the 
conclusion that the root causes lie within – in our own attitudes, convictions and 
inclinations. The woman in our example, wondering whether she likes soap 
operas, first considers whether it’s because her friend forces her to watch them, or 
maybe because she only watches them because she has just one TV station, or 
maybe because a research company pays her to. If it turns out that this “review of 
the circumstances” fails to indicate any external factors influencing her choice to 
watch soap operas, she will then search for the answers inside herself. She thus 
comes to the conclusion that she likes this form of entertainment. Let us observe 
that not only does Bem assume the process of deduction about one’s own 
preferences or attitudes takes a course analogical to that of deduction about the 
preferences of others, but he also turns the association between our attitudes and 
actions upside-down. It is commonly known that our attitudes lead us to engage 
in some behaviours and to refrain from others. If I like books, I read them. If I 
like exotic animals, I go to the zoo. If I’m happy I laugh, and if I’m sad I cry; Bem 
does not call this association into question, but he does ask: how can I know that 
I like books and exotic animals? Because I read a lot, and I spend my free time at 
the zoo. How do I know that I am happy or sad? Because I laugh out loud, or I 
feel tears streaming down my cheeks. Of course, Bem does not declare that think-
ing about the causes of one’s own behaviours is the sole source of knowledge 
about self. Sometimes, however, we have no other foundations for coming to 
conclusions about our own preferences and attitudes.
Possibly the most suggestive evidence in support of Bem’s theory is an experi-
ment conducted by Fritz Strack, Leonard Martin and Sabine Stepper (1988). The 
experimenters asked a portion of their study’s participants to assess some jokey 
cartoons. Another group assessed the same jokes while holding a pencil between 
their teeth. Still another group assessed the jokes with a pencil between their lips 
and with their teeth closed. What was the result? The jokes seemed the funniest to 
those who held the pencil between their teeth, and the least funny to those who 
held it using their lips (Strack et al., 1988). Thus it was the loosening or tightening 
of the facial muscles associated with expressing joy and amusement, or disgust and 
distaste, lead to us concluding that we find something more or less humorous! I 
know that a joke is funny because I feel the activity of my zygomatic muscle 
extending from the base of my ear to the corner of my mouth. I know that it irritates 
me and seems stupid because I can perceive the activity of other facial muscles. 
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The theory of self-perception is most often referred to in the literature as the 
psychological underpinning for the effectiveness of the “foot-in-the-door” tech-
nique. Someone who accedes to the first, initial request begins to question why he 
has done so. Not finding any sensible external explanation (nobody has black-
mailed him, nobody has offered him serious money for doing so), he arrives at the 
conclusion that his own preferences and convictions must be at the heart of the 
decision. Put differently, he comes to the conclusion that he possesses attitudes and 
convictions that are consistent with that decision. Owing to the process of self-
perception he becomes a psychologically somewhat different person, a person who 
now defines or expresses himself in a slightly different fashion. The next, more 
serious request is now in line with this new self-image, thus it comes as no surprise 
that the chances he will agree to it increase.
Several decades have passed since the publication of the experiments by 
Freedman and Fraser described above. In that time, many experiments demonstrating 
the effectiveness of the “foot-in-the-door” technique have been conducted, 
encompassing quite a few areas of life. For example, it can be used to boost the 
chances of receiving large donations to charitable causes. This has been explored in 
several experiments, with direct practical implications. Patricia Pliner, Heather Hart, 
Joanne Kohl and Dory Saari (1974) did this in conjunction with a campaign in 
support of the fight against cancer. One day they handed out stickers with messages 
about caring for those afflicted by cancer to randomly selected residents of a small 
town, and asked them to display the stickers on their clothes. Not once did someone 
refuse. The next day, donations for the fight against cancer were collected among 
residents of the same town. It turned out that those who had previously agreed to 
sport the stickers were more generous than others. Joseph Schwarzwald, Aharon 
Bizman and Moshe Raz (1983) asked randomly selected individuals to sign a peti-
tion to authorities concerning funding for a disabled persons’ social club. Almost 
everyone approached agreed to give their support. Two weeks later, people were 
asked to donate money. In this case as well it turned out that people who had 
previously been asked to do a small favour were more likely to reach for their wallets. 
Peter Reingen (1978) decided to examine whether the positive effect of the 
foot-in-the-door technique could be achieved in the framework of single interac-
tions. He asked students on a university campus to make a charitable donation. It 
turned out that he was much more effective when the participants were first asked 
to answer a few questions in a survey concerning the organization (engaged in the 
fight against heart disease) on whose behalf the money was being collected. Similar 
positive effects were noted by Morton Goldman (1986) while conducting a cam-
paign for the municipal zoo, by Robert Bell and Matthew Cholerton (1994) as 
they collected funds for educational campaigns to raise awareness about AIDS and 
ways of avoiding the disease, and by Sebastien Meineri and Nicolas Gueguen 
(2014) encouraging people to get involved in protecting the natural environment. 
Jacob Hornik and Tamar Zaig (1991) demonstrated that the technique under 
discussion can prove very helpful in conditions involving a telephone survey with 
questions about issues that respondents are not particularly keen on discussing 
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(e.g. income, sexual education for children, watching pornographic films, etc.). 
The portion of respondents refusing to answer questions in such surveys is generally 
high, which leads to the study sample losing its representative character. Hornik 
and Zaig show that a double-digit increase in the readiness of respondents to answer 
such questions can be attained if they are first asked personal but less invasive questions. 
The foot-in-the-door technique is exploited extensively in totalitarian political 
systems. New regimes rarely require extremely immoral acts from their subjects at 
the beginning, but rather step up their demands over time, escalating the expecta-
tions and requirements addressed to them (Gilbert, 1981).
Meta-analyses aimed at determining the conditions necessary for the 
foot-in-the-door technique to be effective show that it is successful both when 
the first and the second request are formulated by the same individual and when 
two different people are involved in the process (Fern, Monroe & Avila, 1986). The 
length of time between requests and the difficulty of the initial request are rela-
tively inconsequential (Beaman, Cole, Preston, Klentz & Steblay, 1983; Dillard, 
Hunter & Burgoon 1984; Fern et al., 1986). It also turned out that the foot-in-the-door 
effect can be achieved even without the queried individual fulfilling an initial 
request; it is enough that he attempts to do so in spite of adversity. In one such 
experiment, individuals walking along the pavement were approached (Dolinski, 
2000). Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: experimental 
and control. In the experimental conditions, a young man approached participants 
and asked for directions to Zubrzyckiego Street (in fact, the city in which the study 
was conducted has no such street). The normal response was to stop and think for 
a moment, then respond “I don’t know”, “I don’t have any idea” or something 
similar. Next, after the participant had gone another 100 metres down the street, 
he was approached by a second experimenter, a young woman. She stood on the 
pavement with a large bag, pointed at the top floor of a multi-storey building and 
asked for a favour, saying that she wanted to visit her friend living on the fifth floor, 
but that she had an unusually heavy bag, which there was no good reason to carry 
up there. She then asked the participant to watch the bag for a few minutes. It 
turned out that while 34% of participants agreed in the control condition to watch 
the bag, 58% consented to do so in the experimental condition. 
While there have already been a large number of experiments concerning the 
effectiveness of the foot-in-the-door technique, far fewer have addressed whether 
the mechanism of self-perception in fact lies at the heart of its success. As we shall 
see, this is a complex issue. Miron Zuckerman, Michele Lazzaro and Diane 
Waldgeir (1979) observed that, in accordance with Bem’s theory, if the fulfilment 
of the first request is accompanied by the promise of a reward, the process of self-
perception should be halted. Individuals often have a purely external explanation 
for their reactions. As a consequence, such conditions should not lead to increased 
readiness to carry out a second, more serious request. The authors called people 
randomly selected from the phone book and asked them to participate in a 5-minute 
discussion on pedestrian safety in the city. Half of the participants were offered a 
reward of $1.50 for their involvement, while in the case of the other half there was 
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no mention of any reward at all. After two days another experimenter called study 
participants and asked them to give a 25-minute interview concerning the house-
hold products they used. The experimental design also included a control group 
whose cohort was asked straight away to participate in such an interview. It turned 
out that in the control group, 45% of participants agreed to carry out the request. 
Participants from the group that had given the 5-minute interview for no reward 
agreed with greater readiness (64.3%), while in the group that received an award 
for participation in the short interview only 33.3% of participants consented. Such 
results are entirely consistent with self-perception theory. The absence of external 
motivation (in this case, a reward) for fulfilling the first, relatively simple request 
induces people to think of themselves in categories such as “since I did THAT, then 
I am THAT KIND of person”. However, monetary compensation for doing so 
leads to explaining one’s own behaviour as “I did it because they paid me”. This 
type of thinking, in turn, prevents the occurrence of the “since I did THAT, then 
I am THAT KIND of person” line of reasoning, and the individual is not inclined 
to do similar things in the future in the absence of some benefit. The link between 
offering a reward for fulfilling an initial request and decreased effectiveness of the 
foot-in-the-door technique is also confirmed by the results of various meta-analyses 
(e.g. Burger, 1999; Dillard et al., 1984).
It may be assumed that self-perception also does not appear in conditions 
involving the presence of an explanation other than non-monetary reward, which 
unequivocally explains the individual’s compliance with the initial request. Taking 
this assumption as his starting point, Seymour Uranowitz (1975) asked women 
shopping in supermarkets to guard his shopping bag for a few minutes. He 
explained to a few of the participants that he needed to find a lost one-dollar bill, 
while he told others that he had lost his wallet and needed to look for it. After a 
few minutes he returned, declaring that he had found what had gone missing, and 
thanked the women for his help. After he walked away, a situation was staged in 
which the participant became a witness to a parcel falling out of the bag of another 
experimenter. It turned out that for the condition in which a weak justification for 
guarding the bag belonging to the man who went to look for something was 
offered (i.e. when he went to look for a one-dollar bill), as many as 80% of par-
ticipants informed the second experimenter that something had fallen out of his 
bag. However, when the justification for fulfilling the initial request was an obvious 
one (i.e. when the man went in search of a wallet), this number dropped to 45%. 
In the control conditions, when the reactions of women who had not been asked 
to guard the bag were tested, 35% of them informed the experimenter that some-
thing had fallen out of his bag. Thus, the patterns of results from other experiments 
involving conditions modifying the effectiveness of the foot-in-the-door tech-
nique also coincided with the assumptions underlying self-perception (e.g. DeJong 
& Musilli, 1982; Dolinski, 2012; Gamian-Wilk & Dolinski, 2015; Wagener & Laird, 
1980). Self-perception as the mechanism underlying the effectiveness of the 
foot-in-the-door technique would also seem to be indicated by the results of a 
meta-analysis conducted by William DeJong (1979). 
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However, not all of the empirical data gathered over the years by psychologists 
from around the world provides verification that this particular mechanism under-
lies the effectiveness of the technique being reviewed here. Beaman et al. (1983), 
undertaking a meta-analysis of an even greater number of studies than did DeJong, 
claim that the conclusions of those studies are not as definitive as initially thought. 
At the same time, the psychological literature is seeing an increasing number of 
theoretical interpretations differing from self-perception intended to explain why 
fulfilling a simple request makes an individual more likely to then carry out a more 
serious later request. We shall review them one by one, starting with the model 
proposed by Robert Rittle (1981), who draws attention to the possibility that after 
fulfilling an easier initial request, an individual perhaps does not begin to perceive 
himself in any particular associated categories (e.g. I am a person who helps others, 
I am a person who fulfils the requests of others), but rather his attitude to the idea 
itself of helping other people is what changes. Helping other people is nearly 
always associated with some cost, and to a certain degree with risk. Indeed, it could 
turn out that someone doesn’t wish us to intervene and exhibits disapproval or 
even aggression. It may also occur that a social milieu demonstrates some sort of 
hostility towards an individual trying to help. Rittle thus suggests that fulfilling the 
easier request is linked with positive emotional experiences. The person who has 
been given help is generally nice, usually smiles and says thank you. This leads to a 
change in the attitude of the individual towards the very act of providing assistance. 
He then begins to perceive altruistic activities as a general human obligation, and 
it also seems relatively unlikely to him that something bad would happen to an 
individual offering help.
In one of his experiments Rittle received a certain confirmation of his ideas. 
Participants were invited to a psychological laboratory. In the waiting room of the 
laboratory, some of them encountered a helpless child struggling with a vending 
machine offering sweets and beverages. In the large majority of cases the partici-
pants spontaneously made an effort to help the child. (The few times they did not 
do so, the child asked them directly for help. Nobody refused). Next, they 
proceeded to the laboratory, where they were first asked to fill in a questionnaire. 
It measured, among other things, their convictions regarding their own altruistic 
tendencies and attitudes concerning helping others. It turned out that the differ-
ence in their assessments of own levels of altruism between the experimental group 
(helping the child) and the control group (not encountering the child) was not 
great, and even statistically insignificant. Participants from the experimental group, 
however, were demonstrably less convinced than those from the control group that 
an individual helping a stranger could experience problems. 
Rittle goes on to suggest that this pattern of results contradicts the theory of 
self-perception, and rather confirms his proposed interpretation. Many researchers 
dispute this conclusion. The primary charge is that Rittle’s experiment does not 
match the situation assumed in the foot-in-the-door procedure. In his experi-
ments, most people spontaneously provide help to a child, while foot-in-the-door 
(at least in its classic form) requires the individual to be asked to fulfil some initial 
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request. Also important is that self-perception can concern not only one’s own 
altruism, but also many other things – such as one’s own submissiveness, support 
for “good causes” or engagement in “good deeds”. 
Particularly sceptical of the conclusion arrived at by Rittle are Nancy Eisenberg, 
Robert Cialdini, Heather McCreath and Rita Shell (1987). These authors relied on 
earlier psychological studies demonstrating that children under the age of 7 do not 
possess sufficient cognitive resources to draw inferences from their own behaviours, 
and then use them as the foundation for formulating predictions as to their own 
reactions. For example, they are not capable of such thoughts as “since I helped 
someone before, I will also probably help someone in the future if I’m in a similar 
situation”. It is this absence of such cognitive capacities that leads to children 
behaving inconsistently in successive similar situations. 
Eisenberg and her collaborators therefore assumed that if the foot-in-the-door 
technique is based on the mechanism of self-perception and the need to exhibit 
consistency in behaviour, then it should not be effective on children under 7 years 
of age. The experimenters invited people from three age groups to participate in 
their experiments: the first group was composed of 5- and 6-year-old children, the 
second of 7- and 8-year-olds, and the third of 10- and 11-year olds. In each of the 
groups, studies were conducted in control conditions (directly addressing the target 
request to the children) and in experimental conditions (first lodging a small initial 
request). In the experimental conditions, children were given six coupons that they 
could exchange for toys, and were then asked if they would give back one of them 
to benefit poor children who had no toys at all. One or two days later the children 
were given a choice – they could either play with fun toys or they could engage 
in the much less enjoyable activity of sorting pieces of coloured paper into four 
single-colour stacks for sick children in hospital. The control conditions involved 
only the second situation: a choice between playing and sorting the coloured paper. 
The youngest children displayed no difference between the control and experi-
mental conditions. In both cases, they were uniform in rarely agreeing to sort the 
paper. A difference approaching statistical significance did appear with the 7- and 
8-year-old cohort, and a clear, statistically significant difference came out in the 
case of the 10- and 11-year-old children. While this effect is entirely in line with 
the authors’ expectations, I do not agree that it is proof of the inaccuracy of Rittle’s 
suggestion. Indeed, doubts arise whether children 7 years and younger are capable 
of changing their attitudes and convictions concerning assisting others under the 
influence of some incidental experience. If this is not the case, then it could be argued 
that the results attained by Eisenberg et al. (1987) are consistent with the interpretation 
offered by Rittle.
The aforementioned studies were aimed at indirectly testing theories that 
state the self-perception mechanism is what underlies the effectiveness of the 
foot-in-the-door technique. We should, however, observe that this can also be tested 
directly, by measuring changes in what participants believe about themselves (they 
should transform following the fulfilment of a simple request), and then examine 
whether a change in beliefs is accompanied by an increased propensity to carry out 
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a subsequent request. Taking this very assumption as his point of departure, James 
Dillard (1990) asked study participants for help in addressing envelopes to be used 
in correspondence for an organization engaged in environmental protection 
efforts. After a certain time – a period of 1 to 3 weeks – another experimenter 
asked a number of the same participants to complete a specially constructed scale 
regarding their attitudes towards environmental protection. Other participants were 
asked to do something difficult. The request involved sacrificing several hours on 
the construction of a hiking trail. A control group of participants to whom no 
initial request was addressed was also asked to either fill in the scale or to join in 
the construction of the hiking trail. It turned out that those who had previously 
agreed to help with the envelopes displayed a more positive attitude towards the 
need to protect the environment than participants from the control group. In addi-
tion, agreement to work on the construction of a hiking trail was more frequent 
among those who had been subjected to the foot-in-the-door procedure than 
among those to whom the request had been addressed directly. Such results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that assumes the foundation of the effectiveness of 
the foot-in-the-door technique is the act of self-perception. Dillard’s studies do, 
however, display a certain weakness. Asking different groups of people to fill in an 
attitude scale and to carry out a serious request does not facilitate an investigation 
of the causal links between an attitude transformed as a result of fulfilling an initial 
request and later compliance with the real request. To put it more simply, in this 
case we have no evidence that the individuals whose attitudes undergo change are 
then inclined to fulfil a subsequent request. 
Donald Gorassini and James Olson (1995), operating differently than Dillard, 
decided to measure self-assessment and inclination to fulfil a subsequent request in 
the same group of individuals. They observed that if the self-perception interpreta-
tion is correct, then individuals who carry out the easier initial request should 
begin to perceive themselves differently than those from the control group, and 
those differences should be reflected in later varying levels of compliance of par-
ticipants from both groups towards a serious request. Carrying out a series of 
experiments, Gorassini and Olson (1995) first asked participants to help them for 
5–10 minutes in preparing a psychological experiment, and then to complete a 
specially designed survey. This survey measured such items as self-assessment of 
participants’ tendency towards altruistic behaviour. The same survey was also filled 
in by members of the control group. After that, the target request was addressed to 
all of the participants, in accordance with which they were asked for their consent 
to participate in a time-consuming psychological experiment. The results turned 
out to be quite problematic for the theory that the foundation of the technique 
under analysis here is self-perception. While there was a difference between the 
experimental and control groups in respect of self-assessment of tendencies towards 
altruism and a greater propensity of compliance with the target request in the 
experimental group than the control group, those phenomena affected different 
people. In other words, those who had begun to view themselves as altruists after 
fulfilling the initial request were not subsequently more likely to accede to another 
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request than were participants from the control group. However, those who did not 
begin to perceive themselves as altruists after fulfilling the first request were 
inclined to sacrifice their time to participate in a psychological experiment. 
Gorassini and Olson conclude that three primary elements must be taken into 
account when considering the mechanisms underlying the effectiveness of the 
foot-in-the-door technique. First, compliance with the initial request must activate 
an attitude already held by the individual that will correspond most closely with 
the content of the next request. Second, the target request must be formulated in 
a manner that the entity acceding to it behaves in a manner consistent with the 
aforementioned attitude. Third, when fulfilling the initial request, the individual 
should be in a position to see the association between that attitude and his own 
reactions, which will make it clear to him that rejection of a subsequent request 
would be inconsistent with his accepted values. This interpretation is somewhat 
similar to that offered a while back by Mary Harris (1972), which holds that fulfil-
ment of the first request leads to an enhanced feeling of social responsibility. The 
norm demanding that people help each other and extend a hand to those in need 
of aid comes into sharper focus, and by the same token exerts a greater influence 
on future behaviour.
A different view of the mechanism underlying the foot-in-the-door technique 
is taken by William Crano and John Sivacek (1982). They assume that the fulfil-
ment of an initial request may be associated with the receipt of rewards with a 
social dimension. An example of such a reward is an expression of gratitude from 
an individual receiving help, or a pleasant smile. These types of occurrences boost 
the likelihood that individuals will behave in a similar manner in the future. The 
authors’ interpretation seems interesting and suggestive. I would also add that one 
particular reward could be the simple fact of satisfaction experienced by the person 
who has helped another. 
Yet another theory is advanced by James Cantrill and David Seibold (1986). 
They state that when an individual makes the decision to comply or not to comply 
with a request, that the difficulty of the request is evaluated in relation to the 
amount of the effort that would need to be made, the amount of time to be 
sacrificed, or the amount of money to be spent. All of these estimates, while rather 
objectified, do not generally provide a definite answer to the question about 
whether the request is an easy one to fulfil or not. For example, is it a simple mat-
ter to watch someone’s bag for 5 minutes, or a difficult one? At times it is definitely 
easy, while at others hard. What determines our judgement in these matters? In 
Cantrill and Seibold’s opinion, people subjected to the effects of the foot-in-the-door 
technique estimate the difficulty of the target request based on information about 
the difficulty of a request that is at least somewhat similar in nature and which they 
have fulfilled in the recent past (that is, the initial request in the sequence). Because 
there was no great expense in performing the first request, there are grounds to 
assume that the second one will not prove problematic. The so-called assimilation 
effect is at work, manifesting itself in overestimation of the similarity of difficulty 
levels exhibited by the two requests. Those from the control group are deprived of 
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this point of reference, which can lead to difficulties in estimating the difficulty 
involved in requests directed to them, in turn making refusal to fulfil them seem a 
rational step.
While the authors’ idea is quite interesting, it does have some weak points. 
First and foremost, it seems unlikely that, assuming a relatively long period of 
time between two requests (initial and main) and their formulation by different 
individuals, an individual would spontaneously recall information concerning 
the difficulty involved in fulfilling the first request and compare it with infor-
mation about the task at hand. In addition, according to the proposal of Cantrill 
and Seibold, the individual’s contact with the first request rather than consent 
to its fulfilment is the key issue. Merely the appearance of the initial request 
provides a convenient frame of reference for estimating the difficulty of the next 
one. If this is the case, we could expect that the consent of the individual to 
fulfil the initial request is not a necessary condition for the effectiveness of the 
foot-in-the-door technique. However, research results indicate that individuals 
who refuse to fulfil the initial request nearly always refuse to go along with a 
subsequent one. Existing research results also fail to confirm the key assumption 
in this model of a linear association between the difficulty of the first request 
and the effectiveness of foot-in-the-door (see e.g. Beaman et al., 1983; DeJong, 
1979). Finally, the authors themselves failed to empirically demonstrate the 
accuracy of their model. 
It would thus seem that, in spite of a wealth of theoretical approaches, the 
first one remains the best – that offered by Freedman and Fraser (1966) assuming 
the occurrence of an act of self-perception following the fulfilment of the initial 
request. That said, there remains a fundamental problem associated with this 
particular interpretation. In most of the studies recording the foot-in-the-door 
effect, the pause between the issuing of the first and the second request lasted 
several days (Beaman et al., 1983; Dillard et al., 1984; Fern et al., 1986). Let us 
recall that in Freedman and Fraser’s original study (1966, exp. 2) this period 
lasted as long as 2 weeks. It would seem that in explaining their research results 
with the mechanism of self-perception, the authors accept the unspoken 
assumption that an individual fulfils the initial request, comes to the conclusion 
that she is an altruist, and then hears no other requests for favours over the 
following several days. Suddenly, a serious request is issued by the experimenter, 
and the individual agrees to it. This line of reasoning would assume that a given 
participant is shoved into a freezer after performing the first request, then is 
taken out a split second before the experimenter decides to state the second 
(final) request. In the real world, there is no such freezer. Participants live their 
normal lives, hearing dozens of requests every day from different people. They 
agree to some of them, while to others they do not (Dolinski, 2009). So why 
should the reaction to the initial request from an experimenter be more impor-
tant than favours later asked for by other people? Let us imagine that someone 
agrees in the morning to a request from an experimenter to fill in a short survey, 
but in the afternoon ignores the plea of an Internet user asking for the completion 
Sequential techniques of social influence  21
of a survey that is to serve as the basis for a master’s thesis. Why should a reaction 
to the request of the experimenter induce self-perception and lead the indi-
vidual to the conclusion “I am altruistic”, but the reaction to the Internet user’s 
request would not lead to the thought that “I am not altruistic”? Additionally, 
if study participants engaged in self-perception after every request, whether 
fulfilled or not, their perception of themselves in respect of altruism or submis-
siveness would be ridiculously unstable. Every instance of agreement should 
boost one’s conviction as to one’s own altruism or submissiveness, while every 
refusal should lead to a drop in the strength of those beliefs. Meanwhile, studies 
indicate that people exhibit rather stable beliefs about themselves (Campbell, 
1990; Goldman, 2006). 
In this context it is worth remarking that this criticism does not apply to an 
interpretation very similar to that based on self-perception while remaining 
distinct. Specifically, I am referring to Robert Cialdini (2001), who invokes the 
human need for consistency. In this case, an individual considering whether to 
fulfil a difficult request may take into consideration past behaviours in similar situ-
ations. If he acceded, he should now behave consistently. This interpretation has 
found confirmation in experiments concerning personality indicators and suscep-
tibility to the application of the foot-in-the-door technique, in which participants 
first completed a specially designed preference for consistency scale (PFC) measur-
ing the individualized need for consistent behaviour in situations occurring 
sequentially (Cialdini, Trost & Newsom, 1995). Next, some participants were 
asked to agree to an easy request. They were asked by telephone if they would be 
willing to spend 60 seconds answering three questions about TV programmes. 
After receiving the consent of the participant, the three questions were posed, and 
then the target request was issued. It concerned agreeing to fill in a special ques-
tionnaire comprising 50 items. Participants in the control group were asked 
immediately to respond to the experimenter’s questions. It turned out that the 
foot-in-the-door effect was only noted among participants who had received high 
scores on the PFC scale. Among those characterized by a reduced need for consist-
ency, this effect was not observed. Such participants from the experimental group 
also expressed their consent to complete the questionnaire with the same infre-
quency as those from the control group (see Table 2.2).
In respect of my rather strong criticism of the assumption that the mechanism 
underlying the effectiveness of the foot-in-the-door technique is self-perception, 
TABLE 2.2  Percentage of compliance with the large request in Cialdini et al. (1995) 
experiment







Source: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1995, vol. 69, p. 323 
Copyright 1995 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 
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I hasten to add that my reservations concern only the classic dependency as 
expressed in the literature, meaning the sequence of “fulfilment of the first 
request – act of self-perception – appearance of the second request”. However, it 
could be assumed that this mechanism is slightly different. It would seem to me 
that we could assume with a great degree of probability that the performance of 
easy, relatively frequent requests is generally automatic. When asked for directions 
to the train station, we stop and point in the right direction; asked for the time, we 
pull out our phone and provide an answer. It is taken as self-evident that we will 
fulfil such requests, and they do not lead to questions such as “Why did I behave 
in that manner?” Why, indeed, should I stop and think about the reasons I agreed 
to answer some questions over the phone, or what caused me to complete a ques-
tionnaire when asked to do so by some psychologist doing a study? (I’ve already 
done it, why wouldn’t I?). However, if a similar but more difficult second request 
is made, I neither accede to it nor reject it out of hand. Now I begin to think about 
whether I should fulfil it. While analyzing the problem, I can recall that not long 
ago I agreed to carry out what was indeed an easier but still similar request. If I 
also recall the circumstances surrounding that event without observing external 
factors that would lead me to carry out the request (nobody forced me, nobody 
paid me, etc.), then I might come to the conclusion that I am “the kind of person 
who does those things”. So, while the act of self-perception in the classic model of 
foot-in-the-door occurs after the initial request is fulfilled, in the theoretical 
proposition made above, it only occurs at the moment a clearly more difficult 
request is made (Dolinski, 2009).
Four walls and repeating “yes” 
Door-to-door salesmen around the world apply a technique of some similarity to 
do foot-in-the-door. Frequently, before they try to sell their potential customer 
something, they ask a few questions. Such questions are designed to ensure that the 
vast majority of people answer them in a predictable manner. Immediately after, 
the salesman pitches them some product or service. Refusal to take the salesman 
up on his offer would contradict the answers given to those questions. We can 
imagine that a salesman would ask us something like “Is it worth living a healthy 
lifestyle?”, “Does the body need vitamins?”, “Isn’t it worth feeling confident that 
our body has enough of the nutrients it needs to function properly?”, and then 
after the third “yes” he offers us “an amazing multivitamin supplement with added 
zinc and magnesium”. Robert Cialdini and Brad Sagarin (2005), who were likely 
the first to describe this type of sales strategy in scholarly literature, named it the 
“four walls technique”. A team of French researchers interested in social influence 
decided to examine the effectiveness of such strategies empirically (Gueguen, Joule, 
Courbet, Halimi-Falkowicz & Marchand, 2013). 
A young woman approached men walking alone on the pavement who, una-
ware of the fact, became participants in the study. In the control conditions the 
participant was invited to participate in a survey study for which they would need 
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to answer 45 questions on people’s food habits. The questions were to be answered 
at home, and apart from the survey participants also received a stamped addressed 
envelope for returning the completed survey to the researcher. In the experimen-
tal conditions, before asking the participant to take the survey home, complete it 
and post it back, he was asked if he would agree to answer eight simple “yes or no” 
questions about odd jobs in the home (the participant thus likely expected that the 
interaction would not take long). In half of the cases the questions were designed 
in order to ensure that nearly every one would be answered in the affirmative (e.g. 
“Have you ever assembled a storage unit?”), while in the other cases they were 
crafted in order to generate a series of negative responses (e.g. “Have you ever 
installed a solar water-heater?”). After answering the eight questions, the men were 
asked to participate in a survey study, thus making the same request as the men in 
the control conditions. 
It turned out that 30% of participants from the control group agreed to partici-
pate in the time-consuming survey; in conditions where participants first carried 
out an initial request and responded “no” several times this number jumped to 60%, 
while when they answered “yes” eight times, over 83% of men agreed to the subse-
quent request. The differences between each of the three conditions were statistically 
significant. The experiment’s authors concluded that a scenario involving the initial 
fulfilment of an easy request and negative answers to eight simple questions followed 
by participation in a time-consuming survey study could be considered a demon-
stration of the effectiveness of the “foot-in-the-door” technique, which you, dear 
Reader, read about in the previous section of this book. However, the greater 
readiness to fulfil the final request in conditions where the participant had first given 
several “yes” responses, compared to circumstances in which he said “no”, was an 
illustration of the four walls technique’s effectiveness. While the technique itself 
seems interesting, and the experiment described here would attest to its efficacy, 
some doubts do arise (as they usually do at the outset of investigations into a par-
ticular psychological phenomenon). Let us try to present them here. 
First, we have no idea why the authors presented only the percentages of indi-
viduals who agreed to complete a long survey concerning food habits in their 
homes. If the participants were directly handed such questionnaires, together with 
stamped envelopes, it was also possible to easily determine what percentage of 
people in particular groups actually did fulfil the request to participate in the time-
consuming survey. Second, while it is true that the proportion of individuals in the 
group that responded in the negative and then fulfilled the target request was 
greater than in the control group, the actual consequences of multiple repetitions 
of the word “no” remain unclear. Unfortunately the experimental design did not 
contain a group in which the questions would require a different response than 
“yes” or “no”. It is easy to imagine a question like “How often do you eat fruit?”, 
“What time do you usually go to sleep?” or “Do you prefer to wear a sweater or 
a blazer?” If it turned out that in those conditions there was also an increase in the 
tendency to fulfil a subsequent, more difficult request compared to the control 
group, it would be worth engaging in more in-depth analysis. Differences in 
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compliance among participants in three experimental groups could be examined: 
in a group that used the word “yes” several times in a row, in a group that said “no” 
with equal frequency”, and in a group that fulfilled the initial request and agreed 
to answer a few questions but without answering “yes” or “no”. This would help 
us establish whether multiple uses of the word “no” reduces the effectiveness of a 
classic social influence technique (foot-in-the-door) or whether it is of no signifi-
cance from that perspective. 
However, the most important issue remains that of the psychological mecha-
nism underlying the technique being discussed here. Let us observe that if we 
return to the practices of clever door-to-door salesmen, we can imagine an effec-
tive marketer who first leads his interlocutor to answer “no” to some questions, but 
then inclines him to purchase a given product. We can imagine such questions as 
“Is it worth needlessly risking your health?”, “Should you ignore symptoms of the 
common cold?” or “Would you like to gain 10 pounds over the next 2 years?”, and 
after hearing the answer “no”, the salesman then offers a supplement designed to 
protect people from these problems. What would seem to be the key element in 
the behaviour of door-to-door salesmen is not so much getting their interlocutor 
to say “yes”, but rather to guide them into the trap of commitment and consistency. 
Indeed, the interlocutor should behave consistently with his or her previous verbal 
declaration. However, it should not matter whether an answer of “yes” was given 
to a question about whether we should take care of our health, or “no” to a ques-
tion about whether it is worth thoughtlessly endangering our health. In both cases, 
the proper course of action is to purchase the vitamin supplement. The situation 
created by Gueguen, Joule, Courbert and their collaborators (2013) in their exper-
iment is entirely different. There is no association between the content of the 
introductory questions (concerning e.g. a storage unit or solar water-heater) and 
the request to complete a long questionnaire at home about food habits. The com-
mitment and consistency trap here concerns the very fact of consenting to 
participate in a time-consuming survey study after previously participating in a 
short survey study. It is thus limited to the foot-in-the-door effect. This mechanism 
does not, however, explain why people who have repeated the word “yes” several 
times in a row are particularly inclined to fulfil a subsequent and more difficult 
request. We are therefore dealing with a slightly different technique than four walls. 
How can we explain the effectiveness of a strategy designed to induce another 
person to repeatedly respond “yes”? 
The results noted in the experiment by Gueguen, Joule, Courbert et al. (2013) 
can be explained by reference to the mechanism of activation of selected mental 
representations and patterns of action (Higgins, 1996). Multiple repetitions of the 
word “yes” lead to an increased likelihood that the response to successive questions 
or another request or proposal will be the same. It should be observed, however, 
that accepting this interpretation leads to the conclusion that the effectiveness of 
this technique, aimed at inducing an individual to repeat the answer “yes” multiple 
times, should be limited to situations in which the target request appears immedi-
ately afterwards. The technique should then be unsuccessful in conditions when 
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the target request surfaces after a certain time (e.g. on the next day). Separate 
empirical studies would be needed to determine whether this really is the case.
While researchers are just beginning to explore the “four walls” and “repeating 
yes” techniques, the next sequential technique of social influence to be presented 
here has already been the subject of empirical study.
Door-in-the-face
A group of social psychologists researching social influence techniques – Richard 
Miller, Clive Seligman, Nathan Clark and Malcolm Bush (1976) – presented read-
ers of one of their articles with a story from the popular comic strip “Blondie”. 
Because this story is an excellent illustration of the essence of the door-in-the-face 
technique, I will repeat it here. The action begins with Blondie returning home. 
The situation differs from the everyday in that she comes back in a new hat, new 
shoes and new dress. She asks her husband Dagwood if he likes what he sees. His 
response is to ask how much they cost. After hearing the answer, he becomes 
enraged and demands that Blondie return the new items. The woman begins 
crying and asks him to let her at least keep the hat, which she is particularly fond 
of. Dagwood magnanimously agrees, but emphasizes that he doesn’t want to hear 
of any other purchases. The story concludes with a scene in which Blondie con-
gratulates herself on getting her husband to agree to her buying an expensive hat, 
and Dagwood is pleased that he managed to recover the majority of the money 
spent by his beloved but spendthrift wife.
The door-in-the-face technique is based on the assumption that if we want to 
induce an individual to fulfil a rather difficult request, we should begin by presenting 
an even more difficult one. This request will almost certainly be rejected by its 
addressee. However, the chances grow that he will agree to fulfil a request easier than 
the one which he has just refused. The first psychological experiments addressing this 
technique were conducted by Robert Cialdini and a group of his collaborators 
(Cialdini et al., 1975). In one of them, the experimenter introduced himself as an 
employee of an institution that assisted juvenile offenders, and asked the study par-
ticipant to lend a hand. The control group’s participants were asked to go on a 
two-hour trip to the zoo with a group of young people who had experienced 
trouble with the law. Just under 17% of participants agreed to do this. In the experi-
mental group, the first request was a very difficult one: to assume the role of a 
counsellor and advisor for juvenile offenders. This would require 2 hours a week of 
involvement over a period of 2 years. Participants refused to carry out this request. 
However, when a one-off form of activity was then proposed (taking juvenile 
offenders to the zoo), 50% of participants gave their consent. The experimental 
design also contained a group that was asked to engage in the process of resocializing 
underage offenders; participants were given the choice of two forms of involvement: 
2 years of regular consultations or taking a group of “difficult youngsters” to the zoo. 
In this case as well, the first alternative was universally rejected, while one in four 
participants agreed to act as a chaperone at the zoo (see: Table 2.3). 
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In considering the mechanism that underlies the effectiveness of the 
door-in-the-face technique the authors take into consideration the contrast 
effect and the norm of mutual reciprocity. The contrast effect (Kenrick & 
Gutierres, 1980) can be illustrated by something experienced by one of my col-
leagues. He owned an apartment that he wanted to sell. I wouldn’t say it was 
particularly attractive. It was located on the top floor of an old, tall tenement 
house without an elevator. The layout of the apartment was also not the nicest. 
Hallways took up more space than the rooms did. However, the owner of a real 
estate agency assured my colleague that he was sitting on a treasure worth a 
fortune. He appraised the property at a very high price, and guaranteed that he 
should be able to sell it quickly. My colleague was delighted, and he expected 
to quickly come into a tidy sum of money. Soon thereafter, crowds of people 
came to see the apartment. They looked around, shook their heads and walked 
away. However – in the agent’s opinion – there was no reason to worry. “If they 
don’t buy it, someone else will,” was what he said to steady the nerves of my 
colleague. But nobody came to buy the apartment. By chance, the owner of the 
unfortunate apartment ran into a woman who had come to see the apartment 
the previous day. “The thing is . . . you wanted so much money for such a little 
cage. Right after we left, the agent took me to a bigger, cheaper apartment in a 
good neighbourhood. I liked it so much that I bought it on the spot.” As my 
colleague belatedly came to understand, the agent was only using his apartment 
to evoke the contrast effect. After a potential client had looked over his apart-
ment, viewing one whose price seemed to be realistically calculated made an 
excellent impression on him.
Continuing our exploration of topics related to social influence, it is worth 
mentioning studies by Sotohiro Kojima (1994). This psychologist asked people 
about their subjective feelings associated with the acquisition of various consumer 
goods. Participants spoke of the joy they felt when purchasing new furniture or 
photographic equipment, but they also emphasized the discomfort associated with 
the necessity of paying for those products. Kojima observed that this discomfort 
was reduced among those who had recently purchased homes compared to those 
who had not. Considering that the groups were no different in terms of financial 
status, it could be supposed that the aforementioned contrast effect was at play. 
When people have recently spent a lot of money on something, then another 









Source: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, vol. 69, p. 209. 
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object that costs a fraction of that sum feels inexpensive to them. However, without 
this frame of reference the same item seems expensive. Kojima generated similar 
results in other studies. For example, he demonstrated that sales staff in electronics 
stores were very adept at convincing customers to pick up some little gadget in the 
course of a high-value transaction.
In respect of the experiment by Cialdini et al., (1975) under discussion here, the 
contrast effect consists in the request to take difficult youngsters on a trip to the 
zoo seeming easy (or even very easy) when compared to the extremely difficult 
request to become a mentor to underage offenders. We should also observe that 
the contrast effect is present in the third group, which was presented with the 
choice between the two aforementioned activities, and the proportion of people 
who decided to take the youngsters to the zoo was in this case half that of the 
group in which the sequence of extremely difficult – relatively easy request was 
applied. Thus, while the contrast effect may play a certain role, Cialdini et al. per-
ceive the primary psychological mechanism underlying the effectiveness of the 
door-in-the-face technique in the norm of mutual reciprocity.
This norm is a particular version of the broader and more general rule of reci-
procity. According to this rule, individuals are obliged to compensate others for 
goods received from them (Uehara, 1995). This is a principle that organizes the 
lives of individuals, social groups and entire societies. It facilitates the establishment 
of social bonds, trust and lasting coalitions. Alvin Gouldner (1960) even feels that 
the norm of reciprocity is the “starting mechanism” of societies, without which the 
establishment of any lasting group life would be impossible.
In the case of the door-in-the-face technique the norm of mutual reciprocity 
is materialized when someone makes a difficult request, is refused, and then reduces 
his expectations towards the partner in the interaction, making a particular type of 
concession. The partner in the interaction is now obliged under the principle of 
symmetrical reciprocity to make a concession himself, which may come in the 
form of fulfilling the second, easier request addressed to him.
Support for an interpretation involving the norm of reciprocity can be found 
in results that indicate the door-in-the-face technique loses its effectiveness when 
the second, easier request is formulated by a different individual than the one who 
submitted the first, extremely difficult one (see e.g. Dillard et al., 1984; Feeley, 
Anker & Aloe, 2012). In essence, we cannot speak in this case of perceiving a con-
cession from the partner in the interaction, and what follows is that the norm of 
mutual concessions is absent. By the same token, there is no motivation to accede 
to a subsequent request. However, the assumption that the norm of mutual reci-
procity is at the heart of the effectiveness of the technique being analyzed here is 
not consistent with results indicating that such effectiveness is associated with the 
length of time separating the lodging of the two requests. Arnie Cann, Steven 
Sherman and Roy Elkes (1975) called up study participants, introduced themselves 
as employees of an organization promoting road traffic safety, and asked their inter-
locutor to join in a campaign being planned by their organization. The request 
involved standing for 2 hours on the pavement and counting the cars passing by 
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on the street. The overwhelming majority of people refused to agree to this 
obviously excessive request. A second request was then issued. The participant was 
asked to distribute among friends and acquaintances 15 brochures that the road 
traffic safety organization would send via post. Depending on the experimental 
conditions, this request was formulated either immediately after the participant 
gave notice of refusal to stand and count cars, or during a follow-up phone call 
made after 7–10 days had elapsed. In the control group, who were asked immediately 
for their consent to receive the brochures and distribute them to their friends, 62% 
of participants agreed. In the group to which the aforementioned request was made 
immediately following refusal to carry out the very difficult request, this number 
was much higher and amounted to nearly 90%. However, in the group which 
experienced a delay between the two requests, the percentage of those agreeing to 
the easier one was even lower (albeit statistically insignificantly) than in the control 
conditions: half of the participants agreed to hand out the brochure. 
Results from meta-analyses paint a similar picture. Dillard et al., (1984) demon-
strated that the longer the break between the two requests, the less effective the 
technique becomes. Thomas Feeley, Ashley Anker and Ariel Aloe (2012) deter-
mined that in experiments during which the final request appeared more than one 
day after the rejection by the participant of the initial request, compliance rates did 
not exceed those in the control conditions.
Meanwhile, in real-life situations people adhere to the reciprocity principle 
even after a very long time has passed. We send Christmas cards to those who sent 
them to us last year, we loan money to friends who loaned us a large sum of cash 
ten years ago, etc. Why, then, does the door-in-the-face technique stop being 
effective on the very next day? There is yet another result that proves troublesome 
for the assumption that the effectiveness of this technique is grounded in the 
norm of reciprocity. Indeed, it may be assumed that the intensity of the obligation 
felt by an individual to fulfil an easier request should correlate with the extent of 
the concession made by the individual who first made a difficult request, followed 
by the easier one. However, it turns out that the extent of the concession is not 
associated with the effectiveness of the technique (Fern et al., 1986; O’Keefe & 
Hale, 1998). 
Daniel O’Keefe and Marianne Figge (1997) hold that the interpretation set 
forth by Cialdini et al. is fundamentally incorrect, and propose their own alternative. 
They state that the mechanism explaining the effectiveness of the door-in-the-face 
technique is the feeling of guilt. Refusing the first request leads to this feeling, 
because the individual knows that while it would be difficult to do, it is socially 
desirable. Acceding to the easier request helps to minimize the unpleasant feeling 
of guilt. Taking this perspective, it becomes clear why the technique is less effective 
when requests are made by people representing commercial interests as opposed 
to conditions in which they are advanced by charitable organizations (Dillard 
et al., 1984; Fern et al., 1986). Refusing to purchase a vacuum cleaner does not lead 
to a feeling of guilt, and thus there is no subsequent agreement to buy a less 
expensive hair dryer. The extent of the concession also plays no role here, for it is 
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correlated neither with the intensity of the feeling of guilt nor the potential to 
successfully reduce it.
In turn, results attesting to a negative correlation between the extent of the delay 
separating the two requests and the efficacy of the door-in-the-face technique, 
problematic for an interpretation grounded in the principle of reciprocity, become 
relatively easy to explain from the perspective of the feeling of guilt. The emotion 
dies down over time, thus rendering the technique increasingly less effective. 
The authors also draw attention to two limitations on the effectiveness of the 
door-in-the-face technique that result from their model. This technique should 
prove unsuccessful in conditions in which refusal to fulfil the first request does not 
evoke a feeling of guilt, as well as when the fulfilment of a subsequent request can-
not serve to reduce the feeling of guilt. O’Keefe and Figge have not conducted 
studies to confirm the accuracy of these assumptions (or at least they have not 
published them), but they have tried to demonstrate, through a review of the sub-
ject literature, that the results of studies conducted in the past are more consistent 
with their interpretation than with the one advanced by Cialdini and his collabo-
rators. Indirect support for their ideas is also provided by the research of Lohyd 
Terrier and Robert Joule (2008). They demonstrated that if the individual making 
the requests clearly demonstrated an understanding of the fact that the other per-
son would refuse to agree to the first of them, saying something like “Of course, I 
quite understand that you may not be able to accept”, the technique is less effective 
than in conditions when that statement is not made. It could be thought that such 
an expression of understanding leads to a reduction in the intensity of the guilt felt 
by the addressee of the request, and thus that person experiences reduced motiva-
tion to actively deal with the guilt by acceding to the subsequent, easier request. 
O’Keefe and Figge (1997) do not, however, stop to consider an effect that is not 
consistent with their own proposal. Studies on the door-in-the-face mechanism 
primarily feature situations involving a brief interaction with a stranger. The feeling 
of guilt in these situations could be limited not only by doing something positive 
for him, but also by fulfilling a similar request made by another person. Meanwhile, 
as the results of meta-analyses demonstrate definitively (Feeley et al., 2012), the 
technique ceases to be effective.
The norm of mutual concessions and the appearance of negative emotions 
stemming from a feeling of guilt are not the only potential sources of the effective-
ness of the door-in-the-face technique. Mark Pendleton and Daniel Batson (1979) 
draw attention to the role potentially played by mechanisms associated with self-
presentation. Rejection of the initial request may lead an individual to feel 
concerned that this will be taken badly by his partner in the interaction, as well as 
by any potential witnesses. This concern induces compliance with the subsequent 
easier request. Such an interpretation would be linked with the expectation that 
the dimension of the initial request would be the decisive factor in the conviction 
of the request’s addressee that his interlocutor could have a poor opinion of him. 
The likelihood that an obviously difficult request will lead to such a feeling is 
smaller than the likelihood that it will appear after the rejection of a modestly 
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difficult one. Indeed, the rejection of a more difficult request is easier to understand 
and socially justifiable. Pendleton and Batson (1979) received data consistent with 
this assumption; however, Robert Reeves, Gary Baker, Jeffrey Boyd and Robert 
Cialdini (1991) did not succeed in replicating that result in their research. 
Yet another theoretical proposition is offered by Tusing and Dillard (2000). They 
assume that individuals do not worry so much about what others think of them, 
but just the opposite: they begin to focus on their own internal standards. Rejection 
of the first request leads them to begin thinking that it is socially responsible to 
help people who deserve it. Activation of this mental scheme makes it easier to 
submit to a new request. While there is not yet empirical research providing direct 
evidence of this model’s accuracy, there is some indirect support for it in the results 
of meta-analyses (Feeley et al., 2012). 
Matthew Abrahams and Robert Bell (1994) have also conducted some interest-
ing research aimed at identifying the mechanism responsible for the effectiveness 
of the technique under analysis here. In their experiments they differentiated the 
dimensions of the initial request, the level of expectation on the part of the 
addressee that there would be future interaction with the individual formulating 
the request, and also that person’s emphasis on the fact that withdrawing the initial 
request is a concession. 
Each participant was invited to a psychological laboratory. In the waiting room 
they encountered another person who was in fact a confederate of the experi-
menter. The experimenter soon arrived and informed the pair that they would 
soon be participating in a study (conditions of expected interaction), or that they 
would soon be separated (conditions of absence of expected interaction), after 
which they were then left alone while the experimenter (supposedly) went to 
prepare the laboratory equipment. The experimenter’s confederate confided to the 
participant that he was involved in a campaign to assist AIDS victims and to raise 
awareness in society of how to avoid the disease. He also said that a march of soli-
darity with those afflicted by the illness was being organized, and asked the 
participant if he would be willing to devote 30 hours (very high level of difficulty 
of the initial request) or, in other conditions, 10 hours (moderate level of difficulty 
of the initial request) to the organization. When the participant refused, the con-
federate responded either that it would be equally helpful if he agreed to sponsor 
the march and donate some money, or suggested that volunteers were needed more 
now than ever before. However, if the participant could not afford to get involved 
personally, it would at least be good if he agreed to sponsor the march. The assump-
tion was that the second case would involve an emphasis on the concession and a 
reduction of expectations towards the participant. 
The authors assumed that differentiation of the individual experimental factors 
would enable them to identify the mechanism responsible for the effectiveness of 
the door-in-the-face technique. If it turned out that the factor of emphasizing the 
concession made to the addressee was significant, this would indicate that the rule 
of reciprocity plays a role. If it was the dimensions of the initial request that turned 
out to be significant, this would be explained rather by the contrast effect. If, 
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however, the significant factor was to prove the expectation of a future interaction 
with the partner, this would point to self-presentation (an interpretation grounded 
in the feeling of guilt was not taken into consideration). 
Unfortunately, the study’s results were not definitive, but the effectiveness of the 
door-in-the-face technique was very high (66.4% compliance in experimental 
conditions compared to only 25.9% compliance in the control conditions, which 
involved the proposal to sponsor the march being issued to the participant directly). 
The recorded results were the least consistent with the contrast effect, as the 
dimensions of the initial request did not lead to differentiation in the compliance 
of participants. The other two factors, however, led to differences in the behaviour 
of participants only in specific circumstances that are beyond the scope of the ques-
tions being discussed here.
While the experiment described above, as well as other studies, have failed to 
produce unequivocal results, it is my belief that the hypothetical mechanisms dis-
cussed so far are not exclusive of one another in any way. We cannot exclude the 
possibility that they frequently combine to induce compliance, while in particular 
situations one of those mechanisms (not necessarily the same one) plays the lead 
role. It can also not be excluded that this is precisely why the door-in-the face 
technique proves effective in very different areas of social life. For example, it has 
been demonstrated that the technique can be effectively employed for conducting 
a charitable collection drive in both face-to-face situations (Reingen, 1978) and 
over the Internet (Gueguen, 2003), for convincing people to participate in opinion 
polling (Mowen & Cialdini, 1980), in seminars addressing the subject of racism 
(Rodafinos, Vucevic & Sideridis, 2005), and even for convincing people with 
greater frequency to purchase home-made cheese (Ebster & Neumayr, 2008).
From one perspective, research conducted by Magdalena Paska (2002) is par-
ticularly interesting. It explores the issue of whether this technique can prove 
effective in conditions under which requests concern behaviours that violate ethical 
norms. Paska asked drivers getting out of their cars in a supermarket car park to 
participate in a campaign for the elimination of separate parking places for disabled 
individuals. In the control conditions participants were asked to sign a petition in 
which customers were demanding that store management take action to remove 
the parking spaces. It turned out that 37.5% of people approached agreed to sign 
the petition (as an aside, it is worth musing over that alarmingly high number). 
In the experimental conditions, participants were first asked to help in gathering 
signatures. They were asked to approach drivers in the same manner as the 
researcher, asking them to place their signatures on the petition. None of those 
who were asked gave their consent. Immediately after hearing the refusal, the 
experimenter submitted an easier request – to sign the petition. Only 12.5% of 
participants agreed. It thus turns out that the “door-in-the-face” technique leads 
to a clear decline in people’s inclination to perform the unethical act they are being 
encouraged to do! Paska received similar results in a second experiment during 
which students were first (unsuccessfully) encouraged to participate in a protest 
against providing support for the homeless from public funds, and then asked to 
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sign a petition on the matter. None of the students agreed to sign the petition, yet 
in the control group – where students were simply given the petition to sign – one 
third of those approached agreed to do so. Analogical patterns of results were 
attained in both studies: opposite patterns to those in situations in which people 
were encouraged to engage in ethical or ethically-neutral behaviour. This would 
seem to demonstrate the very interesting potential for practical application of the 
door-in-the-face technique in circumstances where people display a tendency to 
exceed moral boundaries. 
Foot-in-the-face 
As we know, in the case of the foot-in-the-door technique discussed at the begin-
ning of this chapter, an easier request is first issued assuming its fulfilment will 
increase the chances that the individual will later fulfil the more difficult, target 
request. With regard to the sequential technique discussed in the preceding section 
(door-in-the-face), the procedure is reversed: first, a clearly difficult request is for-
mulated with the assumption that its rejection will make the individual more 
inclined to carry out an easier one. From a certain perspective we could say that 
an increase in the chance that a moderately difficult request will be fulfilled can be 
generated either by starting with an easier request, or with a clearly more difficult 
one. The foot-in-the-door and door-in-the-face techniques are thus symmetrical 
to one another.
The question may arise of what will happen if we apply a sequence involving 
two requests of the same level of difficulty. This question was asked by Cialdini et al. 
(1975) during research on the door-in-the-face technique. Their starting point was 
the assumption that we may not exclude the possibility of the technique relying 
not on the second request being easier than the first, but rather on the simple 
renewal of the request by its initiator. This repetition is a social signature indicating 
that the person making the request is in real need of help, and this may constitute 
the key mechanism in achieving compliance from people subjected to this tech-
nique. Thus, the experimenters created a situation in one of their experiments 
involving a sequence of two requests with analogical levels of difficulty. Participants 
were first asked to accompany a group of youngsters in danger of falling into a life 
of crime on a two-hour trip to a museum. Regardless of their agreement or lack 
thereof, they were then asked if they would be willing to go on a two-hour walk 
with the same youths to the zoo. It turned out that 8 of 24 people agreed to the 
museum trip, and 7 of that 8 agreed in turn to go to the zoo. From among the 16 
who refused to go to the museum, only 1 agreed to take the youths to the zoo. 
Thus it can be said that in general participants behaved consistently (save for two 
cases) – if they agreed to the first request, they agreed to the second, while if they 
refused the first they also refused the second. The compliance rate of 33.3% with 
the target request (to go to the zoo) was analogical to the control group, which was 
directly issued with the proposal to go to the zoo. The researchers thus received 
information leading them to believe that the concession of the one making the 
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request is key to the door-in-the-face technique. The mere repetition of the 
request (urging) is not sufficient. 
It should be kept in mind that Cialdini et al. applied a sequence of requests that 
was adequate in respect of their research objectives. They thus took care to ensure 
that the addressee of the request had no doubt that the two requests were of equal 
difficulty, and similar to each other. In both cases the request involved caring for a 
group of young people in danger of succumbing to the temptation of a life of 
crime. In both cases it was necessary to devote 2 hours to the youngsters. Finally, 
in both cases the trip was to take place on a Saturday. One may, however, wonder 
what would happen if we applied a sequence of two requests whose respective 
levels of difficulty are difficult for the addressee to compare. It is obvious that 
devoting 2 hours to an activity is a greater sacrifice than 1 hour to the same activ-
ity, and equally it is less of a burden than devoting 4 hours. How much of a loss is 
2 hours spent on some activity when compared to, for example:
•• completing a long questionnaire when we are not in a position to estimate 
how much time it will take us?
•• making a donation equivalent to our hourly wage?
•• spending 2 hours on an entirely different activity?
It would seem that doubts could arise in all three of these examples. So, what 
will happen if an individual is asked to carry out in sequence two requests which, 
while exhibiting entirely different characters, are performed by a similar propor-
tion of people in control conditions (thus fulfilling the criteria applied in the 
relevant literature on social influence to state that they are of similar difficulty)? 
It is obvious that in respect of the first request in the sequence, the addressee 
has two options: to carry it out or to refuse. Let us observe that if he accedes to 
the first request, then in accordance with the foot-in-the-door principle, he should 
be more inclined to fulfil the next request. This should be all the more likely if the 
second request is not in some way obviously more difficult than its predecessor. 
The majority of participants in the aforementioned experiment conducted by 
Cialdini and collaborators behaved in just this manner: of those who agreed to go 
to the museum, a significant majority also agreed to go to the zoo. What would 
happen, however, in the case of an individual refusing to carry out the first request? 
In the experiment by Cialdini et al., when such conditions were observed nearly 
everyone refused to carry out the subsequent request. That said, I believe that in 
conditions in which the second request was to involve an entirely different type of 
activity, we could encounter different results. The mere fact of the second request 
being clearly different itself constitutes a real alternative. The addressee of the 
request sees that he has been presented with a choice. This, in turn, may activate 
the rule of reciprocity in the same manner as a concession in the classic door-in-the-face 
technique. In addition, it would seem that in real-life social situations, when some-
one formulates a request or a proposal that is then turned down, this is followed 
by a more beneficial proposal or a request that should be easier to carry out. 
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We may assume that this individual has encountered similar situations on multiple 
occasions in the past. Thus, in conditions that render it difficult to accurately assess 
the objective difficulty of the two requests, the addressee may be inclined to inter-
pret the second of them as easier than the first. Such a situation would be 
analogical to the door-in-the-face technique. 
We can then imagine a technique whose essence consists in the successive pres-
entation of two requests that are clearly different in form or content, but are very 
similar in respect of their objective levels of difficulty (measured by the percentage 
of people who fulfil such requests spontaneously, i.e. in control conditions). 
Regardless of what decision the addressee takes in respect of the first request, he 
will be pressured by psychological forces inclining him to fulfil a subsequent 
request. If he accedes to the first one, he sets off down the path of foot-in-the-door. 
Rejection of the first request places him on the path of door-in-the-face. Because 
this technique is a synthesis of the two techniques mentioned above, it could best 
be given the name foot-in-the-face (Dolinski, 2011). 
One of the experiments dedicated to the foot-in-the-face technique was pre-
ceded by a series of pilot tests intended to identify two requests of average difficulty 
level, while at the same time being as similar in difficulty to each other as possible. 
It turned out that roughly half of the students approached agreed to complete a 
survey that the experimenter explained would serve as the empirical foundation of 
a master’s thesis prepared by a blind student, and that it would take around 30 minutes 
to complete. A similar proportion of students agreed to a request to record a dictation 
of five pages from a psychology textbook, also allegedly for a blind student. 
The design of an experiment testing the foot-in-the-face technique should, 
naturally, facilitate a comparison of compliance in the group to whom the request 
of average difficulty is submitted as the second request (that is, after the participant 
either carries out or rejects an initial request) with conditions in which the same 
request is issued immediately. The decision as to which of the two requests (com-
pleting a survey or dictating a few pages for a recording) should come first and 
second would of necessity be arbitrary. Instead, I operated under the assumption 
that a more appropriate design would involve the first condition beginning with 
the request to complete a survey followed by the request to record material for a 
blind student, while the second condition would reverse this order. The experi-
mental design can be presented like this:
CONDITION 1: Request A, then, regardless of participant’s reaction, Request B
CONDITION 2: Request B, then, regardless of participant’s reaction, Request A
with A denoting the request to complete the survey and B denoting the request 
to dictate a recording of a few pages. It should be noted that this condition also 
allows for the omission of classic control groups. A test of the effectiveness of the 
foot-in-the-face technique could be based on comparing compliance with request 
B in condition 1 (in this case considered the experimental condition) to compli-
ance with the same request (B) in condition 2 (in this case considered the control 
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condition), along with a comparison of compliance with request A in condition 2 
(experimental condition) and compliance with the same request (A) in condition 1 
(control condition). In other words, the design is a comparison of compliance with 
the request that comes second in the sequence and compliance with the very same 
request when issued directly. 
One more factor was added to the experimental design – the amount of time 
between the first and the second request. The assumption of Alice Tybout, Brian 
Sternthal and Bobby Calder (1983) concerning the classic foot-in-the-door and 
door-in-the-face sequential techniques is that an individual considering acceding 
to the second request can take two types of information into account. First: how 
he himself behaved in a similar situation in the past; and second: how the person 
issuing the second request behaves. The assumption under which this model oper-
ates is that people wish to view themselves as consistent and coherent. Thus, when 
the addressee ascertains that he has fulfilled the first request, this should make him 
more inclined to comply with the second. In turn, declaring that he rejected the 
first one should provide motivation to reject the subsequent one. In relation to the 
role of information about the behaviour of the other person in the interaction, 
the model’s authors assume that if the addressee becomes aware of an escalation of 
the demand being made of him, he will refuse to fulfil the first request. However, 
if the addressee can observe that his partner in the interaction is scaling back his 
expectations, he will be more inclined to agree to the second request. We are 
therefore dealing with a situation where, in the case of foot-in-the-door, the 
addressee is influenced by information about himself to carry out the second 
request (“I agreed to a similar request before”), but information about the behav-
iour of his partner in the interaction leads him in the opposite direction (“he’s 
stepping up his demands”). The opposite occurs in the event of door-in-the-face. 
Information about himself (“earlier I refused”) leads the addressee to say “no”, 
while information about the manner in which the person lodging the request is 
reacting (“he’s lowered his expectations of me”) push him towards complying 
with the second request. The model’s authors assume that the key determinant in 
both techniques is the information that the addressee of the requests focuses on. 
The foot-in-the-door technique should prove particularly effective when the 
addressee concentrates on information of the first type (i.e. about himself) while 
ignoring information of the second type (i.e. about the behaviours of his partner 
in the interaction). Door-in-the-face, in turn, would prove to be an especially 
effective technique in precisely the opposite conditions. What does this have to do 
with the amount of time separating the requests? The authors’ belief is that in the 
case of foot-in-the-door, the addressee’s concentration on the second type of 
information can be made to wane when a particular amount of time lapses 
between the fulfilment of the initial request and the submission of the second one. 
This de-emphasizes the fact that the demands made of the addressee are escalating. 
With regard to the door-in-the-face technique, it would be more beneficial for 
the second request to come immediately after the first, as this serves to emphasize 
the concessions made by the partner in the interaction. 
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The experiment used the requests selected in the aforementioned pilot study. 
The individual carrying out the study visited students in dormitories and explained 
that he wanted to help his blind friend, himself a student as well. In half of the cases 
the participant was asked to complete a survey that was supposed to be an impor-
tant element of the blind student’s master’s thesis, while the other half of participants 
heard a different request. It was explained to them that a blind student used 
recorded course material in order to study, and they were asked to dictate five pages 
of a textbook into a recorder. If the participant agreed to carry out the initial 
request, he was given the survey or (in the other conditions) a textbook and tape 
recorder. Those who refused to carry out the first request were politely thanked. 
In conditions involving the absence of a delay between the requests, the second 
request was made at a moment when the experimenter arrived to take the com-
pleted survey or textbook and tape recorder or directly after the participant 
declared his refusal to fulfil the first request. When there was a delay, the second 
request was issued after two days had elapsed. 
The foot-in-the-face technique turned out to be effective. The request to help 
out the blind student was carried out by 58% of participants when it came as the 
second in the sequence, while 48.8% of them agreed in conditions when it was 
formulated directly. While these differences do meet the threshold for statistical 
significance, it would be a stretch to say that a difference of less than 9% was excep-
tional. The picture changes when we take into additional consideration the factor 
of time elapsing between the requests. Compliance with the second request 
reached a level of 66.8% if we take into account only conditions in which either 
compliance with the first request was followed by a two-day wait before the 
second request was issued, or if the first request was turned down then the second 
TABLE 2.4  Decision tree of people who agreed to fulfil the second request in each condition 
in Dolinski (2011) experiment
First request: Record
or questionnaire
















Source: Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 2011, vol. 41, p. 1531.
Copyright: 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
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came immediately thereafter (Dolinski, 2011). The results of this experiment are 
presented in Table 2.4.
A practitioner of social influence making use of the foot-in-the-face technique 
should thus observe the following rules: prepare two requests exhibiting similar 
levels of difficulty. If the person you are approaching agrees to the first then give 
him some time and do not rush with the second, but rather wait a few days. 
However, if he refuses the first one, issue the second one right away. 
Dump-and-chase
As we have seen, the foot-in-the door technique consists of this sequence: easier 
introductory request – more difficult target request. The door-in-the face tech-
nique reverses the sequence as difficult request – easier (main) request. In turn, the 
foot-in-the-face technique allows for the use of two requests displaying similar 
difficulty levels, but different enough in content that it is difficult to view them as 
such. We also hasten to remind that Cialdini and his collaborators (Cialdini et al., 
1975) demonstrated that if two requests appearing in sequence are obviously 
similar in content and difficulty, compliance with the second request is no greater 
than with the same request given to the control group (that is, in conditions where 
it is the only request lodged). It would therefore seem obvious that a technique 
based on a repetition of exactly the same request following its rejection ought to 
be ineffective. 
Franklin Boster and his collaborators, however, argue that in such situations the 
matter is not entirely clear (Boster et al., 2009). They observe that refusal to accede 
to a request can take one of two forms: rebuff or obstacle. Rebuff is an open and 
unequivocal refusal, without explanation or justification. Obstacle is something 
different – the addressee of the request explains why he refuses to carry out the 
request. By doing so he opens the door to the possibility of convincing him that 
the grounds for refusal that he presents are not, in fact, important or may not even 
exist at all; it also creates the possibility of explaining why it is worth agreeing to 
the request. In other words, from the point of view of the person formulating a 
request, refusal in the form of an “obstacle” is far better than a “rebuff ”. What to 
do if a rebuff is encountered? Boster et al. propose a social influence technique that 
rests on the assumption that in such cases it becomes necessary to effect a “trans-
formation of the target’s rebuff into an obstacle” (Boster et al., 2009, p. 220). When 
we hear “no”, we should just ask “why not?” If we receive an explanation, we can 
then begin questioning its sense, present arguments to the contrary and . . . even 
repeat our presentation of the same request many times over. The key to success is 
obstinacy. The authors also provide a name for the technique, which they label 
“dump-and-chase”. 
The experimenters decided to test the technique in conditions under which 
they asked passers-by to guard their bicycle for around 10 minutes. If the partici-
pant refused and gave a reason, an attempt was made to convince him that there 
was no good reason why he couldn’t watch over the bicycle. If he refused without 
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giving a reason, first the experimenters attempted to draw the reason out of him, 
and then to convince him that it wasn’t a serious problem. The researchers com-
pared the effectiveness of this with the application of the door-in-the-face 
technique (the participant was first asked to guard the bicycle for 20 minutes, and 
upon refusing was told that watching it for 10 minutes would be enough). The 
experimental design also included conditions in which the request was accompa-
nied by a (superficial) justification for submitting the request (the person making 
the request said “will you watch my bike for me until I return because I cannot 
watch it?”). The authors of the study report that their technique was more effective 
than door-in-the-face. In the dump-and-chase conditions 60% of those approached 
agreed to watch the bicycle for 10 minutes, while with door-in-the face this was 
only 20%. The authors do not, however, examine the reasons why the door-in-the-face 
technique proved utterly ineffective in their experiment. This can easily be 
explained by the specifics of the study: if someone asks us to watch a bicycle for 
20 minutes, but after hearing our refusal proceeds to assure us that 10 minutes is 
long enough, we might reasonably fear that the person making the request won’t 
return after 10 minutes. The individual guarding the bicycle is then placed in a very 
uncomfortable situation regardless of how he chooses to behave. If he waits, he 
wastes time, but if he leaves, he faces the feeling that he has let down someone who 
entrusted him with property. As it turned out, the percentage of those agreeing to 
watch the bicycle in the door-in-the-face conditions was even lower (20%) than 
in the conditions in which the dump-and-chase technique was just beginning to 
be applied, meaning the request was simply formulated and addressed (40%). 
However, if we compare this indicator with the success of the dump-and-chase 
technique, it does not turn out to be effective. However, the authors themselves 
admit their technique may not be more effective than presenting the request with 
a superficial justification. In a second experiment the authors expanded the exper-
imental design using foot-in-the-door conditions, as well as changing the nature 
of the requests. While in the first experiment the person making the request was 
clearly acting in his own interests (having his own bicycle guarded), this time the 
experimenters presented themselves as members of the “In Your Face Theater 
Troupe” and explained that they were attempting to combine education with 
entertainment in order to increase awareness of sexuality issues that may affect 
students. They stood on the pavement, handed out brochures with information 
about the group’s activities, and tried to discern whether passers-by were interested 
in them. In the dump-and-chase conditions, participants were asked to perform a 
similar role at any chosen time the following week. In the door-in-the-face condi-
tions, the initial request involved doing it in another city where the group was 
scheduled to perform, and then, after they refused, they were told that it would also 
be helpful to be active in the town in which they had been approached. In the 
foot-in-the-door conditions, participants were first asked to agree to wear a small 
sticker supporting the group, and then asked to distribute brochures to passers-by. 
The group in which the superficial justification was used heard the phrase “because it 
is essential that we have someone here” appended to the request. The dump-and-chase 
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technique turned out only to be more effective than the request accompanied by 
a superficial justification. It was not proven to be more effective than the two 
classic sequential techniques. Unfortunately, the authors again failed to compare 
the percentages of those who ultimately agreed in dump-and-chase conditions 
with those who agreed to carry out the request at once (which could be treated 
as control conditions). This difference did not achieve statistical significance, which 
makes it difficult to label the technique a successful one. For the sake of accuracy, 
we must add that both experiments had very small sample sizes, which makes it 
hard to expect that the differences between groups would cross the threshold of 
statistical significance. 
In spite of the absence of empirical evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of 
the technique under discussion here, it remains worthy of attention. However, 
there can be no doubt that proper studies conducted with larger groups of par-
ticipants are necessary in order to answer questions about both the technique’s 
effectiveness and, if it proves successful, the psychological mechanism underlying it. 
The most likely explanations for the (potential) effectiveness of this technique may 
be associated with the individual to whom the request is being addressed perceiv-
ing the persistence of the one making the request. This could lead to the conclusion 
that fulfilment of the request is of great importance to him. If this is the case, then 
a feeling of empathy towards the person making the request may arise, as well as a 
feeling of guilt from refusing to help someone in a difficult situation. (In Chapter 6 
you will have the opportunity to read about experiments demonstrating that such 
emotions can induce compliance). It is, however, possible that another mechanism 
is at work, related to the cognitive and motivational sphere. If someone who is 
asked for something presents an obstacle, he implicitly states “if it weren’t for 
certain reasons, I’d agree to the request”. During the subsequent conversation, if it 
occurs that the problems preventing the request from being fulfilled are smoothed 
over or resolved, then the addressee may feel obliged to carry it out. It is also pos-
sible that the very conversation between the person formulating the request and 
the person to whom it is addressed is the key element (regardless of the substance 
of the conversation). Enmeshing one’s interlocutor in a dialogue is a factor that 
markedly increases the chances he will agree to various requests, something that 
you will have occasion to read about in Chapter 4.
Low ball 
Let us imagine that a shop display contains a pair of shoes and the information that 
they are on sale for a 40% discount. The offer is shockingly attractive. It’s the begin-
ning of the season, and the shoes are the height of fashion! An interested customer 
asks about the shoes, but it turns out that her particular size is out of stock. As she 
is heading, disappointed, to the exit, a pair of her desired shoes in just her size turns 
up! She tries them on and takes a look at herself in a large mirror. They’re perfect! 
Her friends will all be jealous. They’re a bit tight but they’ll definitely loosen up 
(beautiful and fashionable shoes definitely loosen up; a tight squeeze would 
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disqualify ugly shoes from consideration). The customer heads to the shop assistant, 
with a smile on her face. She asks for the shoes she was wearing when she arrived 
to be packed up, and she’ll put the new ones on right away! The shop assistant, 
however, seems to be a bit troubled. He explains why he couldn’t find the customer’s 
size at first. Her shoes were on another shelf . . . and they aren’t on sale. Will the 
customer who wished to have fashionable shoes for a song give in to temptation 
and purchase them at the regular price? If the answer is “yes”, it means that the 
sales trick turned out to be successful. 
Robert Cialdini, John Cacioppo, Rodney Bassett and John Miller (1978) 
observed similar behaviour among American car salesmen. They resort quite often 
to generating a client’s interest with an exceptionally good offer, such as unusually 
low monthly instalments or an amazingly low price. When the customer, whose 
interest has been piqued by the outstanding opportunity, takes a test drive, asks about 
some technical details, warranty conditions and insurance, and then finally declares 
his desire to purchase the vehicle, the problems begin. It turns out, for example, that 
there are no more cars available on the outstanding instalment plan, and that the 
ones left on the lot are available under normal payment terms (it’s the customer’s 
own fault for taking too long to decide). If, however, the “once in a lifetime oppor-
tunity” consisted in a very low price, it turns out that “the higher-ups in corporate” 
won’t agree to sell that particular car at a lower price because it’s probably already 
reserved for another customer, or that the salesperson made a mistake and forgot to 
inform the customer that the price doesn’t include some headers that regulations 
require to be installed (for an extra fee of course). One way or another, the situation 
is always the same: the factor that got the customer interested in the car and led him 
to decide to buy it (such as an instalment plan or a low price) has been removed. 
The conditions of the sale are now the standard ones, but the client is now aware 
that he is particularly fond of one particular car and wants to have it. He is therefore 
unlikely to withdraw from the transaction and will probably agree to purchase the 
car on worse terms than the ones initially offered to him.
The psychological mechanism underlying the effectiveness of this method, 
named the low-ball technique by Cialdini et al., is described by Charles Kiesler 
(1971) as the feeling of commitment. In Kiesler’s model, if an individual engages 
in some behaviour assuming he has the freedom of choice to do so, and believes 
that he himself, without any external pressure, is working towards the pursuit of 
some goal, he then feels an obligation to continue. So even if the conditions 
involved in accomplishing a given aim are transformed, the individual feels obliged 
to continue the activities he has already begun and to reach the goals already set. 
Cialdini and his collaborators decided to undertake empirical verification of the 
effectiveness of the strategy they had observed among car salesmen. University stu-
dents were invited to take part in a psychological experiment. Participants in the 
control group were informed immediately that the experiment would begin at 
7:00 am. Those from the experimental group were first asked if they would agree 
to take part in a psychological experiment, and then after they had agreed, they were 
told that the study would begin at 7:00 am. The students were then asked to reaffirm 
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their readiness to participate in the experiment. Two measurements of the strategy’s 
effectiveness were taken into consideration: a verbal declaration of participation in 
the experiment, and actual arrival at the laboratory at 7:00 in the morning. In the 
low-ball conditions, 56% of students declared their participation while only 31% did 
so in the control conditions. Comparisons of actual behaviours turned out to be 
even more suggestive. While 53% of those approached in the low-ball conditions 
turned up at the laboratory, only 24% from the control group did so.
Another study examined whether students living in dormitories would agree to 
put up posters from a charitable organization on the windows and doors of their 
rooms, assuming they themselves first had to go down to the dormitory’s ground 
floor within the next hour. In the control conditions they were asked directly to 
do so, and 26% of the students agreed. In the low-ball conditions, participants were 
first asked if they would agree to display the posters in their rooms, and after 
receiving their agreement the experimenter dug through his bag and stated that he 
had just run out of posters. He went on to say that if the participant was still inter-
ested in hanging the posters up in his room, he could go downstairs within the 
next hour and take one. In these conditions, 60% of people agreed.
In the next experiment, the researchers offered students credit hours in 
exchange for participating in a psychological study. They were given a choice 
between two forms of activity, of which one (which we shall call B) was slightly 
more attractive than the other (which we shall call A). The researchers, however, 
stated that participation in study B was worth one credit hour, while volunteering 
for study A would net them 2 credit hours. Having received this information, the 
majority (81%) decided to participate in the activity that would give them 2 credit 
hours. At that moment, however, “a mistake was discovered”, and it turned out that 
regardless of which study they chose to participate in, they would receive only one 
credit hour. In spite of this, when the participants were asked to make a final 
declaration, 61% of them indicated they would participate in study A. In the 
control conditions, the number of those volunteering for study A was reduced by 
nearly half (31%), and the vast majority selected task B. In another version of the 
experiment the participants were very strongly persuaded to select task A, allegedly 
worth 2 credit hours. When it then “occurred” that this activity was only worth 
one credit hour, only 41% elected not to change their original decision. Thus the 
low-ball technique requires that the addressee feels free to choose at the moment 
of selecting a given option. If, however, the choice is made under pressure from an 
external source, then the engagement of the addressee in a given activity is not 
strong enough to make him inclined to continue following the emergence of new 
circumstances that render that option less attractive. 
One variation on the low-ball technique is known as ‘the lure’, described by 
a group of French researchers, Robert Joule, Fabienne Gouilloux and Florent 
Weber (1989). While in the case of the classic low-ball technique the addressee 
of the request retains the possibility of receiving what he wants in spite of a 
sudden change of circumstances increasing its cost (e.g. it happens to be necessary 
to get up at the break of dawn to participate in an experiment), in the case of 
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the lure technique it “turns out” that the initial option becomes unavailable, and 
an alternative is proposed.
In their study, Joule et al., (1989) offered students the chance to participate in a 
psychological experiment. It was explained to the control group that the experi-
ment would involve a test of memory, and volunteers were asked to sign up for 
one of two dates. In the experimental group, participants were invited to take part 
in an interesting experiment involving emotions, which would be described in 
greater detail after a short time. They were promised a sum of 30 francs (around 
$7or £5) for their participation. When interested students arrived at the laboratory, 
they were told that due to some unspecified difficulties the experiment concerning 
emotions would not go ahead. However, they were offered the chance to take part 
in an empirical study for which they would, unfortunately, receive no financial 
benefit. It turned out that in those conditions, three times as many people decided 
to take part in the experiment concerning memory than in the control group.
The differences between the low-ball technique and the lure technique are just 
subtle enough that the literature fails to distinguish whether the changes concern 
the conditions involved in achieving something, or the thing that can be achieved. 
In this chapter, I treat the lure as a variation on the low-ball technique, presenting 
research on the two together. The relevant studies have shown, for example, that 
this type of influence can convince people to participate in time-consuming forms 
of protest against further tuition and fee increases, consisting of writing letters and 
postcards by hand to the Student Opinion Administration (Burger & Petty, 1981), 
to convince them to reduce the amount of tobacco they consume (Joule, 1987) or 
to lower the consumption of gas used in heating their homes (Pallak, Cook & 
Sullivan, 1980). 
Jerry Burger and Richard Petty (1981) were interested in learning whether the 
low-ball technique would retain its effectiveness if the first and the second requests 
were made by different individuals. During their study they promised credit hours 
to students in exchange for participation in a psychological experiment. It then 
turned out that there would be no credit hours awarded, but the request to take 
part in the study was made again. In conditions in which both requests were for-
mulated by the same experimenter, participants nearly always reaffirmed their 
desire to participate. However, when the request came from another researcher, the 
proportion of those willing to take part in the study was reduced by nearly three-
fold (see Table 2.5).
In another study carried out by the same authors, the experimenter knocked 
on doors in a dormitory and informed students that he was a representative of The 
National Multiple Sclerosis Society. He then asked the students to hang a poster 
from his organization on their doors. In some conditions the experimenter reached 
into his bag, gave the student a poster and left. In others, the experimenter also 
reached into his bag, but then put on an expression of surprise and stated that he 
had just given out the last one. He promised to deliver one promptly. After 10–15 
minutes a representative of the organization again knocked at the student’s door. 
In half of the cases it was the same individual who had visited previously, while in 
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the other half it was a different person. This time, the participants who had earlier 
been given the posters were told that the association was looking for volunteers to 
work that evening, while those who had not received the posters were told that 
there were none left, but if they wished to demonstrate their support for the 
Society then it was a good day to do so, as in the evening volunteers would be 
needed for work. The experimental design also contained a group of participants 
who were asked directly to become volunteers. It turned out that the low-ball 
technique was only effective in conditions when the target request was made by 
the same person who had earlier run out of posters. The implication of the studies 
by Burger and Petty is that low ball is based rather on the obligation to make a 
concession to a specific person rather than to see a given commitment through. 
This conclusion is supported by the results of work by Konrad Maj (2002), who 
decided to examine how to explain to somebody that has given in to an attractive 
offer the fact that circumstances have changed and the offer is less beneficial than 
it was. In both real-life and experimental situations, the individual who must com-
municate this message offers an apology for the situation. If we concur with Burger 
and Petty that the foundation of the low-ball technique’s success is the particular 
relationship established during the interaction between the initiator of the request 
and the addressee, then this pleasantry serves to maintain the relationship and leads 
to the addressee acceding to the request or offer in its final (less attractive) form. It 
would be easier for the addressee of the request to act in his own interest and 
refuse, if not for the person making the request being so polite and nice. In an 
experiment conducted by Maj (2002), students were given the opportunity to 
purchase special instructional materials helpful in studying for exams. This was 
done by an employee of an academic bookshop who appeared at the beginning of 
a class. In the control conditions, he said that the materials cost $20. The price 
given in the experimental conditions was $15. He then requested all those inter-
ested to place their names on a list. Participants from the experimental groups were 
again approached by the employee of the bookstore just before the end of the class 
and told that he had made a mistake. Sometimes he offered a sincere apology and 
explained that he had confused the price with that of materials intended for other 
students, while in other cases he simply stated that the price was different from the 
TABLE 2.5  Percentages of subjects complying with initial and second requests in Burger and 
Petty (1981) experiment
Group Initial Request Second request
















Source: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1981, vol. 40, p. 494.
Copyright 1981 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 
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one initially given. In both situations, however, he gave participants the chance to 
cancel their purchase. In the control conditions, nearly 34% of participants pur-
chased the instructional materials. In the low-ball conditions in which the shop 
assistant politely apologized for the mistake, 62.5% of them did so. However, when 
the low-ball technique was not accompanied by an apology, the percentage of 
those prepared to purchase the materials for $20 was even slightly lower (not quite 
25%) than in the control group. Maj recorded similar results in a replication 
experiment. It would seem the results generated by Maj suggest that, contrary to 
what Cialdini et al. suggest, the individual who is the target of the low-ball tech-
nique does not feel the need to continue the action engaged in, but rather simply 
cannot break off the interaction with an individual treating him politely and 
respectfully. Indeed, if these elements emphasizing the interpersonal connection go 
missing, the technique becomes utterly ineffective. 
Summary 
Sequential techniques are based on a model in which the target request is preceded 
by a different one. Researchers have devoted the most attention to the foot-in-the-door 
technique. It consists in an easy request being made first, and then when the 
addressee of the request carries it out (or at least agrees to do so), a subsequent, 
more difficult request appears. While the literature generally assumes that the foun-
dation of this technique’s success is the mechanism of self-perception, not all study 
results provide confirmation. Four walls is a technique similar to foot-in-the-door, 
but the key element is for the individual being approached to make verbal declarations 
that will result in him being obliged in some way to carry out a request or take advan-
tage of a proposal. The door-in-the-face technique, similarly to foot-in-the-door, 
has generated significant interest among scholars. It essentially consists in the 
assumption that one can be induced to carry out a rather difficult request when 
we start with an even more challenging one. The addressee will most likely reject 
it, but if the easier request is then presented, he will be likely to accede. Empirical 
studies have demonstrated the efficacy of this technique, as well as the two condi-
tions on which it depends. First: both requests must be made by the same person. 
Second: the target request must be made immediately following rejection of the 
initial request. This technique also has led to discussions on the psychological 
mechanism responsible for its success. The most commonly cited one is the reci-
procity rule. An individual who rejects a request to fulfil a difficult request sees how 
the person making the request reduces his expectations and formulates an easier 
request. This, in turn, leads the addressee of the requests to feel obliged to make a 
concession, and he agrees to the second request. Another theoretical model pro-
poses that rejection of a difficult request often leads to a feeling of guilt, and by 
complying with an easier request we can ameliorate that unpleasant feeling.
The next sequential technique analyzed in this chapter is foot-in-the-face, 
which is a merging of foot-in-the-door with door-in-the-face. This technique is 
based on the assumption that, prior to formulating the target request, another 
Sequential techniques of social influence  45
request of a different nature but similar level of difficulty should first be advanced. 
If the addressee fulfils this request, the mechanisms responsible for the success of 
the foot-in-the-door technique are activated. If he rejects it, the mechanisms that 
generate the effectiveness of the door-in-the-face technique are set in motion. 
Thus regardless of the decision concerning the first request, the chances grow that 
the second one will be carried out. The dump-and-chase technique, in turn, con-
sists of persistent repetition of the same request while simultaneously convincing 
the addressee to discuss the reasons for the refusal. In the course of the discussion 
those arguments become less convincing and counter-arguments are presented. 
Studies on this technique are still in their initial phase, but we can assume that 
under certain conditions it is a successful method. The last of the techniques 
presented in this chapter is the “low ball”. It is based on issuing a proposal to an 
individual that seems very attractive. After the addressee becomes cognitively and 
emotionally involved in carrying out the particular activity, it turns out that the 
offer is not quite as beneficial as it was initially made out to be. In spite of that fact, 
the addressee continues down the course he had set out on. While it was initially 
assumed that this was the result of the activation of mechanisms of engagement in 
activity and consistency, the newest research indicates that the feeling of an obliga-
tion towards an individual with whom we have entered into an interpersonal 





People can hold good or bad opinions about themselves. These opinions relate to 
particular characteristics, competences and skills, or they can be of a more general 
nature. Psychologists are generally in agreement that such convictions are of 
importance, but controversy arises around the reasons why this is so. High levels of 
self-esteem obviously result in an individual experiencing positive emotions: it is 
pleasing to think of oneself as competent, humorous or physically attractive. This is 
why people try to find the good in themselves, applying an incredibly broad range 
of strategies and techniques that enable them to defend and even enhance their 
positive self-image. For example, they attribute success to themselves rather than 
others, while chalking failure up to others instead of themselves (e.g. Gilbert, 1995), 
they are eager to disclose any link they may have to famous people, which gives 
them pride and satisfaction (Cialdini, Borden, Thorne, Walker, Freeman & Sloan 
1976), and they also exhibit tendencies towards bias in comparing themselves to 
others, maintaining their belief that they are better (Wills, 1981). It would, however, 
be an oversimplification to make the assumption that all of these efforts are based 
solely on the desire to experience pleasing emotions. Researchers emphasize that 
an affirmative view of oneself is a condition of effective task performance, as well 
as of making both short- and long-term plans (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Thus, 
striving to view oneself in even a slightly exaggerated positive light is adaptive. Yet 
another aspect is highlighted by Sheldon Solomon, Jeff Greenberg and Tom 
Pyszczynski (1991), authors of terror management theory. According to this notion, 
humans are the only entities on earth aware of their own mortality, this awareness 
being the source of fear and of threats. However, an individual can maintain the 
pretence of being immortal in both the literal and symbolic sense. Literal immor-
tality is offered by the vast majority of religions, promising everlasting continuation 
of the soul and a second life after the one on earth. Symbolic immortality, on the 
other hand, is ensured by participation in broadly-taken culture, whose lifespan is 
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far longer than that of an individual. High self-esteem allows individuals to feel 
they are valuable elements of culture (or a part of it, such as a nation or a group of 
a football club’s fans). Thus, maintaining positive beliefs about oneself is a means of 
reducing the terror that results from being aware that our life must, eventually, end. 
Roy Baumeister and Dianne Tice (1990) do not concur with these assumptions. 
They do not directly dispute the theory itself that awareness of mortality gives rise 
to fear, but they rather feel that the bulk of people’s daily anxieties are grounded 
in the threat of exclusion from the community in which we function. A strong 
majority of communities accepts competent, honest and valuable individuals. The 
conviction that one fulfils these requirements leads to a weakening of the afore-
mentioned fear. So, while Solomon, Greenberg and Pyszczynski on the one hand, 
and Baumeister and Tice on the other, posit completely different sources for the 
majority of human beings’ fears, they are in agreement that the antidote to them 
is positive self-assessment. 
Most people are concerned, not only with what they think of themselves, but 
also with how they are viewed by others. We try to manipulate the impression we 
make on others so that they think of us in a manner consistent with our own 
interests. Sometimes we desire for people to like us, other times we want them to 
fear us, or even to treat us as helpless and in need of immediate assistance (e.g. Leary & 
Allen, 2011). When others react in the way we desire, this also contributes to 
improving and maintaining our self-esteem.
In recent decades, an increasing amount of empirical data has begun to indicate 
that processes associated with one’s feeling of self-worth are not necessarily con-
scious ones. Anthony Greenwald and Mahzarin Banaji (1995) propose applying the 
term ‘implicit self-esteem’. People are not aware of their special relationship to 
things associated closely with the “I”, even while those things are totally unrelated 
to their attitudes, skills and level of competence. 
While the effects associated with people’s tendency to care for their positive 
self-image and to make the desired impression on others are strong and undisputed, 
the question is rarely addressed in research of how mechanisms associated with this 
can be used in successfully exerting influence over others. It appears that such stud-
ies are focused primarily on four social influence techniques: using the name of 
one’s interlocutor; emphasizing one’s incidental similarity to that person; drawing 
attention to discrepancies between publicly declared and actual behaviour; and 
exploiting the presence of a witness to the interaction. In this chapter I will discuss 
each of these techniques in turn.
Using the name of one’s interlocutor
When Napoleon’s army occupied the Netherlands in 1811, the emperor issued a 
decree ordering all residents of the country to officially register their surnames. 
Family names were not widespread at the time in the Netherlands but were the 
exclusive domain of people at the top of the social ladder. For many of those at 
the bottom of it, Napoleon’s decree must have seemed a needless extravagance. 
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The Dutch thus began thinking up quite exotic surnames for themselves, such as: 
Naaktgeboren (Born Naked), Den Boef (Swindler) or Poepjes (Little Halfwit). 
While surnames may have seemed unnecessary in some countries and during some 
periods of history, since the dawn of human civilization no one has questioned the 
need to use first names. The status of an individual without a name can be com-
pared to one stripped of honour, or even of humanity (Koole & Pelham, 2003). As 
a result, for many years a person’s name has borne exceptional significance. 
Jozef Nuttin (1984) described his impressions from a holiday he took with his 
wife. At one moment he observed that some of the licence plates on cars passing 
him were evoking warm feelings. After thinking about it, he concluded that this 
was probably from the plates that contained the letters of his name or digits 
corresponding to his date of birth. This constatation served as a starting point for 
a sterling series of empirical studies in which Nuttin demonstrated that people do, 
in fact, exhibit an unusual preference for the letters that compose their name. 
Further studies conducted around the world demonstrated that the first letters 
of a name in particular seem to have impressive power. It turns out that individual 
letters are liked more by people whose names begin with just those letters 
(Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997; Koole, Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 2001). In our 
experiments (Dolinski, 2005), the first letters of names were described by partici-
pants as having a more pleasing shape (perhaps a surprising conclusion) than letters 
that did not form a part of their own names. This effect was also observed in respect 
of letters printed from the commonplace computer programme Word for Windows 
(the fonts Courier and Times New Roman were used), as well as decorative letters, 
such as can be found at the beginnings of chapters in older volumes. 
Brett Pelham, Matthew Mirenberg and John Jones (2002) demonstrated that 
the initial letters of first names have an influence on professional careers and on the 
places that people inhabit. For example, among American dentists there is a large 
number of people named Dennis (and vice versa, many people named Dennis are 
dentists), while a far greater number than chance would indicate of women named 
Virginia live in Virginia Beach. People with the first name or surname of Saint, 
more often than coincidence could explain, decide to take up residence in Saint 
Louis, Saint Paul or Saint Joseph. The special role of one’s first name is also attested 
to by the cocktail party effect. 
During a cocktail party, people generally stand around in small groups, and in 
this intimate company discuss various things. The selectivity of top-down attention 
means that they can block out voices coming from other small groups, focusing on 
what someone in their immediate vicinity is saying. The din, often loud, bothers 
them a bit, but they are able to tune it out to such a degree that, in a sense, they 
don’t hear it. However, if their own name pops up in this ignored murmur, not 
only do they register it immediately, but they also begin listening to what the per-
son who has just used their name is saying. People are thus both ignoring and not 
(completely) ignoring this din at the same time: one’s own name is a stimulus so 
strong that it has the fascinating power to divert others’ attention. In the context 
of this chapter, the cocktail party effect constitutes an outstanding example of the 
Egotistic and self-presentation mechanisms  49
importance of one’s own name. From a purely practical perspective, it advises us to 
avoid speaking the name of the person we would like to gossip about. We mustn’t 
be deceived by the fact that Christine is standing some distance from us and seems 
to be completely absorbed in her own, private conversation. 
Sometimes it occurs that we recall someone’s name following a chance encounter. 
However, other situations occur more frequently. We know that we have been told 
several times the name of that tall, blonde woman, or of the balding man in the 
glasses, but we are simply incapable of recalling what their names are. Fortunately, 
certain situations occur that demonstrate we are not exceptions in this regard: after 
all, we encounter people who themselves are utterly unable to remember our names.
If someone meets us just once, then later can recall and use our name while 
making some request of us, does that mean there is an increased chance that we 
will fulfil this request? Daniel Howard and Charles Gengler (1995) asked them-
selves this very question. They began with the assumption that the starting point 
for an analysis of this issue should be the psychological consequences of someone 
remembering our name. Those, in turn, are very strongly dependent on how we 
view the causes underlying this fact. In Howard and Gengler’s opinion, the conse-
quences will be minor if the cause is viewed as something associated with external 
circumstances, such as a short period of time (“It’s no surprise that she remembers 
my name. After all, I was introduced to her just a minute ago”), or something 
exceptional occurring at the time (“I was sure he’d remember my name, because 
just after we met I got caught up in my dress and fell on the floor, then I spilled a 
whole glass of red wine on myself ”). In other cases, the fact that someone remem-
bers our name can give rise to a wholly different set of consequences. Setting aside 
particular situations like the one just described, this fact means that we have 
become a person of importance to someone else. This sort of consideration fulfils 
the need to have our ego stroked (e.g. Bowerman, 1978; Bradley, 1978). It also 
causes us to feel positively about the person who is providing us with such pleasant 
and desirable experiences. As a rule, we like people who are quick to remember 
our names. In turn, if we like them, we should be particularly inclined to fulfilling 
requests they target us with. 
In an experiment designed to shed light on this question, a natural situation 
involving a meeting between a professor and students was used. The professor 
asked each of them in turn to introduce themselves to the group, and then con-
ducted a standard introductory lesson. The next day, the professor sought out the 
students on campus and asked them to participate in a study he was conducting. 
What he wanted was for the students to fill in and return a questionnaire as 
quickly as possible. In half of the cases, the professor addressed the student by 
name, while in the remaining ones he indicated that he knew he was speaking to 
his student but couldn’t remember that individual’s name. Regardless of how the 
professor addressed the student, he explained that one of the areas explored by the 
research was the effect of the time of day on cognitive functioning, and that students 
were asked to write down the exact time at which they began and finished filling 
in the questionnaire. 
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None of the students refused to take the questionnaire and complete it. (It would 
have been odd had someone done so, taking into consideration the asymmetric 
relationship of professor/student.) We should keep in mind that the investigator 
emphasized it was of importance that the student return the completed question-
naire as quickly as possible. Thus, indicators of a positive reaction to the request were 
the time at which the student began and completed work on the questionnaire, and 
the time between the completion of this activity and the return of the papers to the 
professor (he had said that he would wait in his office until 11:00 pm). Analysis of 
the results demonstrated that students whom the professor had addressed by name 
began filling in the questionnaire more quickly (on average after around 2.5 hours) 
and brought it to his office a shorter time after completing it (on average around 
half an hour) than students whose names the professor appeared to be unable to 
recall (on average, after 5 hours and 1.5 hours, respectively). 
In another experiment (Howard, Gengler & Jain, 1995), the researchers exam-
ined whether remembering someone’s name and addressing a person by it increases 
the likelihood that the person will make a purchase, the proceeds of which would 
go to benefit a charity. Indeed, almost every handbook for salespeople in America 
advises them to remember the name and surname of their regular customers and 
to address them personally, but this advice is rather based on the intuitive feeling 
that such behaviour will increase their sales, not on any proper studies that would 
unequivocally confirm this. 
As in the previous example, the experimental design assumed a natural situation. 
During the first lesson, students introduced themselves to the teacher. Following 
that, the teacher declared that he would like to meet each of them individually and 
discuss their expectations concerning the course, as well as past experience in the 
area the classes would focus on. The students signed up on a list, selecting the most 
convenient time. When a student appeared in the professor’s office, the professor 
greeted the person either by name and surname, or impersonally, or gave a clear 
signal that he was not able to recall the student’s name. (By differentiating these 
three groups, it was possible to reject the hypothesis that it is not so much remem-
bering someone’s name that increases the chance that person will fulfil later 
requests, but rather that a visible inability to remember someone’s name will make 
that person exceptionally unlikely to accede to them.) After a short conversation 
with the student, the professor mentioned that his wife was selling cookies, and that 
the proceeds from sales would go to a church conducting various charitable cam-
paigns. A record was kept of whether students bought cookies or not, and also the 
number of packages purchased. Initial analysis indicated that neither the decision 
to buy nor the number of packages bought differed between the group of students 
greeted impersonally and the group of students whose names the professor could 
not recall. This allowed for exclusion of the hypothesis that individuals observing 
that their name has clearly been forgotten would be particularly unlikely to fulfil 
requests targeted at them. Both of these groups taken together did, however, differ 
from the group of students addressed by their name and surname. Those students 
purchased cookies with more frequency and in greater quantities. 
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The results of the aforementioned experiment are consistent with the one 
described before it. This does not, however, conclusively prove that the foundation 
of greater inclination to fulfil the request of a person who addresses us by name is 
a feeling of affinity. An alternative explanation can involve the roll of one’s mood. 
A large number of studies have indicated that people in a good mood are more 
eager to help others than those who are in a neutral mood (e.g. Baek & Reid, 2013; 
Isen & Levin, 1972; see also Chapter 6). We may assume that the constatation that 
someone remembers our name and surname after the first meeting puts us in a 
good mood (because we have turned out to be important, interesting and of 
significance), which then inclines us to help others. 
The legitimacy of this interpretation was tested in a successive study based on 
a design similar to the one in the experiment previously described. This time, 
however, students who had arrived for an individual meeting scheduled in advance 
with a professor were asked to fill in a special survey concerning their classes, place 
it inside an envelope, seal the envelope and place it in a box located in the office of 
another professor responsible for evaluations of courses and instructors. The 
questionnaires filled in by the students included questions about the attitude of 
the professor towards students, as well as a scale to determine the mood of the 
respondent while filling in the survey. Again, analysis of the results demonstrated 
that people who were addressed by name purchased cookies more frequently and in 
greater amounts than participants from the remaining groups. It also turned out 
that individuals addressed by their name rated the professor’s attitude towards 
students more highly, and they were in a better mood than the other respondents. 
It was also shown that addressing study participants by name had a greater impact 
on their attitude towards the person interacting with them than the mood they 
were in. While both the attitude towards the professor and the degree to which 
their mood was positive impacted their readiness to buy cookies at the professor’s 
request, the strength of the former association was greater than that of the latter. 
These results allowed the authors to adopt the assumption than an interpretation 
grounded in the mechanism of liking has a greater justification than the alternative 
interpretation linked to the mechanism of positive mood. 
It should be noted that the hypothesis assuming that the effectiveness of the 
technique of addressing individuals personally (by name) is based on good mood 
can be verified in an even more direct and conclusive manner. In order to achieve 
this, an experiment’s design should include conditions in which a request is for-
mulated by an individual other than the one who used the name of the participant. 
If this were to generate an increase in readiness to fulfil the request, it would indi-
cate that a good mood is the key factor. However, if no differences were observed 
between those participants who had previously heard their name (remember: from 
another person) and those whose name was not used by anyone or could not be 
recalled, this would be direct evidence that such an interpretation was off the mark. 
Such a study has been carried out in Poland (Dolinski, 2005). The experiment was 
conducted by a student of Polish language and literature doing a teaching intern-
ship in the fifth grade of a vocational secondary school. During the first class she 
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asked the pupils to introduce themselves and to say something about their favourite 
books. At the end of the last lesson that day (in another subject), the teacher 
excused the pupils one at a time, at half-minute intervals, in an order established 
beforehand with the experimenter. Although the investigator did not have as phe-
nomenal a memory of names as Howard (Howard & Gengler, 1995), she knew the 
name of every pupil leaving the room because they had been written down for her. 
She read out the name of every pupil before the student left the class, and in doing 
so she created the impression that she remembered them. 
The aforementioned researcher stood together with her colleague, another 
intern, in the corridor just outside the door to the classroom. Upon seeing a pupil 
exiting, she either addressed the youngster personally: “Oh, hello James, you’re 
from the fifth grade, is that right?”, or impersonally: “Oh, hello, you’re from the 
fifth grade, is that right?” In addition, either the experimenter or her colleague 
made a request of the pupil. In the latter situation, the researcher stepped a few 
metres away, distancing herself from the interaction between her colleague and the 
pupil. The request addressed to the student involved “completing a survey at 
home”, which consisted of 60 questions concerning fears related to school-leaving 
exams, assessment of one’s prospects for the exams and future plans. Pupils were 
told that if they agreed to participate in the survey study they had a week to return 
the completed survey, but also that returning it sooner would make the work 
easier for the individual undertaking the study, so it would be fantastic if they could 
bring it back the following day or the day after. The experiment was conducted 
with the participation of pupils from three groups preparing for their school-
leaving exams.
Nearly all of the pupils handed the surveys in, and the four experimental groups 
recorded equal levels of unreturned questionnaires. However, the result was that in 
conditions when the experimenter addressed the pupils by name and made the 
request herself to bring the completed surveys back as quickly as possible, the 
pupils returned them quicker than in the other conditions. When the experimenter 
addressed the pupils by name but the request to fill out the survey was made by 
her colleague, the pupils returned them later, to be precise, with the same delay as 
in the two conditions in which the experimenter did not remember their names. 
So, we may assume that this study justified a rejection of the interpretation of 
results recorded by Howard et al. (1995), in categories referring to the conse-
quences of improving the mood of the person being addressed. By the same token, 
the most likely mechanism that would explain the compliance of people whom we 
address by name remains an increase in the interpersonal attractiveness of the 
person formulating the request. 
In their last experiment, Howard, Gengler and Jain (1995) accumulated addi-
tional data indirectly confirming the accuracy of just such an interpretation. This 
particular study was based on the assumption that an egotistic reaction to the sound 
of one’s own name would be the response primarily of people whose faith in their 
own capacities had been shaken. A situation was thus set up in which, prior to 
addressing the participants either by name or impersonally, they performed a task 
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at which they either succeeded or failed. The task was an intellectual one, consisting 
of discovering the rule explaining the connection of two stimuli into a pair, and 
information on the participants’ success or failure was supplied in a random 
manner. It turned out that the effect of hearing one’s own name on the inclination 
to purchase cookies was particularly evident in respect of those students who had 
failed at the task just a moment earlier.
The question thus arises of whether it is really the case that increased fondness 
of the requester, and the desire of targets of the request to demonstrate gratitude 
for remembering and using their name are what come into play, or if there is also 
a fear (or at least anxiety) that failure to fulfil the request (or fulfilling it with insuf-
ficient zealousness) may result in the requester exacting some revenge. Of course, 
from a subjective perspective, such revenge is all the more likely when the person 
making the request identifies us personally and wields great influence over our 
situation; it is, therefore, more likely when this individual knows and remembers 
our name than when that person is unable to recall it, or doesn’t even bother to 
try, and also more likely when the person in question is our professor or teacher 
rather than someone of similar status to us. In their next study, Howard, Gengler 
and Jain (1997) made an attempt to confirm the hypothesis of the motivation for 
revenge as the mechanism underlying pliability in the situations under analysis. As 
in previous experiments, participants were students asked during their first seminar 
with a professor to introduce themselves and to discuss their areas of expertise and 
interests. At the end of the class, the students were informed that a longitudinal 
study was being performed to evaluate courses, and that they would receive addi-
tional credits for participation. Those interested were able to sign up for the 
research. Because everyone declared their participation, the next day the professor 
met with them again in order to give them the evaluation surveys. The study was 
of an individual nature. Depending on the experimental conditions, the professor 
either addressed students by name, or stated that he was unable to recall students’ 
names and requested that they introduce themselves again. Participants then 
anonymously (in a separate room) filled in the questionnaire, which addressed such 
issues as the perception of the professor’s attitude towards students and the degree 
to which they feared that assessment of their work during the course and of their 
competencies could be based on something beyond substantive considerations. The 
students then returned to the professor’s office, at which time they received a 
document confirming the additional credits received for participation in the study. 
At the same time, the experimenter proposed that they purchase cookies. In half 
of the cases he pointed to a table on which students could find the cookies and a 
piece of paper with information that they cost 25 cents each, as well as a box for 
money. In the other cases, the professor informed them that the cookies were in 
another room, and the students could go there and purchase them if they wished. 
The self-service cookie point of sale was arranged in a similar way. It can thus be 
said that the potential purchase of cookies was either of a public nature (the student 
knew that the professor was aware of the decision taken) or a private one (the 
student did not think that the professor would see). The analysis of results revealed 
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that students whom the professor addressed by name generally bought cookies 
more frequently (77%) than those whose name was not mentioned by the experi-
menter (38%). It should come as no surprise to us that students addressed by name 
did so with particularly great frequency in public conditions (92%). That said, what 
is symptomatic is that even in purely private conditions those students bought 
cookies more often (64%) than those whose names the experimenter “forgot” – 
both in private (25%) and in public (50%) conditions. This pattern of results is 
entirely consistent with the assumption that the fulfilment of requests by people 
we address by name results from their desire to repay us for doing so.
An analysis was also undertaken of the answers provided by the student 
participants to questions contained in the instructional evaluation questionnaire. It 
transpired that students whom the professor had addressed by name rated his atti-
tude towards them slightly higher than those whose names the professor had 
“forgotten”. Responses to the question concerning fears over transparent assess-
ment by the professor were not, however, a function of whether he remembered 
their names or not. This result also indicates clearly that the effect discussed here is 
not grounded in the fear of people addressed by name that refusal to accede to a 
request will result in their being poorly treated by the person making the request. 
Incidental similarity
In one experiment by Jerry Burger, Shelley Soroka, Katrina Gonzaga, Emily 
Murphy and Emily Somervell (2001), female student participants filled in a ques-
tionnaire that they were told was a personality test. Next, they received feedback on 
the results of the test. In some conditions they learned that another person who had 
filled in the questionnaire together with them received a very similar personality 
profile. In the following stage, that very person (who was in fact collaborating with 
the experimenter) turned to the experiment participant with a certain request. It 
concerned providing assistance with a task that the collaborator had received during 
a class in English literature, which involved finding and asking a previously unknown 
individual to provide an honest assessment of an essay the collaborator had written. 
The essay was eight pages long, and the idea was for someone to give a sincere 
review of the argumentation contained therein and to write a one-page review. 
Would the person targeted with the request agree to it? The outcome was that this 
request was fulfilled much more often when the participant and the requester had 
allegedly similar personalities than in conditions under which no mention was made 
of a comparable personality profile. How can this result be explained? The simplest 
assumption would be to say that, since we generally like our own personality traits, 
the consideration that someone else shares them should result in a positive attitude 
towards that individual. From this positive prejudice it should follow that we are 
more inclined to fulfil requests made by that person.
Jerry Burger, Nicole Messian, Shebani Patel, Alicia del Prado and Carmen 
Anderson (2004) began, however, with the assumption that people may be particu-
larly likely to accede to the requests of people exhibiting any – even a purely 
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coincidental – similarity. In the first of their experiments the researchers informed 
female participants that they were conducting studies on the link between person-
ality and signs of the zodiac. Situations were arranged so that the participant sat in 
a room with the experimenter, who pretended to be another participant. At the 
very beginning, the experimenter peeked at the birthdate of the participant, who 
had given it in a questionnaire containing demographic information. In half of the 
cases the experimenter provided an analogical date as her birthday, and in the 
remaining cases a different date was given. After a moment, the person conducting 
the experiment entered the room occupied by both women and explained that the 
personality test they would be given depended on their astrological signs. She then 
asked her collaborator, who was only pretending to be a participant in the study, 
about her date of birth. As a result, in half of the cases the real study participant was 
able to take into consideration that she shared a birthday with the other “participant”. 
The person conducting the study then asked the real respondent about her date of 
birth (who, in the case of concurrence of dates usually made mention of her 
surprise at this unusual coincidence), after which she gave personality tests to both 
women. After the allegedly completed study, both women exited the laboratory, 
and in the corridor the experimenter made the request to review an eight-page 
essay she had written. It emerged that prior constatation of the coincidence of 
birthdates generated almost a twice-greater chance that this request would be 
fulfilled. While under conditions in which there was no concurrence of birthdates, 
just over 34% of participants agreed to fulfil the request, when this concurrence 
did occur the rate of compliance was over 62%. 
In their next study, the experimenters set two objectives for themselves. First, 
they decided to examine whether analogical effects would occur in the case of a 
slightly induced conviction of an incidental similarity. Second, they changed the 
nature of the request. Whereas in the experiment previously described the request 
was of a personal nature, and accession to it provided the person making the request 
with immediate benefits, in this case the request had a socially beneficial essence. 
Here participants were invited to an experiment concerning creative thinking. They 
were asked to select one of the items placed on a desk, and then spend five minutes 
describing all of its possible applications. With knowledge of each participant’s name, 
during these five minutes a scenario was arranged to take place following the 
participant’s exit from the laboratory. An experimenter stood in front of the building 
collecting donations on behalf of a severely ill girl. She wore an ID badge and held 
a picture of the sick girl in her hands. Depending on the experimental conditions, 
the ID badge worn by the experimenter had either exactly the same name as the 
study participant, or a different one. In the latter case, different names of the sick girl 
on the picture were also given. Sometimes the signature under the photograph 
indicated that she had the same name as the study participant, whereas in other cases 
the names were different. The researchers did not provide data on the percentage of 
people making a donation in particular experimental conditions, limiting them-
selves to the average sums donated by participants in individual conditions. The 
results of this study are presented in Figure 3.1.
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As can be seen, when the study participants ascertained that the volunteer had 
the same name as they did, they gave significantly larger sums of money than in 
the remaining two conditions. The observation that they share a name with the 
victim in need of assistance did not, however, result in such generosity. The per-
ception by the target of the request of similarities to the person issuing the request 
is of key importance (see also Pandelaere, Briers, Dewitte & Warlop, 2010). 
Nicolas Gueguen, Nathalie Pichot and Gwenaelle Le Dreff (2005) invited stu-
dents via e-mail to participate in a questionnaire study. It transpired that they were 
far more successful in recruiting participants for such studies in conditions when the 
person lodging the request signed with the same surname as the person invited to 
participate. Randy Garner (2005) investigated the persuasive influence of name 
similarity on questionnaire return rates. He demonstrated that both undergraduates 
and college professors completed and returned questionnaires more frequently if the 
name on the cover letter was similar to their own. This effect was independent of 
name familiarity. Angelique Martin and Nicolas Gueguen (2013), in turn, stopped 
passers-by on the pavement and asked them to answer a series of questions. They 
began with purely demographic questions (date of birth, marital status, etc.), pro-
ceeding to slightly intrusive and intimate (the age at which their virginity was lost), 
until reaching the level of clearly “taboo questions” (e.g. “Do you use sex toys?”). It 
is known that people very often refuse to answer such intimate questions (Tourangeau 
& Yan, 2007). Such refusal occurred with far less frequency in conditions under 
which the experimenter, upon hearing the respondent’s day of birth, stated with 
feigned surprise that he was also born on the same day of the same month. Other 
studies have demonstrated that people declare their intention to take advantage of a 
dental care programme or recreation centre programme more often when they 
“discover by chance” that they were born on the same day and month as the indi-
vidual making the pitch to them (Jiang, Hoegg, Dahl & Chattopadhyay, 2010). 
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Although the similarity induced in the studies discussed above concerned 
rather trivial things, it was sufficient to increase the tractability of people towards 
requests targeted at them. It is worth observing that the likelihood of such a coin-
cidence occurring was rather minimal. The odds that another person was born on 
the same day and in the same month as us are 1/365; the probability that someone 
else has the same name as we do is more difficult to estimate, and depends on the 
degree of originality of our name in a given population, but we can safely assume 
that the chances of this happening are not great. The question arises of whether 
the low probability of a similarity occurring is a condition that enhances submis-
siveness? In attempting to answer this question, Burger et al. (2004) informed 
study participants that they were involved in a study dedicated to the links 
between personality and biological traits. As part of this study, thumbprints were 
taken from the participants. Individuals taking part in the experiment were then 
informed that they had a type E fingerprint. As one might expect, another study 
participant also had the same type of fingerprint. The experimenter also mentioned 
either that type E fingerprints could be found in just 2% of the population, or that 
it was the most common type, occurring in 80% of humans. In the control group, 
thumbprints were also taken from participants, but nothing was said to them 
about the type of fingerprint they had. Next, the official portion of the experi-
ment was concluded, and an experimenter playing the role of a participant asked 
an individual actually taking part to review an essay she had written. The same 
request was also made in the control group. It transpired that only an exceptional 
similarity to other individuals inclined people to fulfil their requests. While in 
conditions when type E fingerprints were allegedly present in only 2% of the 
population the request was fulfilled in the vast majority of cases; in conditions 
when it was said that type E was the most prevalent one, only about half of the 
participants complied with the request. The rate of compliance in this group was 
not significantly higher than that observed in the control group. The results of this 
experiment are presented in Figure 3.2.
One particularly distinctive form of similarity is imitation of the behaviours 
exhibited by an individual we begin interacting with. As was demonstrated by 
Tanya Chartrand and John Bargh (1999), people usually unconsciously imitate 
gestures (e.g. wiping one’s face, foot tapping) made by the person with whom they 
are speaking. In another experiment, the authors also proved that people are gener-
ally more positively predisposed to those who subtly imitate them. It is this last 
discovery that served as a natural impetus to undertake a series of studies concern-
ing social influence. The hypothesis that the subtle imitation of partners make them 
more likely to comply with our requests and suggestions has become exceedingly 
obvious. The results of experimental studies are quite definitive. Rick van Baaren, 
Rob Holland, Kerry Kawakami and Ad van Knippenberg (2004) demonstrated 
that when an experimenter imitated the position of an interlocutor’s hands and 
legs, there was a greater likelihood of receiving assistance from the study participant 
in gathering coins that had allegedly spilled onto the floor by accident. In other 
experiments results indicated that waiters who repeated the words spoken by 
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customers while taking their orders received larger tips (van Baaren, Holland, 
Steenaert & Knippenberg, 2003), and sales staff in shops with electronics equip-
ment (Jacob, Gueguen, Martin & Boulbry, 2011) and cosmetics (Kulesza, 
Szypowska, Jarman & Dolinski, 2014) sold more of it. Wojciech Kulesza, Dariusz 
Dolinski, Avia Huisman and Robert Majewski (2014) demonstrated that similar 
techniques can induce people to make donations for charitable causes, and that 
copying the words used by our partner in an interaction results in an effect of equal 
strength, regardless of whether the order of those words is observed or not, as long 
as the sense of the utterance is maintained.
Copying the behaviours of an interlocutor can, moreover, concern both behav-
ioural and verbal reactions simultaneously. Robin Tanner, Rosellina Ferraro, Tanya 
Chartrand, James Bettman and Rick van Baaren (2008) invited participants to 
sample a new beverage named “Vigor”. In some cases, while speaking about the 
product, the experimenter imitated the gestures and repeated the words spoken by 
the participant, allegedly to be sure that he had properly understood the statement. 
He did not do this with the other participants. It turned out that participants from 
the former group rated the taste of the beverage more highly. 
Induction of hypocrisy
At the beginning of the 1990s, Elliot Aronson, Carrie Fried and Jeff Stone (1991) 
described a technique that they termed ‘induction of hypocrisy’, which is based on 
inducing individuals to understand clearly that their behaviour is inconsistent with 
their public declarations. Such an observation of one’s own hypocrisy and incon-
sistency in behaviour is an unpleasant experience, and motivates people to behave 
















FIGURE 3.2 Percentage agreeing to the request in Burger et al. (2004) experiment
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The induction of hypocrisy technique consists of two stages. In the first, individuals 
are encouraged to openly declare support for a viewpoint or idea they really do 
(at least on the level of verbal declarations) accept. In the second stage, their 
attention is focused on their own behaviours that are inconsistent with that declaration. 
In a series of experiments Aronson et al. asked students to make short speeches on 
camera about the sensibility of using condoms. Next, they held conversations with 
the students during which they asked the participants to recall all the situations in 
which they failed to use condoms. Study participants then had the opportunity to 
purchase condoms. Results indicated that the students subjected to the induction 
of hypocrisy technique bought more of them than those who were assigned to 
another group during the experiment – those who only made statements on 
camera about the necessity of using condoms, or those who only had to recall 
situations in which they did not use them.
In another study involving the induction of hypocrisy technique, students at a 
swimming pool were asked to sign a declaration that the obligation of every con-
scious human being is to avoid wasting water. They were then asked to respond 
to questions in a survey whose alleged objective was the implementation of a water 
conservation programme. The questions were formulated so that students respond-
ing to them were inevitably led to the conclusion that they did not conserve water. 
They were thus made aware of their hypocrisy (I will sign an appeal about saving 
water, but I won’t do it myself) and a lack of consistency in their behaviour. As it 
turned out, students subjected to this influence later began limiting the time they 
spent taking showers in comparison to those who were not asked to respond to 
the survey nor to sign the petition (Dickerson, Thibodeau, Aronson & Miller, 
1992). Using a similar approach it was also possible to prompt people to recycle 
packing materials (Fried, 1998), and to use sunscreen to reduce the risk of skin 
cancer (Stone & Fernandez, 2011).
What, exactly, explains the success of the technique being described? Aronson 
claims that the mechanism underlying its effectiveness is the individual’s experi-
ence of a state of dissonance. In contrast to Leon Festinger, creator of the theory 
of cognitive dissonance (1957), who defined this phenomenon as an inconsistency 
between two convictions or between a conviction and a behaviour, Aronson 
(1969, 1997) also perceives its essence in a threat to one’s feeling of self-worth and 
the integrity of the “I”. Cognitive dissonance in his definition is linked with the 
need to see oneself as an intelligent and moral person, and it emerges only when 
this perception is under threat. The successful reduction of dissonance is a condi-
tion in which individuals can again view themselves as moral and intelligent beings. 
The induction of hypocrisy technique leads to people becoming consciously 
aware of the discrepancies between what they feel is important and proper (and 
what they publicly declare support for) and their real behaviour. This state places 
their values under threat and wobbles the conviction of the integrity of the “I”. It 
motivates individuals to behave in accordance with prior public declarations. Their 
manifestation makes it possible to rebuild the conviction of self-worth and the 
view of self as an individual who behaves in a consistent, coherent manner. It is 
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worth stressing that the induction of hypocrisy technique also works when, 
following an individual’s realization of the differences between beliefs and behaviours, 
the opportunity is then created to boost the threatened self-appraisal in a manner 
other than adapting actions to declared opinions. Jeff Stone, Andrew Wiegand, Joel 
Cooper and Elliot Aronson (1997) first asked participants to videotape a speech for 
a high school AIDS prevention programme about the importance of using con-
doms to prevent AIDS, and then encouraged them to admit they themselves had 
on occasion neglected to use condoms. It was made possible to recover one’s sense 
of self-worth either directly (participants were offered the chance to buy condoms, 
thus behaving in a manner consistent with their professed beliefs), or indirectly 
(participants could make a donation to benefit the homeless, and thus feel they 
were morally just). Even though participants were given the chance to recover their 
self-esteem indirectly, they preferred to take the direct route, adjusting their behav-
iour to their declared views. This demonstrates the strength of the induction of 
hypocrisy technique in altering people’s behaviours. 
Valerie Fointiat (2004) decided to examine whether the induction of hypocrisy 
technique is based in dissonance. She began with the assumption that dissonance 
should be felt particularly acutely by people whose feeling of self-worth is uncer-
tain or is being threatened. If the technique presently analyzed is particularly 
effective towards just these kinds of people, it will constitute a strong argument for 
a foundation in dissonance. 
In a study conducted in a supermarket car park, housewives were approached. 
They were randomly assigned to one of four groups. In three of them, partici-
pants were first asked to sign an appeal with the words “Everybody has to respect 
speed limits. When you drive slowly, life goes on”. Then, participants were asked 
to respond to a series of questions about whether in the last two months they 
had been speeding, and to discuss the place, time and circumstances surrounding 
these incidents.
Next, the women were offered to have a recording tachometer installed in their 
cars – a special device that registers the speed at which a car is driven. They were 
also informed that this would be free of charge. 
In two of the aforementioned three groups an additional manipulation of the 
integrity of participants’ “I” was introduced. In one of the groups, the experimenter 
stated at the very beginning that although 95% of people exceed the speed limit, 
it didn’t seem that the participant would belong to this category (reinforcing the 
feeling of integrity); in the second group, the experimenter did just the opposite, 
expressing the belief that the participant did, at least sometimes, exceed the speed 
limit (a threat to the feeling of integrity). 
In the fourth (control) group a portion of participants were asked to sign the 
appeal, and the other to answer a series of questions. The results of this experiment 
have shown that individuals in whom hypocrisy was induced (and thus those who 
first signed the appeal, then responded to questions about their own behaviours 
behind the wheel) agreed more often to the installation of a tachometer in their 
car than did those from the control group who either signed the appeal or 
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answered survey questions. The effect of the induction of hypocrisy was strong in 
those experiencing a threat to their own feeling of self-worth, but was absent in 
those who had this feeling reinforced. 
Thus the experiment by Fointiat (2004) not only provided another piece of 
evidence as to the effectiveness of the induction of hypocrisy technique, but also 
proof of its grounding in dissonance. While keeping in mind empirical data attesting 
to the effectiveness of this technique, it should also be considered that its effec-
tiveness is limited to particular areas of reality. Indeed, it is only useful when we 
desire to induce people to behave in a manner they support and value in the 
verbal layer. Other studies by Fointiat and her collaborators (Fointiat, Somat & 
Grosbras, 2011) also show that changes to behaviours do not occur if, immediately 
after becoming aware of one’s hypocrisy, the participant is given the chance to 
trivialize the discrepancies between words and deeds. In one of their experiments, 
participants were made aware of their hypocrisy regarding observance of speed 
limits, and were then asked to participate in volunteer work for a road safety 
organization. If this request was made just after the induction of hypocrisy, the 
result was a greater tendency on the part of the participants to engage in altruistic 
behaviour. If, however, the offer to be involved in work for a road safety organiza-
tion was preceded by a questionnaire filled in by participants in which they had to 
rate how important it was to adhere to the rules of the road regarding speed, they 
applied a different method for reducing cognitive dissonance: trivialization. They 
usually responded that observing speed limits isn’t a particularly important matter, 
and then demonstrated no eagerness to become involved in altruistic work for the 
benefit of a road safety organization. In another article, Fointiat (2008) presents data 
that suggests the circumstances in which individuals become aware of their hypoc-
risy may be of importance. The effects of changes to behaviours are stronger when 
a norm governing how people should behave is negotiated during a discussion 
with others rather than a situation in which they are asked individually about it. 
This last issue brings us closer to another area of social influence – the potential 
presence of others (outside observers) in situations during which we are asking 
someone for something. 
A witness to an interaction
One of the more well-known and classic books by Erving Goffman (1959) bears 
the title “The presentation of self in everyday life”. In essence, individuals are often 
not entirely themselves, but actors showing others their various faces, staged for the 
needs of particular audiences. People do not want others to know they are irritated; 
they desire for others to see them as intelligent and to admire their sense of 
humour; on the beach they suck their stomachs in to show how attractive and thin 
they are. These types of behaviours are referred to in psychology as “self-presentation”. 
Activities involving self-presentation can exhibit a very wide range of features. It 
has been shown in many studies that this often lies at the foundation of offering 
help to others. Generally, readiness to provide assistance is reduced when people 
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are unobserved (e.g. Finkiel & Baumeister, 2010; Gottlieb & Carver, 1980). When 
there are witnesses, however, people can demonstrate their altruism.
With this in mind, Bruce Rind and Daniel Benjamin (1994) came to the con-
clusion that certain types of requests will be more readily fulfilled by people when 
there is another person witnessing them. It would be best if the witness was an 
emotionally close person, whose opinion is of particular importance to the target 
of the request.
With a view to testing this assumption, Rind and Benjamin conducted an 
experiment in the period immediately preceding Christmas, at a small restaurant in 
a shopping centre. The study participants consisted of young men. The experi-
menter approached men sitting at a table either alone, or in the company of a 
woman. Next, he offered the man a chance to purchase a lottery ticket. The main 
prize was a weekend for two in Bermuda, and the proceeds from the lottery were 
to benefit a charity. The gauge of request fulfilment was the average number of 
tickets purchased in the two conditions compared with each other. It turned out 
that the men purchased nearly twice as many tickets when they were in the com-
pany of a woman (on average two tickets) than when alone (on average just over 
one ticket). It was also the case that half of the men sitting alone were not even 
interested in listening to the entire pitch given by the person selling the tickets, 
while in conditions in which a female was in their company, only six percent of 
the time did the men interrupt the ticket salesman before he had finished speaking. 
These results could suggest that the need to make a good impression on the witness 
to an interaction between a requester and the target of the request inclines the lat-
ter to a greater level of amenity and to complying with the request. This need could 
thus form the basis for an effective technique exploiting the presence of an observer. 
Some questions, however, arise from this experiment. First and foremost, the 
issue of whether the desire to cast oneself in a good light before a person of impor-
tance to us is really at work here. Conditions in which someone offers to sell a 
lottery entry to a man sitting with a woman induce him to listen to the entire 
pitch, not because he wants to look good to his partner, but because the situation 
itself becomes unclear and ambiguous. When a man is sitting alone and concludes 
after hearing just a few words that he is not interested in the proposal being made 
by a stranger, he can express this directly and interrupt the monologue. If, however, 
he is accompanied by someone else, he might assume that the proposal he himself 
is not interested in could be an attractive one for his female friend. This fact pre-
cludes him from interrupting the salesman’s monologue. Another problem with 
Rind and Benjamin’s experiment concerns the nature of the request itself. The 
lottery ticket salesman mentioned that the main prize was a trip for two people to 
Bermuda. This could have rendered the chance to take a punt more attractive for 
a man sitting at a table with a partner (he could go with her to Bermuda) than for 
a person sitting alone (who would be more likely to think that he wouldn’t have 
anybody to go with, so there would be no point in buying a ticket). The sorting 
of participants into groups is also difficult to label as random. Men spending their 
time alone can differ in many ways from those sitting with women.
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The first of these issues was examined by Renata Koscielniak (1998) in a study 
based on a concept applied by Rind and Benjamin, but with an enhanced experi-
mental design. She assumed that if the need for positive self-presentation is what 
motivates people to hear someone out to the end when confronted with situations 
like the one created by the American researchers, then the readiness of the person to 
whom the request is addressed should be a function of who the witness of the inter-
action between the asker and the asked is. A situation in which a young man is with 
a young woman he knows should provide a greater impetus to self-presentation than 
one in which a man happens to be with another man, or with an unknown woman.
The research was conducted on the streets of Wrocław, a city in south-west 
Poland. The target participants were young men either walking alone, or in the 
company of another man, or in the company of a woman. A female experimenter 
approached participants, introduced herself as a representative of a children’s founda-
tion, and asked them to do something on behalf of the foundation (depending on 
the conditions, this could be purchasing a ticket for a lottery in which the main prize 
was a television; purchasing a ticket for a lottery in which the main prize was a New 
Year’s Eve package in the mountains for two; or making a donation for a particular 
charity). The experimental design also included conditions in which the targeted 
man was with an unknown woman for only a short moment. In these cases, a female 
collaborator of the experimenter approached a man walking alone and asked him for 
directions. Next, the experimenter appeared and made her request, while the col-
laborator remained as a passive observer of the interaction. As it transpired, participants 
were more inclined to purchase lottery tickets than to make a donation, but in none 
of the conditions did the presence of an additional person and witness to the interac-
tion increase participants’ readiness to fulfil requests compared to conditions in which 
they were walking down the street alone. Koscielniak’s second experiment precisely 
replicated that of Rind and Benjamin, but her results also failed to demonstrate a 
reduced interest in acceding to requests made by an unknown individual on the part 
of men who were alone compared to those of men accompanied by women.
These results potentially suggest that there are differences in models of self-
presentation between the United States and Poland. It cannot be ruled out that in 
the USA, a person who wants to make a good impression on someone else makes 
a demonstration of generosity and eagerly buys a lottery ticket whose proceeds will 
benefit a charity. In Poland, this type of self-presentation is most likely far less com-
mon, and people try to make an impression on others in an entirely different way. 
It could even be supposed that people in Poland want to show their assertiveness 
during a situation in which someone probably wants to cheat them out of money. 
However we look at it, the effectiveness of the technique of exploiting a witness’s 
presence requires further exploration, including of the intercultural dimension.
Summary
This chapter has provided analysis of social influence techniques whose common 
denominator are the mechanisms underlying their effectiveness. These mechanisms 
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appeal to a fundamental human need: most people want to see themselves in a 
good light, and they want others to think well of them. 
The first technique is very simple. It only requires that we quickly and correctly 
remember the name of the person we are interacting with, and then use this name 
during future contact. This simple operation (requiring a very sharp memory) 
results in a greater propensity on the part of another person to comply with our 
requests. People treated in this manner feel they are favoured and appreciated when 
they consider that during the first, brief meeting someone has bothered to remem-
ber their name. This generates increased goodwill to the individual who is presently 
formulating a request towards us.
The second of the techniques consists in displaying a similarity, if just an inci-
dental one, to the individual asked to fulfil a request. This could be a shared 
birthdate, or some unusual trait (in the experiment discussed this trait involved 
fingerprint characteristics). Interestingly, research has shown that even similarities 
in respect of entirely trivial (but rarely occurring) characteristics are sufficient for 
a marked increase in amenability. Compliance can also be induced in others by 
imitating their gestures, or by repeating their verbal communiqués.
The third technique described in this chapter is more complex. The induction 
of hypocrisy is comprised of two phases. In the first of them, individuals are 
encouraged to declare their support for a view or idea that they in fact (at least at 
the level of verbal declarations) accept. In the second phase, the focus shifts to their 
behaviours that contradict the declaration. When people become aware that their 
own behaviours are inconsistent with their public statements, this evokes a feeling 
of dissonance. The desire to rid oneself of this feeling induces people to undertake 
behaviours consistent with previous public declarations. It must be emphasized 
that, while the technique is effective, this effectiveness is limited to situations in 
which the aim is to induce an individual to engaging in behaviours in line with 
openly declared convictions.
The fourth of the techniques placed under analysis is based on the assumption 
that many human behaviours are associated with the need for self-presentation. We 
behave a bit differently in the presence of others than in entirely private situations. 
American studies demonstrated that if the request concerns engaging in charitable 
activity, men are more eager to fulfil it when they are in the company of a woman 
than when they are alone. In Poland, this result could not be replicated. Perhaps 
this is the result of culturally determined differences.
4
THE ROLE OF WORDING  
THE REQUEST
The overwhelming majority of human interactions involve a verbal component 
(Clark, 1985). It goes without saying that the same trait is true of the majority of 
social influence techniques. For example, in the case of sequential techniques 
described in the Chapter 2 of this book, an initial request is first issued verbally, and 
then the target request is also presented verbally. Even when the role of non-verbal 
interaction is being studied, such as in the case of techniques based on making eye 
contact or holding the addressee of a request by the arm (see Chapter 5), these 
gestures are accompanied by a request expressed verbally. Words thus lie at the heart 
of social influence. In this chapter, we will take a special look at words by examining 
techniques in which the word takes centre stage. We will analyze the role of subtle 
differences in the content of messages addressed to other individuals. It will 
become clear that seemingly superficial differences can in fact be of key significance, 
and that what seems obvious to us is not always so. 
“Please” – is it always the magic word?
Most of the time, being polite will not only increase the chances that our request 
is agreed to, but will also give rise to a symmetrical politeness when it is carried 
out. We can imagine a situation in which someone asks for directions to a building, 
like a university library. This exceedingly simple request can be formulated in at 
least a dozen different ways. For example, we can ask “Where’s the university 
library?”, “Excuse me, where is the university library?”, or “I’m so sorry to bother 
you, but would you be so kind as to tell me where the university library is?” 
Herbert Clark and Dale Schunk (1980) conducted a series of studies in which they 
asked their students to read a list of similar requests and then write down the 
answers they would provide to them. The pattern in the results showed very clearly 
that the more polite the question, the more polite the response. This gives rise to 
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the question of whether being polite always increases the strength of social 
influence. The body of empirical work examining this particular question, while 
admittedly small, gives us firm grounds to doubt that it does. 
Michael Firmin, Janine Helmick, Brian Iezzi and Aaron Vaughn (2004) examine 
the extent to which including the word “please” when making a request increases 
the likelihood that it will be carried out. They called several hundred students and 
offered to sell them chocolate cookies, while informing them that the proceeds 
from the sale would go to help people suffering from hunger. A cookie cost 50 
cents. Half of the time, the pitch was concluded with the words “Will you purchase 
a cookie?”, and in the other half the word “please” was added to the question. The 
frequency with which people bought the cookie differed between the two condi-
tions, but as it turned out, in conditions where the word “please” was added to the 
end of the request they were bought less often (65.3%) than in conditions where 
that word was absent (79%). While this result was quite surprising for the authors 
of the experiment, they made an effort to explain it. In my opinion, at least two of 
the potential explanations they offered for the results of their experiment deserve 
our attention. 
First, it is highly probable that the word “please” in the context of a minor 
request submitted in the course of an experiment might seem strange, inappropri-
ate or even suspicious to the experiment’s participants. “Please” is a word used in 
order to persuade people we do not know during interactions with them, so it may 
be the case that hearing that word at the end of a sales pitch for cookies leads to a 
heightened sense of caution.
Second, the appearance of the word “please” at the end of a message may rede-
fine the object which is receiving the aid. When the situation consisted of the study 
participant being informed that by purchasing a cookie he would help those 
suffering from hunger, his positive decision was associated with providing aid to 
people who have nothing to eat. The word “please” may lead to a change in the 
perception of that situation. Agreeing to buy the cookie would be more likely 
associated not with the hungry, but rather the person who most clearly has a direct 
interest (that is, the person who is making the request). Naturally, it is more sensi-
ble to think that buying a cookie will help those who are suffering from hunger 
rather than someone who is likely sitting comfortably in a chair, talking over the 
phone as part of his everyday job.
In another experiment, Aaron Vaughn, Michael Firmin and Chi-en Hwang 
(2009) examined the degree to which the word “please” could help a dishonest 
person avoid having his fraud uncovered. They took advantage of the fact that some 
students were supposed to take a test on general knowledge of psychology. The 
students were invited to come in pairs into a room; one of the students was an 
actual student (the study participant), while the other was a confederate who was 
only pretending to take the test. A teaching assistant handed out the test to both of 
them, informed them that they had 10 minutes to complete it, and left the room. 
The confederate copied multiple answers from the student’s test on several 
occasions. A minute before the examiner’s return, the confederate turned to the 
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participant and asked him to keep his cheating a secret by saying “Don’t tell the 
teaching assistant I cheated, I need your help”, while in half of the cases this message 
was preceded by the word “please”. In the control conditions he said nothing to 
the study participant. It was then recorded whether the study participant reported 
his colleague’s dishonesty to the teaching assistant (the confederate quickly exited 
the room, leaving the participant alone with the examiner). It turned out that in 
the control conditions 24% of participants informed the examiner of the other 
student’s cheating. In conditions in which the “student” politely requested that the 
participant keep his secret, the results were similar (28.6%), while in the conditions 
in which he simply said “Don’t tell . . .” they shot up to 52.2 %. What explains this 
pattern of results? Perhaps the very appeal not to expose the cheating focused 
participants’ thoughts on the dishonesty and violation of ethical norms by their 
partner in the interaction, and for this reason they reported the fraud more 
frequently in the “Don’t tell” conditions than in the control conditions. “Please”, 
in turn, awoke a feeling of sympathy and had the opposite effect, minimizing the 
inclination to expose the dishonest partner in spite of the focus on his reprehensi-
ble behaviour. One way or another, the polite request was, indeed, more effective 
than a simple message, but it was not as effective as silence. 
In two field studies which I conducted with Barbara Dolinska (Dolinska & 
Dolinski, 2006), we examined the role of the sex of partners in an incidental inter-
action, involving conditions of formulating a request either politely or rather 
impolitely. In the first study, the experimenter pretended to be looking for a lost 
gold earring, which was supposed to be a present for his/her mother; in the second, 
help was sought in guarding a bicycle as the experimenter needed to drop by his/
her aunt’s flat on the eighth floor of a block of flats in which the elevator was out 
of order. In half of the cases the request for help was formulated very politely 
(“Would you be so kind as to help me . . .”), while in the other half it came across 
as an order (“I’ve lost a precious gold earring here. You must help me look for it!” 
or “Watch my bicycle so no one will steal it.”). It turned out that if the interaction 
took place between individuals of the same sex, the polite request was clearly more 
effective than the order (this probably comes as a surprise to nobody). Surprisingly, 
however, it turned out that if a woman addresses an unknown man, or a man 
addresses an unknown woman, a quite impertinent order is more effective than a 
polite request! In attempting to explain this pattern of results, we assumed that an 
order constitutes an emphasis on the part of the person giving the message of his/
her privileged position in relation to the addressee of the message. In Western 
culture (European/American), men generally enjoy higher social status than 
women, something that also concerns situations involving communication (Carli, 
1990). Men therefore perceive that it is their right to order a woman to do some-
thing. On the other hand, the same culture acknowledges that women, due to the 
disparity in physical strength between women and men, have the right to demand 
assistance and care from the opposite sex, therefore they have the right to issue 
orders to men. Both men and women are thus entitled to emphasize their privi-
leged status during interactions with people of the opposite sex, which they may 
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do by way of direct orders. The addressee of such a message clearly does not call 
this privilege into question and provides the necessary assistance to the person 
issuing the order. 
To tell the truth, I am not entirely sure if this is the right interpretation, but I 
am not able to come up with a more convincing one. Either way, the experiments 
presented in this part of the chapter demonstrate that the word “please” – contrary 
to what our instincts tell us – does not always boost our chances of success in 
having someone carry out a request. 
Even a penny will help
Robert Cialdini and David Schroeder (1976) draw attention to the fact that people 
do not experience great difficulty in refusing difficult requests. Indeed, if someone 
turns to us with a request that would cost us a lot of money, place heavy demands 
on our time, or would in some other way prove burdensome, we are capable of 
providing many reasons for which we cannot accede to that request. What is more, 
these reasons generally enjoy social acceptance. Other people (including the one 
formulating the request) should, in turn, acknowledge the sensibility of our argu-
ments. Easier requests, however, are an entirely different matter. First, it is difficult 
to provide rational, convincing arguments why we cannot agree to them; second, 
refusal to carry out simple requests may have negative implications for self-
perception. A person who refuses to do some small thing that would bring joy to 
someone close to him will have to deal with the feeling that he is unhelpful, 
insensitive and unsympathetic. 
The situation is thus quite disadvantageous from the perspective of the person 
issuing a request. If he asks for a lot, there are few who will agree. If he asks for a 
little, the request will definitely be agreed to by more people, but each donor will 
give only a minimum. Cialdini and Schroeder indicate the way out of this paradox. 
They suggest employing a message in which we do not state exactly what level of 
help is expected, while at the same adding that any help at all – even the smallest 
amount – is highly valued and will be accepted with gratitude. It is sufficient in the 
case of a standard request for financial assistance to add on the phrase “Even a penny 
will help”. In this manner, a person hearing the request will be prevented from 
thinking “I would do it, but I can’t afford it”, or “I’m not rich either”. To put it more 
simply, the addressee of such a request will not be able to identify rational arguments 
justifying a refusal to provide assistance. On the other hand, we are not simply asking 
for a small amount of help (we are not saying that we want precisely one penny). 
The chance remains that the assistance offered will be more than symbolic.
In an experiment testing the effectiveness of the “even a penny will help” tech-
nique, people presenting themselves as members of the American Cancer Society 
went door-to-door in the suburbs, and after introducing themselves they stated 
that they were collecting donations for the fight against that awful disease. The 
experimental group added the phrase “even a penny will help” to the standard 
pitch for donations. It turned out that in the control group just under 29% of those 
The role of wording the request  69
approached were willing to make a donation, while in the experimental group this 
number reached 50%. Interestingly, those from the experimental group who made 
a donation to those engaged in the fight against cancer gave them, on average, the 
same amount of money as those approached in the control conditions. Thus the 
experimental group collected a much higher sum than the control group. We can 
clearly observe that those who were told “even a penny will help” did not limit 
themselves to giving a just a penny.
We may, however, question whether the information “even a penny will help” 
really accomplishes what the authors claim it does, which is to stop the addressee 
from explaining to both himself and others the reasons for not providing assistance 
in such terms as “I can’t afford it”, and thus becoming a factor that enhances the 
generosity of those approached; an entirely different mechanism from the one just 
described may, at least potentially, come into play. The information that any sum 
of money will help could imply that the organization seeking donations is in a 
perilous financial situation. In such a situation the factor inducing people to offer 
assistance is rather a feeling of pity and the resulting obligation to support those 
who would not manage on their own. 
To examine which of these mechanisms played a real role in the study being 
discussed, Cialdini and Schroeder conducted an additional empirical study in 
which they applied four experimental conditions. Along with the standard request 
and the appended “even a penny will help”, this time they added “We’ve already 
received some contributions, ranging from a penny and up, and I wonder if you 
would be willing to help by giving a donation”, or it was said that “even a dollar 
will help”. It turned out that the information about previous benefactors giving 
“from a penny and up” provoked a positive reaction on the part of those 
approached with roughly the same frequency as the phrase “even a penny will 
help”. Because this message does not evoke the image of a charitable organization 
in a dramatic financial situation (something which Cialdini and Schroeder exam-
ined in yet another study), we may in fact assume that by providing information 
about the acceptability of a minimal donation, we are able to neutralize self-
justifying interpretations for refusing to help, by the same token inducing people 
to reach for their wallets. This interpretation is also supported by the fact that a 
larger sum was collected from the group which heard “even a dollar will help” as 
a part of the pitch for a donation than in the case of the control group. 
James Weyant and Stephen Smith (1987) decided to examine whether the ‘even 
a penny will help’ technique could be successful when applied in the context of a 
charity drive conducted via direct mail. A fundamental difficulty in using the literal 
formula, however, was the cost of organizing a campaign of that nature. The sym-
bolic penny was not enough to cover the costs of printing and postage. The 
researchers therefore decided to replace the phrase “every cent” with a suggested 
minimum donation of $5. For the experiment, people living in the suburbs were 
sent letters from the American Cancer Society. The letter was accompanied by an 
index card designed to simplify the donation process. In some cases there was no 
suggestion of a minimum donation that should be made, while in others there were 
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various dollar amounts suggested, such as $50 (a typical number for a charity drive) 
or $5 (a very unusual figure, incredibly low). It turned out that when the minimum 
suggested donation was $5 the total sum of money collected was significantly 
greater than when no minimum donation was proposed, and also when the pro-
posed donation was given as $50. At the same time, the average value of donations 
from those who offered their support to the American Cancer Society was similar 
in all three experimental conditions. Thus it can be said that in the case of direct 
mail the principle “ask for less to get more” is also applicable. It should, however, 
be mentioned that when William DeJong and Arvo Oopik (1992) tested the “even 
a penny will help” technique when approaching potential benefactors for a dona-
tion via direct mail, their results did not demonstrate a greater proportion of 
people offering help. Perhaps this resulted only from the fact that study participants 
were sent a large number of very diverse materials, as a result of which most of the 
addressees of the appeal might not have even read it. 
The “legitimization of a paltry contribution” technique (this is a more official 
alternative name for the influence technique under analysis here) is not limited 
exclusively to situations involving the pursuit of monetary donations. Junko Takada 
and Timothy Levine (2007) recruited volunteers to help in administrating orienta-
tion programmes for new international students by approaching young people 
walking around campus who appeared to be students. They explained that various 
activities could be helpful, such as picking foreign students up from the airport or 
showing them around campus. In half of the cases the appeal to volunteers was 
concluded with the words “even a few minutes would help”. It turned out that this 
increased the percentage of people declaring readiness to provide assistance from 
14% to 23%. (However, owing to the small size of the cohort, this difference did 
not achieve statistical significance). In our experiments we approached residents of 
Wrocław, a large Polish city, and asked for their help in distributing flyers among 
their acquaintances promoting the organization of the World Expo in Wrocław. In 
half of the cases the appeal for help was concluded with the phrase “Every single 
distributed leaflet will count”. The result was that, by adding this phrase, the 
percentage of people who accepted a packet of leaflets for distribution rose from just 
under 31% to over 43% (Dolinski, Grzyb, Olejnik, Prusakowski & Urban, 2005).
A range of studies using the technique under analysis in other areas than col-
lecting monetary donations have been conducted by Nicolas Gueguen. 
Interestingly, information that even a minimal level of contribution is legitimized 
was not stated verbally in these experiments. Study participants could, however, 
get the message . . . by reading the t-shirts of experimenters. In one such study 
(Gueguen, 2013a) students were encouraged to donate blood. Those who were 
engaged in recruiting donors were dressed in jeans and red t-shirts. In half of the 
cases the t-shirts bore the slogan “Even one donation in your lifetime will help”. 
It turned out that the presence of this slogan on t-shirts increased the percentage 
of people donating blood from under 10% to over 16%. Celine Jacob, Virginie 
Charles-Sire and Nicolas Gueguen (2013) also dressed experimenters in t-shirts, 
but this time they stood in front of the entrance to a supermarket. The study was 
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conducted just before Christmas and involved the collection of food donations 
for impoverished families. When the t-shirts displayed the slogan “Even a single 
package of pasta will help”, the proportion of people who deposited food pur-
chased from the store into specially prepared shopping carts increased from 
around 20% to over 29%. In yet another study, based on a similar design, the 
experimenters demonstrated that donations could be successfully increased just by 
wearing t-shirts with the slogan “Even a single marble will make him/her happy” 
(Gueguen, Martin & Meineri, 2013). 
But you are free!
Many legends of psychology have rightfully emphasized that people place a high 
value on personal freedom, and that they react with aversion when someone wants 
to restrict that freedom (e.g. Brehm, 1966; deCharms, 1968). Taking this very 
assumption as their point of departure, Nicolas Gueguen and Alexandre Pascual 
(2000) formulated the hypothesis that direct semantic evocation of the subject’s 
freedom in making a decision facilitates compliance with the request. In their 
experiment they randomly divided shoppers walking alone around a mall into two 
groups. In the control conditions, a young man approached such an individual and 
said “Excuse me Sir/Madam, could I ask for some change to take the bus, please?” 
In the experimental conditions he added the phrase “But you are free to accept or 
to refuse”. It turned out that while 10% of people in control conditions were 
inclined to agree to the request, in experimental conditions this number shot up 
to 47.5%! In addition, it turned out that participants who decided to make a dona-
tion gave on average twice as much in the experimental condition. What is 
fascinating in this study is that none of the participants in the experiment had any 
reason to feel compelled to carry out the request. Objectively speaking, freedom 
of action was the same in the control and the experimental conditions. Verbal 
emphasis of the freedom to choose, however, had an exceptionally simple effect! 
In another study conducted by the same authors (Gueguen & Pascual, 2005), 
the individual conducting the experiment approached passers-by and requested their 
participation in a survey that would take around 5–8 minutes. It was explained that 
the study was to focus on the perception of local merchants and craftsmen in their 
town. The offer to participate in the study turned out to be quite an attractive one 
for local residents, as 75.6% of those approached agreed to take part. Could this 
already high number be boosted even further by emphasizing the freedom to 
choose? This time, the relevant words were spoken in the experimental condition 
at the very beginning. The experimenter addressed passers-by with the words 
“Excuse me Sir/Madam, I would like to ask you for something but you are free to 
accept or refuse”, and then explained that he was asking for their participation in 
a survey. In these conditions, 90.1% of those approached agreed to participate. 
Further studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of the “evoking freedom” 
technique as applied to a broad range of requests (Gueguen, Joule, Halmi-
Falkowicz et al., 2013). It turned out that by telling people “you are free to accept 
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or refuse”, we increase the chances that they will share a cigarette with us, and also 
that they will agree to watch a video for 5 minutes and then fill in a questionnaire. 
Study participants to whom experimenters repeated the aforementioned phrase 
were also much more likely to buy pancakes when the proceeds from their sale 
were intended to fill the coffers of a charitable organization. Another experiment 
examined whether the evoking freedom technique can be successful assuming a 
longer time horizon (Gueguen, Joule, Halmi-Falkowicz et al., 2013). Study par-
ticipants were asked to participate in an environmental campaign, and their 
involvement would consist of recording their trash-sorting activities in a special 
diary for one month. The researchers examined whether they would agree to the 
request and whether they really did perform the task which they had consented to 
do. The results of this experiment are presented in Table 4.1. As we can see, the 
technique proved successful in both respects.
Further studies have demonstrated that the “evoking freedom” technique is also 
effective when we attempt to convince someone to do something over the phone, 
via traditional post and by e-mail. It has also been shown that the phrase “you are 
free to accept or refuse” is not the only effective wording for emphasizing personal 
freedom, as “do not feel obliged” and “do as you wish” also turned out to be 
equally effective. What will happen if we initiate the conversation by saying “You 
are free (. . .)” and finish it with “Do not feel obliged”? As it turns out, the tech-
nique is even more effective!
The feeling of personal freedom is particularly important for people living in 
individualistic cultures, in which strong emphasis is placed on the value of the pos-
sibility to determine one’s own fate. At the same time, we may assume that the 
technique under examination here should prove less effective in societies with a 
collectivist orientation, as the need to decide about one’s own life is less acutely 
felt. Significantly, multicultural studies conducted in France, the Ivory Coast, 
Romania, Russia and China (Pascual et al., 2012) demonstrated that the technique 
is outstandingly effective in the first of those countries, and also works well in 
Romania (a country where, particularly in recent years, an individualistic orienta-
tion has begun to dominate over a collectivist one), while in Russia and the Ivory 
Coast the rate at which requests were complied with in experimental conditions 
(e.g. with the phrase “But you are free . . .”) was only slightly higher than in the 
TABLE 4.1  Frequencies of participants who complied with the request for money in 
Gueguen, Joule, Halmi-Falkowicz et al. (2013) experiment
“But you are 
free . .” condition
“Do as you 




Male participants 83.7% (n = 43) 81.3% (n = 43) 60.4% (n = 43) 75.2% (n = 129)
Female participants 67.4% (n = 43) 72.1% (n = 43) 20.9% (n = 43) 52.7% (n = 129)
Total 75.6% (n = 86) 76.7% (n = 86) 40.7% (n = 86) 64.3% (n = 258)
Source: Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 2013, vol. 43, p. 130.
Copyright 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
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compliance among participants in three experimental groups could be examined: 
in a group that used the word “yes” several times in a row, in a group that said “no” 
with equal frequency”, and in a group that fulfilled the initial request and agreed 
to answer a few questions but without answering “yes” or “no”. This would help 
us establish whether multiple uses of the word “no” reduces the effectiveness of a 
classic social influence technique (foot-in-the-door) or whether it is of no signifi-
cance from that perspective. 
However, the most important issue remains that of the psychological mecha-
nism underlying the technique being discussed here. Let us observe that if we 
return to the practices of clever door-to-door salesmen, we can imagine an effec-
tive marketer who first leads his interlocutor to answer “no” to some questions, but 
then inclines him to purchase a given product. We can imagine such questions as 
“Is it worth needlessly risking your health?”, “Should you ignore symptoms of the 
common cold?” or “Would you like to gain 10 pounds over the next 2 years?”, and 
after hearing the answer “no”, the salesman then offers a supplement designed to 
protect people from these problems. What would seem to be the key element in 
the behaviour of door-to-door salesmen is not so much getting their interlocutor 
to say “yes”, but rather to guide them into the trap of commitment and consistency. 
Indeed, the interlocutor should behave consistently with his or her previous verbal 
declaration. However, it should not matter whether an answer of “yes” was given 
to a question about whether we should take care of our health, or “no” to a ques-
tion about whether it is worth thoughtlessly endangering our health. In both cases, 
the proper course of action is to purchase the vitamin supplement. The situation 
created by Gueguen, Joule, Courbert and their collaborators (2013) in their exper-
iment is entirely different. There is no association between the content of the 
introductory questions (concerning e.g. a storage unit or solar water-heater) and 
the request to complete a long questionnaire at home about food habits. The com-
mitment and consistency trap here concerns the very fact of consenting to 
participate in a time-consuming survey study after previously participating in a 
short survey study. It is thus limited to the foot-in-the-door effect. This mechanism 
does not, however, explain why people who have repeated the word “yes” several 
times in a row are particularly inclined to fulfil a subsequent and more difficult 
request. We are therefore dealing with a slightly different technique than four walls. 
How can we explain the effectiveness of a strategy designed to induce another 
person to repeatedly respond “yes”? 
The results noted in the experiment by Gueguen, Joule, Courbert et al. (2013) 
can be explained by reference to the mechanism of activation of selected mental 
representations and patterns of action (Higgins, 1996). Multiple repetitions of the 
word “yes” lead to an increased likelihood that the response to successive questions 
or another request or proposal will be the same. It should be observed, however, 
that accepting this interpretation leads to the conclusion that the effectiveness of 
this technique, aimed at inducing an individual to repeat the answer “yes” multiple 
times, should be limited to situations in which the target request appears immedi-
ately afterwards. The technique should then be unsuccessful in conditions when 
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control conditions (without that phrase). In China, the most collectivist, there was 
practically no difference at all. 
Michael Patch, Vicky Hoang and Anthony Stahelsky (1997) draw attention to 
another aspect of the freedom of an individual approached with a request. This 
time, a particular limitation in the freedom to choose comes into play, consisting 
in the elimination of one of the potential decisions. The researchers focused on the 
feelings that can be experienced by an individual approached by a stranger asking 
for something. They suggest that such an individual may observe that he has been 
placed in a rather uncomfortable situation: someone who is neither my friend, nor 
even my acquaintance, has approached me utterly unexpectedly in order to ask for 
something. Additionally, the request goes beyond trivial matters such as giving 
directions or the time. Unwritten and vague cultural norms are violated, according 
to which a stranger is not entitled to make such requests. Yet it is also undesirable 
to remind him of this fact. Thus the addressee of the request refuses to assist the 
stranger, but keeps his reasons to himself.
What, however, will happen if the person making the request says directly to his 
interlocutor that if he feels the request is an inappropriate one for an interaction 
with a stranger, or if he feels pressured, he can just say so? Paradoxically, this does 
not make the task easier for the addressee of the request, but rather makes it more 
difficult! The option “I won’t help you, and I’ll keep my reasons private” is, at least 
to a certain degree, made inaccessible. Indeed, the addressee of the request is actu-
ally encouraged to state directly why he doesn’t want to provide his assistance. Thus 
he is left with only two possible choices in his decision tree: to refuse and to 
explain that he feels the request is inappropriate, or to accede and comply with the 
request. Owing to the fact that explaining to a stranger – who happens to be a 
polite one – that he has violated some code of conduct regulating interpersonal 
contacts is a confrontational and rather stressful act, people may simply prefer to 
comply with the request being made of them. 
In one of the experiments dedicated to examining the effectiveness of this 
technique, students were asked to help by conducting interviews among their 
acquaintances concerning the ways in which they spend their free time. It turned 
out that those who were encouraged to state their reasons for refusing actually 
agreed to fulfil the request more often (49%) than participants from the control 
group (34%).
The question emerges of whether the effectiveness of the technique being 
analyzed here simply results from the fact that an individual who, when making a 
request, asks the addressee to declare if he feels uncomfortable, is perceived as more 
polite than one who does not do so. In order to exclude this possibility, Patch et al.
(1997) conducted an additional experiment whose participants responded to a 
series of questions concerning their perception of individuals formulating a request 
in various manners. This study succeeded in excluding the aforementioned inter-
pretation. As it is, the most likely interpretation would seem to be the one 
suggested by the very authors of the studies under discussion here. When facing 
the dilemma of “how to behave”, people believe it is less undesirable to fulfil a 
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request addressed to them than to enmesh themselves in the confrontational and 
stressful process of explaining to a stranger that they feel uncomfortable. 
Labelling and asking questions
There are a great number of situations in which people happen to overhear 
opinions about themselves. Sometimes these opinions take the form of so-called 
labels. Someone labels another as a brute, or a slob, others are called unreliable or 
untrustworthy. These types of labels, however, need not necessarily be negative 
ones. Labels can be comprised of such words as “reliable”, “hardworking” or 
“gentleman”. Robert Kraut (1973) suggests that by applying various labels to people 
(labelling), in some circumstances they can believe that they really are what the 
labels say they are, and in consequence they begin to behave in accordance with 
the label they have received. Of course, this can lead to positive or negative effects 
depending on the content of those labels. Richard Miller, Philip Brickman and 
Diana Bolen (1975) supplied pupils, from selected classes in a school, information 
about them suggesting that they were neat and liked to maintain order in the 
classroom. After a certain time it turned out that in those classes there was a visible 
improvement in cleanliness, and pupils took very close care to ensure that objects 
in the classroom were in their proper place. However, no improvements in hygiene 
were recorded in classes where traditional persuasive methods were applied. Edvin 
Schur (1971), in turn, analyzed “labelling” of particular people as aggressive 
deviants. He stated that a certain time after being given this label, he could often 
observe changes in their behaviour, consisting of growing aggressiveness. The label-
ling most likely led to so-called dispositional self-attribution in accordance with 
the content of the label. The “labelled” thus came to the conclusion that “this is 
just the way they are” (the attribution is internal, stable and uncontrollable), and 
then begin to behave in a manner consistent with the image of themselves they 
had come to accept. 
Of particular interest from the perspective of the issues analyzed in this book 
are studies on the consequences of labels referring to altruism. A textbook example 
is supplied in a study by Angelo Strenta and William DeJong (1981). In the first 
phase of their experiment, participants (students taking an introductory course in 
psychology) responded to a 49-question survey ostensibly designed to measure 
particular aspects of their personality. The questions were displayed on a computer 
screen, and respondents answered them using a keyboard. Next, the participants 
were provided randomly with information as to what their answers indicated. 
Some of them were told the results suggested that they were kind and thoughtful. 
Others received information that they were more intelligent than the majority. 
Further participants were informed that the results would be calculated within a 
week, and one of the characteristics of particular interest to the researchers was 
kindness to others. The last of the groups was not given any feedback. When the 
participants left the laboratory they experienced an unexpected event (which, in 
reality, had been meticulously arranged by the researchers). One of the experimenters 
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“dropped” a pile of 500 index cards. It was observed whether a given participant 
would spontaneously act to assist in gathering the cards, and the number of cards 
each participant picked up was counted. The amount of time between the cards 
landing on the floor and the participant’s engagement in providing assistance was 
also measured, as well as the entire amount of time spent helping out. It turned out 
that those who had been given the label of altruists displayed different behaviour 
in all of the aforementioned respects when compared to the remaining groups. This 
group saw 70% of its members provide assistance, while 50% of those from the 
group that did not receive feedback and the group that was informed that the 
results would be analyzed later on did so, and a mere 36% of those from the group 
that was given a label associated with intelligence elected to help out. Participants 
from the group given the label of altruist also picked up far more index cards than 
the people in other conditions. Measurements related to time were equally 
definitive. Participants labelled as altruists reacted the quickest and devoted the 
greatest amount of time to providing assistance.
Of course, in order for labelling to be effective, it is necessary for the person 
being labelled to believe in the accuracy of the label. This can be most easily 
achieved when a label appears immediately after the individual has engaged in 
behaviour consistent with the label; for example, just after offering someone help, 
one is told that he is helpful. It should come as no surprise that experiments 
devoted to social influence techniques often combined labelling with a technique 
we have already learned about in Chapter 2: foot-in-the-door. 
One such study was conducted by Morton Goldman, Mark Seever and 
Margaret Seever (1982). These authors assumed that a positive label associated with 
altruism would magnify the effects of the foot-in-the-door technique applied to 
efforts at increasing people’s inclination to provide help to others. A negative label 
could lead to reduction in the effectiveness of the aforementioned technique. The 
experiment was conducted in a university library. One of the experimenters 
stopped people headed towards the entrance of the library and asked them for 
directions to one of the buildings on campus. After receiving directions they either 
thanked the person (foot-in-the-door conditions), or offered a rather unique com-
ment on the help they had received. In the conditions involving foot-in-the-door 
joined with a positive label, the experimenter said: “You are very helpful. Thank 
you very much, you’ve really been a big help.” In conditions of foot-in-the-door 
combined with a negative label, the response was different and went: “You’re not 
very helpful. You didn’t really bother to explain how to get there, and I still have 
no idea where to go.” Each of the study participants then entered the library, where 
they encountered the next experimenter who asked them if they would be willing 
to sacrifice 2 hours in the following month to assist a charitable organization that 
serves disabled children. The work was to consist of working a shift answering 
phones. The same request was addressed to participants from the control group, 
who had not been approached by anyone at the library entrance. It turned out that 
while in the control conditions 17% of participants responded positively to the 
request to donate 2 hours answering phones, this result improved to 40% when the 
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“pure” foot-in-the-door technique was applied. When the aforementioned 
technique was combined with a positive label, the percentage of those ready to 
donate their time to help disabled children jumped to 67%. However, when a 
negative label was applied, this number plummeted to 20%, more or less the level 
recorded in the control group (the difference between the two groups did not 
reach statistical significance). 
A series of interesting experiments concerning the effect of labelling in the area 
of marketing was conducted by Gert Cornelissen, Siegfried Dewitte and Luk 
Warlop (2007). They demonstrated that if study participants first learn that they are 
very concerned with the environment and ecologically conscious, they then go on 
to select environmentally friendly products with a clearly greater frequency, and 
also prefer biodegradable product packaging. 
An unusually original technique, which may be treated as a particularly specific 
variation of labelling, has been proposed by Anthony Pratkanis and Yigal Uriel 
(2011). The researchers call the technique the “expert snare”. While the classic 
labelling technique generally refers to the personality traits or character of the 
person we wish to influence, this particular technique involves labelling the target 
as an expert in a given field. The request that subsequently appears is related to that 
very subject. The first experiment dedicated to the expert snare technique was 
conducted on the beach of Santa Cruz in Santa Monica, California. Surfers were 
asked to endorse the proposal that the belly of all new surfboards be painted yellow 
with purple polka dots. Before this request was made, some of the surfers were 
complimented on their skills. It turned out that such a compliment led to twice as 
many surfers signing what was in essence an idiotic petition. Perhaps the compli-
ment put them in a good mood, and this led to them agreeing to the request? 
Maybe the receipt of a compliment from a stranger activated the mechanism of 
reciprocity – now the surfers should be polite. From the start the researchers fore-
saw the potential for such interpretations and introduced conditions into the 
experimental design in which the surfer was given a compliment, but the remark 
was not associated with his prowess as a surfer. Rather, he was praised for his nice 
wetsuit (or other swimwear). It turned out that this compliment did not serve to 
boost the inclination of study participants to sign the petition placed before them. 
Why did the surfers who were given the label of experts sign an absurd 
petition? It may be significant that the petition bore the title “Polka Dot Safety 
Petition”. If you’re an expert in surfing, you should definitely have heard that polka 
dots enhance the safety of beginning surfers. You haven’t heard about that? Maybe 
you should ask. But should an expert ask questions about that sort of thing? No, 
he should know about it, and he should support it. 
A second experiment was equally as creative as the one described above. This 
time, the participants were Frisbee players and recreational dancers. A portion of 
them were initially complimented for their proficiency, while others were not told 
anything related to their skills. Participants were asked to sign a petition concerning 
students who were beginning their university education. The petition concerned a 
requirement for students to take an orientation course in Tanzimat Frisbee or root 
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dancing. It turned out that “being an expert” made people more inclined to sign 
the petition, but only when the course that new students would be required to take 
was related to their own area of expertise. As it was, those labelled Frisbee experts 
more frequently signed petitions concerning the course in Tanzimat Frisbee than 
Frisbee players from the control group, but when the petition concerned a course 
in root dancing there was no difference between the groups. By the same token, 
when recreational dancers given the label of experts were asked to sign a petition 
concerning root dancing for students, they did so with greater frequency than 
dancers from the control group. However, if the petition referred to a Tanzimat 
Frisbee course, there was no difference between the two groups of dancers. Thus, 
the issue of flattery is not the one in play here. Rather, the idea is that if you are 
an expert in some area, then you should be knowledgeable on various topics in 
that area and support sensible initiatives. As for things in another area in which you 
are not an expert, you are not expected to know everything and do not have to 
support such initiatives. One important detail about this experiment should be 
mentioned at the end: Tanzimat Frisbee and root dancing do not exist – they were 
fabricated by the experimenters. 
A very interesting variation on the labelling technique is one called image 
induction, proposed by San Bolkan and Peter Andersen (2009). While in the classic 
version of the technique the person exerting influence is also the one providing 
the label to the person who is being influenced, in the case of image induction it 
is the very person targeted by social influence who comes up with labels for him-
self! How can this be? Bolkan and Andersen respond that it is sufficient to use “a 
single question to get targets to apply a label to themselves without any previous 
interaction and which asks them to comply with a direct request” (p. 318). In a 
simple but equally clever experiment, the authors asked each participant at the 
beginning of the experiment whether they felt they were a helpful person (every-
one responded in the affirmative), and then asked if they would agree to help the 
experimenter by volunteering to take part in a 30-minute communication survey 
at a later date. It turned out that 77% of participants agreed to this request. In the 
control conditions where the request was issued at once (without the initial ques-
tion of whether participants viewed themselves as helpful), only 29% of participants 
consented. In a second experiment, participants were given the initial question “Do 
you consider yourself to be somebody who is adventurous and likes to try new 
things?”, or this question was not given. Next, all of the participants in the exper-
iment were asked to provide an e-mail address in order to receive information 
about a new brand of soft drink. It transpired that when the request was made at 
once, 33% of participants gave their address, while when the aforementioned ques-
tion preceded the request 75% of them did so. The third experiment, in contrast 
with the previous ones, was not conducted face to face, rather participants 
completed a questionnaire. In the experimental conditions they initially responded 
to the question of whether or not they viewed themselves as helpful. In the control 
conditions this question was not present. Next, participants were asked if they 
would help the experimenter with his work on survey studies. In the experimental 
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group 50% of participants agreed to help out, while only 32% did so in the control 
group. In another version, a portion of people were first asked if they were adven-
turous, and then asked to give their e-mail address in order to forward them 
information about a new brand of soda. In this case, 55% of those who had previ-
ously defined themselves as adventurous gave their e-mail address, compared to 
30% of those who had not. 
As it is, posing questions is itself a very effective social influence technique. 
Steven Sherman (1980) demonstrated that people’s behaviours can be influenced 
without resorting to orders or requests. It is enough to ask them to predict how 
they would react if they encountered a given situation. Sherman assumed that 
people generally make inaccurate predictions regarding their own responses when 
the behaviours described are either socially desirable or undesirable. In respect of 
the former, people naturally overestimate the likelihood that they will engage in a 
given behaviour, while in respect of the latter they underestimate this likelihood. 
Formulating predictions as to one’s own behaviour very often activates the script 
for engaging in a given behaviour (or for refraining from a given behaviour) with 
oneself playing the lead role. 
In one of Sherman’s experiments (1980) participants were asked to write an essay 
the content of which would clearly contradict their own attitudes. Over two-thirds 
(67%) of those approached agreed to do so. Other participants were asked to declare 
if they would agree to write such an essay when asked by someone else to do so. 
Only 29% of respondents said that they would. Sherman thus declares that if people 
estimate the probability of engaging in undesirable activities, their estimates are 
below the mark. Interestingly, when the same group of people who had estimated 
the chances that they would agree to write such an essay were asked a few days later 
to actually write it, only one-third (33%) of them expressed their consent. A second 
experiment delivered similar results. This time, the activity in question was singing 
a song over the phone. In the case of the control group 68% agreed to do so, but 
when other people were asked whether they would agree to such a request from 
someone else, only 44% said “yes”. When these same people were then asked to 
engage in the behaviour, 42% of participants agreed to do so. Writing an essay that 
does not correspond with one’s own attitudes and singing a song over the phone 
during a conversation with a person we do not know are, indeed, behaviours that 
do not enjoy the highest level of social acceptance, and may even be a source of 
embarrassment. What will occur, however, if people are asked about the likelihood 
they will engage in behaviours that enjoy social acceptance? In his next experiment 
Sherman (1980) asked participants to join in a charity campaign consisting in a 
three-hour collection drive gathering donations for the American Cancer Society. 
Only 4% of respondents agreed to help out. Meanwhile, nearly half of those from 
the group asked to declare if they would hypothetically agree to participate in such 
a campaign said that they would. When these same people were then asked to 
actually engage in the campaign, nearly one-third of them consented to pitch in! 
Sherman claims that in these cases we encounter a very interesting mechanism: 
while people do make erroneous estimates of the likelihood they will engage in 
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various behaviours (as people in comparable control groups whose real reactions 
were tested behaved in diametrically different ways), they then proceed to behave 
in a manner consistent with their own prediction. 
Anthony Greenwald and a group of collaborators (Greenwald, Carnot, Beach 
& Young, 1987) explored whether people’s voting patterns could be influenced in 
a similar manner. They called individuals who had already registered for elections 
and asked them what they were going to do until the announcement of the results 
of initial exit polls. As it turned out, the majority of people mentioned that, among 
other things, they intended to visit their local polling station. Of particular interest, 
however, was that among those who were engaged in such a conversation, 86.7% 
of them did in fact cast their vote. This result was higher than the one recorded 
among a comparable cohort of individuals who were not called (61.5%). 
The “ask about” technique also proved successful in conditions where it was 
used to encourage students to sort packaging material as part of a recycling cam-
paign. Residents of some dormitories were asked to complete a sociological survey 
in which they were asked, among other things, if they would sort their trash. When 
containers were then placed in the dormitories for aluminium beverage cans to be 
recycled, they filled up more quickly in the locations where the survey had been 
conducted (Sprott, Spangenberg & Perkins, 1999). 
Eric Spangenberg (1997) began his research by reviewing a list of members of 
a particular club whose primary objective was to maintain the health and physical 
condition of its members. Spangenberg selected those who had not visited the club 
for at least a month for his study. Participants were then assigned randomly to one 
of two groups. In the experimental group, Spangenberg phoned and asked the 
participant if he planned to visit the club in the near future. In the case of the 
control group, he did nothing. The fact that twice as many people from the exper-
imental group visited the club over the following week compared to the control 
group should come as no surprise, considering the results of previous studies on 
the effectiveness of the technique being discussed here. What is fascinating, how-
ever, is that when six months later Spangenberg examined the frequency of 
members’ visits to the club, it also turned out that people from the experimental 
group went there twice as often as those who had landed in the control group – in 
spite of the fact that members of the experimental group had only been called 
once, without any further contact!
In yet another study it was demonstrated that this technique can be applied 
successfully on a mass scale. One day, in front of the entrance to a university building, 
an electronic notice board displayed the message “Ask yourself . . . are you going to 
recycle?” The corridors and entrances to the building were littered with bins for 
paper, aluminium cans, etc. The message on the board led to the bins filling up 
much more quickly than on other days when no such message was displayed 
(Spangenberg, Sprott, Grohmann & Smith, 2003). 
It is also worth drawing attention to two important advantages of this technique. 
First, it is exceptionally easy to apply. All that needs be done is to ask people what 
they would do in a hypothetical situation. Second, it can be used both to increase 
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the probability of engagement in socially desirable behaviours and of elimination 
of socially undesirable ones. 
How are you feeling?
The technique I would now like to present to you is also based on asking a ques-
tion. There are many reasons, however, for which it is deserving of its own 
section. Daniel Howard was primarily interested in the effectiveness of tech-
niques that could be applied when collecting donations for charitable purposes. 
He observed people working on behalf of charitable societies and participated 
extensively in various internal courses and training sessions designed to boost 
qualifications. 
Before you ask anyone for a donation, you first ask them how they are 
feeling. After they tell you they’re feeling good, and you tell them you’re glad 
they’re feeling good, they’ll be more likely to contribute to helping someone 
who isn’t. (Howard, 1990, p. 1185)
This is the advice Howard heard during one of those courses; he then observed 
that it is, in fact, applied quite frequently (particularly during telephone conversa-
tions) by people seeking donations for charitable causes. As a scientist, Howard was 
naturally interested not only in the mere efficacy of the recommended technique, 
but also the psychological mechanism that could explain why people in such situ-
ations succumb to the requests of others. 
Howard assumed that the foundation of this technique was the mechanism of 
commitment and consistency. In his view, a person who publicly announces his 
good mood then feels obliged to care for the emotional well-being of those who 
do not feel good. Compliance with a request to make a donation to a charitable 
cause is then a means of fulfilling the obligation as it is understood in this 
particular situation.
In Howard’s first experiment, an individual presenting himself as an employee 
of a charitable organization placed phone calls to randomly selected residents of 
Dallas, Texas. In the control group, the interlocutors were informed that in their 
neighbourhood they would soon have the opportunity to purchase cookies at a 
price of 25 cents, and the proceeds from the sale would go to benefit the 
organization of a holiday meal for those suffering from hunger (the experiment 
was conducted in the period before Thanksgiving). Participants were asked if 
they would allow the person selling the cookies to visit them at their home. In 
respect of the experimental group, after introducing himself the researcher first 
asked the interlocutor how he was feeling, and then – depending on the answer – 
said he was either glad or sorry to hear that, after which he proceeded to explain 
that a charitable cookie sale was being organized and asked if they would be 
interested in purchasing some cookies. It turned out that people from the 
experimental group agreed with greater frequency (25%) to have a cookie 
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salesperson and representative of the charity committee visit them than those 
from the control group (10%). 
Nevertheless, the question arises whether the more frequent compliance of 
people from the experimental group did not result from the simple fact that the 
person conducting the telephone conversation came across as more polite. It could 
be assumed that asking how one feels and responding with satisfaction when the 
answer is positive (or with sympathy when the answer is not so positive) is 
polite behaviour. Indeed, it would not be a strange thing for people to consent 
more often to a request from a person who is behaving pleasantly compared to the 
same request issued in a less pleasant manner. In order to exclude this interpretation, 
Howard conducted a second experiment in which an additional experimental 
group was introduced. In this case, the person conducting the study started the 
conversation by expressing the hope that his interlocutor was feeling well. It turned 
out that compliance among participants in that group was equal to that recorded 
in the control group, and was half that of the experimental group. This pattern of 
results led Howard to accept that the factor of politeness exhibited by the indi-
vidual asking for help could not explain the differences in compliance rates across 
individual groups. 
In his third experiment Howard undertook a precise analysis of the responses 
of those asked how they felt, demonstrating that the better their declared mood, 
the more often they expressed willingness to admit the cookie salesperson into 
their home and the more cookies they bought. People from the experimental 
group who declared they were in a bad mood were equally unlikely to participate 
in the charity drive as those who were not asked about their mood.
In his interpretation of this pattern of results, Howard emphasizes that it is not 
a simple function of a good mood being favourable to altruistic behaviours, as 
people from the control group did not declare a worse mood yet they were clearly 
less inclined to comply with requests to join in the charity drive (while it is true 
that control group participants’ moods were not recorded, the random assignment 
of people to individual conditions should lead to that particular effect). Thus of key 
importance is not necessarily the experience of a good mood, but rather of the 
public declaration of such feelings. Daniel Howard therefore concludes that asking 
people about their mood and expressing joy when they declare that they feel good 
is an effective social influence technique. He also proposes a name for this tech-
nique, calling it “foot-in-the-mouth”. 
Results similar to Howard’s were recorded by Valerie Fointiat (2000), who did 
not conduct her study by telephone, as did Howard, but rather in face-to-face 
interactions. Participants were asked to make a donation in support of those suffer-
ing from hunger. In the control conditions this request was made directly – people 
were approached with the question of whether they would like to provide financial 
support for hungry residents of their city. In the foot-in-the-mouth conditions this 
request was preceded by a question about their mood, to which the majority 
declared that it was good, at times responding even more enthusiastically. Fointiat 
also introduced a third group into the experimental design, as she was interested in 
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the effect generated by the combined application of the foot-in-the-mouth tech-
nique and a technique familiar to us from the second chapter, door-in-the-face. In 
this case, the participant was first asked how he felt, then his response was heard 
and commented on, after which a very difficult request was made. This request 
involved making a donation of food for the hungry once a week over a period of 
at least three months. When participants refused to fulfil this quite problematic 
request, they were immediately asked to do something much easier – to make a 
one-time donation to residents from their city who were suffering from hunger. It 
turned out that compliance with the target request was the lowest in the control 
group, higher in the group where the foot-in-the-mouth technique was applied, 
and the highest in conditions involving the joint application of that technique with 
influence based on the concept of door-in-the-face. Valerie Fointiat managed not 
only to replicate the results achieved by Howard, but also demonstrated that the 
technique he described works equally in conditions where the contact between 
the person making the request and the addressee did not involve a telephone call.
The results of the experiments conducted by Howard and the study done by 
Fointiat – who refers to his proposed theoretical interpretation when discussing her 
results – demonstrate that asking people how they feel and then declaring satisfac-
tion upon hearing of their good mood serves to increase those people’s inclination 
to comply with a request to participate in a charitable campaign. Insofar as this 
particular result does not give rise to any doubts, the issue of the mechanism under-
lying this truth is a different matter. It does not seem that Daniel Howard succeeded 
in convincingly proving that the mechanism of commitment and consistency lies at 
the heart of compliance when applying the foot-in-the-mouth technique. 
First and foremost, it is not entirely clear why people who declare they are in a 
good mood should feel obliged to ensure those who have no reason to feel good 
themselves experience the same feeling. In reality we are not dealing with an obli-
gation that would directly and logically result from a public declaration (as we 
would in the case of a declaration such as “I believe we should help people who 
are experiencing difficulties in life”), but at most with a discrepancy between one’s 
declaration of a good mood and the implied information that there are some who 
have no reason to be in such a good mood. Also, by accepting Howard’s interpreta-
tion, we should assume that the participants in his second experiment who heard 
that they felt good and did not dispute this should also (at least to a certain degree) 
feel obliged to help improve the mood of others. Meanwhile, in the case of this 
group the rate of compliance was practically identical to that in the control group.
In many psychological studies it has been demonstrated that the experience of 
a worsened mood does not facilitate engagement in altruistic behaviours (e.g. 
Milberg & Clark, 1988; Forgas, 1998). The results of Howard’s third experiment are 
consistent with this principle. Individuals declaring they did not feel good when 
asked about their mood were equally disinclined to engage in helping the needy 
as people from the control group. We may assume that in American culture, with 
its social norm of reporting one is in at least a good mood; admitting to a more 
negative disposition occurs when one is in fact in a very poor mood indeed. It 
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should thus come as no surprise that people who report precisely just such a mood 
rarely engage in altruistic behaviours. We may, however, ask the question of 
whether we would record a similar effect in a culture where the norm is to declare 
a bad mood. If it turned out that people declaring this kind of mood engaged 
in altruistic behaviours with greater frequency than those from a control group, 
such a pattern of results could not be interpreted in the manner Howard proposes 
(after all, “If I am in a bad mood, I don’t feel any obligation to do something in 
order for others to feel good”). One of what is likely a very small number of countries 
where a norm of complaining exists is Poland (Czapinski, 1993; Wojciszke & 
Baryla, 2005). A good illustration of how complaining is a cultural norm in Poland 
is the results of a simple survey study in which respondents were asked about 
everyday conversations. It turned out that 61% of Polish respondents declared that 
they liked to talk about high prices, 56% about the spread of poor manners, and 
47% about the ineffectiveness and amorality of Polish politicians (Wojciszke & 
Baryla, 2005). Cultural differences between Poland and the majority of other 
countries in the world (including the USA) are also reflected in declarations of 
one’s emotional experiences. The most spectacular illustration of these differences 
would seem to come from the studies which I will now proceed to discuss.
In 1937, one of a small number of contemporary psychological journals 
published a brief report of results from studies conducted by Winifred Johnson. The 
participants in this study were a 30-person cohort of American students who 
responded to just one recurring question. They were asked to estimate their mood 
in comparison to how they usually feel, using an 11-point scale with extremes of 
-5 and +5. The middle of the scale was 0, representing a “like usual” mood. Of 
course, one person’s mood is subject to greater or lesser variations. While we 
generally feel “like usual” (in Johnson’s study we would select 0), we can experience 
days when we feel worse than usual, as well as days when we feel better than usual. 
We should have, on average, as many better days than worse ones. The average 
result generated by each of the participants should, therefore, oscillate around zero. 
Johnson’s calculations, however, showed that the respondents must have generally 
felt better than usual, because the average result recorded by each of them over a 
65-day period was +1.2. In the 1990s I replicated Johnson’s experiment in Poland 
(Dolinski, 1996), extending its time frame to 100 days. It turned out that all of the 
Polish respondents achieved a lower result than the neutral point of zero, and in 
the majority of cases (19 of 24) I recorded a statistically significant effect. For Polish 
students, it was typical for them to feel worse than usual! 
Taking advantage of the fact that Poland is ensconced in a culture of complaining, 
Magda Nawrat (1997) conducted an experiment designed as a cultural test of the 
correctness of the interpretation suggested by Howard. Let us observe that the 
foot-in-the-mouth technique requires those asked “how do you feel” to respond 
that they at least feel good. This technique works in the United States (as shown 
by Howard), France (as shown by Fointiat), and probably in the vast majority of 
other countries because most people reply in just this way when asked about their 
emotional state (and only those people consent to the request to engage in a 
84  The role of wording the request
charitable campaign more often than participants in the control group). However, 
because it can be expected that the standard response in Poland will be a reaction 
like “not so good”, “bad”, or at best “not too bad”, this technique should prove 
ineffective (to put it more precisely: it should not be successful if the mechanism 
of commitment and consistency as proposed by Howard lies at the heart of the 
technique’s effectiveness). As a result, and somewhat paradoxically, the ineffective-
ness of this technique in studies conducted in Poland (or in other countries where 
a culture of complaining holds sway) would provide an argument in support of 
Howard’s interpretation of the psychological mechanism driving the effectiveness 
of the social influence technique he studied. 
In the aforementioned experiment by Magda Nawrat, participants were drawn 
from residents of dormitories in Wrocław. Participants identified in a dormitory 
and assigned to the control group were given information about the organization 
of a campaign to support a young children’s home. This campaign, they were told, 
consisted of collecting money, books and toys. They were informed that the drive 
would be starting soon, and then asked to give their address or telephone number 
in order to arrange the details. In the experimental group the request for assistance 
was preceded by a question about their mood. Participants were asked “how they 
were doing” in the face of the upcoming examination session. 
It turned out that participants from the experimental group (asked about their 
mood) were more likely to provide contact information (62.5%) than participants 
from the control group (27.5%). It was also the case that from among the 40 peo-
ple from the experimental group, only 15 declared a positive emotional state. The 
level of compliance among those people did not differ from that observed among 
the 25 people who declared a different mood (i.e. negative or neutral). As in the 
case of Howard’s study, it transpired that asking people about their mood increased 
the chances that they would agree to the later proposition to take part in a charity 
drive. However, in contrast to his experiments, the declaration of a negative or 
neutral mood also served to boost engagement. 
Another test of the hypothesis that the foundation of the foot-in-the-mouth 
technique’s success is the mechanism of commitment and consistency could be a 
situation in which the request to be fulfilled is not related to a charitable campaign, 
but rather to a clearly commercial venture. If it were the case that also in these 
circumstances people asked about their mood complied more frequently with sug-
gestions addressed to them, it would prove difficult to continue supporting an 
interpretation based on the aforementioned mechanism. Howard acknowledges 
this explicitly, suggesting that the regularities he recorded should only be limited 
to situations in which the addressee of the request knows that the person making 
the request will not personally benefit from it being carried out. Magda Nawrat, 
Iza Rudak and I decided to examine whether this significant limitation actually 
occurs (Dolinski, Nawrat & Rudak, 2001).
Our study’s participants were 100 women walking along the sidewalk in the 
centre of the city; 50 of them were randomly assigned to the control group, and 
the same number was assigned to the experimental group. A young woman served 
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as the experimenter. She greeted participants from the experimental group, and 
then asked them how they were feeling. If the participant responded that she was 
feeling good, the experimenter responded by saying: “I’m glad to hear that you’re 
feeling good”. If the participant responded by declaring something different than 
a good mood, the response went: “I’m sorry to hear that you’re not feeling par-
ticularly good.” Regardless of the mood declared by the participant, the experimenter 
immediately followed up with the statement “I am selling aromatic Indian pastilles. 
Would you like to buy a box from me?” In the control group, people were greeted 
and immediately presented with the proposed transaction. 
In the experimental group 11 out of 50 people decided to purchase the incense. 
In the control group, only 3 people did so (the difference in the proportions of 
people in both conditions who complied with the seller’s request was statistically 
significant). From among those asked about their mood, 21 declared a positive 
emotional state, while the remaining participants reported feeling either bad or not 
very good. It turned out that the declared mood had no influence on the tendency 
to purchase the pastilles: in the experimental group they were bought by 5 of those 
who had declared a good mood, and by 6 of the remaining participants.
We can again observe that asking people about their mood boosts the chances of 
inducing compliance also in situations when they declare feeling bad. Importantly, 
this experiment also demonstrated that the foot-in-the-mouth technique, contrary 
to the predictions made by Howard (1990), proved equally successful in conditions 
involving a request of a clearly commercial nature rather than a charitable one. 
We now know what is not the source of the reported pattern of results: as 
Howard himself demonstrated, it is not one’s mood. In turn, studies conducted in 
Poland suggest that it is also not the mechanism of commitment and consistency 
assumed by Howard. Why, then, is the foot-in-the-mouth technique effective? To 
what psychological mechanisms does it owe its success? 
An interesting interpretation of the phenomenon under analysis here has been 
proposed by Kelly Aune and Michael Basil (1994). In their view, asking people 
about their mood and then expressing satisfaction that it is good leads to the 
formation of a bond with the person asking the question. Asking about some-
one’s emotional state is something qualitatively different from asking for the time, 
or for directions to the university library. Someone who asks us how we are 
doing is expressing interest in us as people, while someone who asks us for the 
time or for directions is only interested in his or her own problems. An inquiry 
about mood thus constitutes an expression of interpersonal warmth and empha-
sizes that the asker and the asked are on some level not indifferent to each other. 
It could be said that asking this question leads to a particular relationship of 
intimacy and closeness. This relationship leads to the person being approached 
for assistance incurring an obligation to help. Indeed, there is a social norm 
requiring us to help those with whom something binds us, particularly if provid-
ing such assistance does not result in a significantly negative impact on our own 
interests; this was precisely the case in both Howard’s experiment as well as in 
the others discussed in this section. 
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Of course, a question about mood is only one of many ways in which we can 
establish a relationship of intimacy and closeness with another person. Aune and 
Basil thus conclude that compliance with a request can also be induced in other 
ways than expressing concern for well-being and the verbal techniques involved in 
creating the aforementioned relationship. They additionally present their own 
study, in which the experimenter either directly asked students encountered at a 
university campus to donate to a charity; asking first how they were feeling and 
then requesting the donation; or asking first if they studied at that university and 
then, upon receiving confirmation, declaring that she did too and following this 
up with a request for a donation. The first group was the control group. The second 
was a copy of the conditions set up by Howard in which, depending on the theo-
retical assumption adopted, either the mechanism of consistency or a relationship 
of closeness was activated. The third created conditions in which a feeling of close-
ness was established resulting from membership of the same community. It turned 
out that participants from the last group complied with the greatest frequency, 
while those in the first group did so the least (see Table 4.2). 
A second, complementary experiment conducted by these authors was done 
using “paper and pencil”. Study participants were given descriptions of the three 
experimental scenarios described above, and were asked to assess the relationship 
between the participants in the interactions (i.e. the experimenter and the person 
she approached). It turned out that this relationship was perceived as being the 
closest in the conditions where the conversation involved studying at the same 
university, while it was the most distant when the experimenter directly addressed 
the participant with a request for a donation. In the authors’ opinion, this indicates 
that the perception of closeness in interpersonal relationships constitutes the 
mechanism responsible for compliance in both Howard’s experiments and their own. 
It should be added that establishing a relationship of closeness could also be the 
mechanism responsible for the effects noted in the Polish studies conducted by 
Nawrat (1997) and by Dolinski et al., (2001). The mere question about one’s mood 
builds a relationship of closeness, and this in turn induces people to agree to carry 
out requests involving engagement in a charity drive, as well as to react positively 
to proposals with a commercial slant. 
My collaborators and I, however, have offered yet another interpretation of the 
effects recorded in studies on the foot-in-the-mouth technique (Dolinski et al., 
2001). Because this issue goes beyond a simple explanation of the mechanism 
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facilitating compliance on the part of people subjected to this technique, it is 
worthy of its own section, which follows. 
Dialogue involvement
In the preceding section we analyzed the “foot-in-the-mouth” technique. Let us 
recall that in Howard’s experiments the experimenter called up participants and 
introduced himself as an employee of a charitable organization. In the control 
conditions, he then immediately asked his interlocutor to purchase some cookies 
and informed him that the funds collected from their sale would go towards organ-
izing a holiday meal for people suffering from hunger. In the experimental 
conditions, before the sale of the cookies was mentioned, he asked his interlocutor 
about his mood, listened to the answer, commented on it appropriately and only 
then formulated the request to buy the cookies. People asked about their emotional 
state bought the cookies far more frequently than those who were not asked. 
Howard assumed that the sole difference between the control and the experimen-
tal groups was that participants in the latter group had been asked about their 
mood. In my opinion, there was yet another difference: in the control group the 
contact was based on a monologue, whereas in the experimental group it was 
grounded in a dialogue. In the control group, the study participant was informed 
of the character and the objective of a charity drive, and then asked to take part. 
In the experimental group, the participant was given a question, responded, heard 
a comment on the response, and only then was the request issued. The same 
procedure was used in our experiments as well, in which we tested the technique 
described by Howard. Both when we attempted to convince students to join in a 
charity drive (Nawrat, 1997) and when we sold Indian incense to passers-by 
(Dolinski et al., 2001), we used a monologue with the control groups, while we 
engaged participants from the experimental groups in a dialogue. The studies of 
Aune and Basil (1994) and Fointiat (2000) were also constructed in an analogical 
manner. The control groups were directly asked for something (using a mono-
logue), while the experimental groups experienced a dialogue between someone 
who asked for something shortly after the dialogue had been established and some-
one who was asked for that thing.
Why might different modes of communication have an effect in respect of 
social influence? Dialogue and monologue are the primary modes of interpersonal 
communication. While monologue as a form of one-sided communication would 
seem “cold”, a dialogue, whose essence consists in the mutual exchange of infor-
mation between participants in the interaction, would seem “warm”. 
It could be said that a monologue is associated with avoiding a deeper interac-
tion with the other person. If someone addresses us in the form of a monologue, 
we usually just listen to him and then conclude the interaction. We can also merely 
pretend to be listening, or we can even ignore what that person is saying. Dialogue 
is a completely different case. This form of communication demands cognitive 
activity. In discussing with someone we are forced to listen to him in order to 
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respond to his ideas and arguments. These are not the only differences between 
dialogue and monologue. It would seem that while the convention of verbal com-
munication rooted in monologue is typical of interactions between those who do 
not know each other, dialogue is primarily characteristic of interactions between 
people who are familiar with one another. It could also be judged that in the case 
of a drastic decline in the relationship between two people who know each other, 
their mode of communication shifts from dialogue to monologue. Workplace 
colleagues in conflict with each other do not engage in conversation (they do not 
use dialogue), but they can, if the situation demands, exchange terse messages based 
on monologue (such as “The boss wants you to prepare a report”, or “Last week I 
wrote the report, now it’s your turn”). Also, a frustrated parent engaged in punishing 
his child who has seriously abused his trust can say “Listen to what I have to say 
to you now” and launches into a monologue, while generally communicating with 
the child in the form of a dialogue. The transition from dialogue to monologue is 
thus associated with a sudden and radical decline in a mutual relationship.
If we agree with the assumption that in conditions of interaction between people 
who know each other well the dominant mode of communication is dialogue, 
while in conditions of interaction between strangers it is monologue, this will have 
real significance for explaining the results of all of the experiments presented in the 
preceding section. Indeed, if we accept that a given mode of communication can 
serve as a stimulus that activates a given reaction pattern, then a monologue would 
activate the pattern of behaviour assigned to strangers, while a dialogue would 
activate the pattern of behaviour assigned to people we are familiar with. Because 
people are more inclined to comply with the requests of people they know rather 
than of strangers (e.g. Argyle & Henderson, 1984; Roloff, 1987), dialogue may 
serve to motivate them to comply with a request more effectively than monologue. 
We could thus assume that it is precisely for this reason interactions based on 
dialogue between the experimenter and the participant (typical for those familiar 
with one another) led to more frequent compliance in the studies presented above 
than did contacts rooted in monologue (characteristic of people who do not know 
each other). 
From this perspective it could be said that in Howard’s (1990) experiments the 
key aspect was not that participants were asked about their mood, but that they were 
asked about anything at all, and then something related to their responses was said. 
Along the same lines, in the experiment performed by Aune and Basil (1994) what 
was crucial was not that participants were asked if they were students from the local 
university, but simply that a question was asked of them, and then their answer was 
commented on. In both cases the study participants were ensnared in dialogue.
In our experiment, dedicated to verifying the assumption that it is the engage-
ment in dialogue that plays a key role, we approached students on the campus of a 
Polish university. They were randomly assigned to one of eight experimental con-
ditions, with 50 people in each group. Independently of each other we differentiated 
the mode of communication (monologue – dialogue), posed or did not pose a 
question about mood, and fostered or did not foster closeness based on social 
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identity. For example, in conditions of monologue, a question about mood and 
absence of closeness, the experimenter (a 20-year-old woman) addressed partici-
pants in the following manner:
“I hope you are doing well today. I am collecting money for children with 
special needs. Would you like to contribute, please?”
However, in conditions of dialogue, without a declaration of mood and without 
fostering closeness, the experimenter asked participants:
“I guess you’re a student here. May I ask what you major in?” After receiving 
the answer, she said, “Well, do you consider it worth studying?” listened to the 
answer, and asked for a donation.
The analyses later conducted showed that participants in conditions of dialogue 
more frequently (31%) agreed to the experimenter’s request for a donation than in 
conditions of monologue (11%). The average sum given was also significantly 
higher in conditions of dialogue than those of monologue.
The conditions of monologue that did not broach the subject of mood and 
did not foster closeness can be treated as the base conditions for estimating the 
effectiveness of various means of exerting influence on people’s submissiveness, 
applied in the remaining seven experimental conditions. In other words, these 
conditions can be treated as a control group. A series of pairwise comparisons 
between the ‘control’ group and each of the seven remaining groups demon-
strated that compliance was greater across all four groups in which dialogue was 
applied compared to the control group. The average sums raised in each of those 
groups compared to the control group was also higher. However, all of the 
differences between each of the three groups in which monologue was applied 
and the control group were far from statistically significant. The results of this 
study are presented in Table 4.3.
TABLE 4.3  Proportion of persons complying with the experimenter’s requests, average 
amount of donation (in parentheses), and average duration of the interaction (in 
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These results are very consistent with our hypothesis, which assumes that the 
activation of dialogue as the mode of communication increases people’s readiness 
to comply with requests made of them. Emphasis on a relationship of closeness or 
of an interlocutor’s good mood in the context of monologue turned out to be an 
insufficient way of inducing submissiveness. However, if our assumption is correct 
that the key is to ensnare the other person in a dialogue, then a similar pattern of 
results should be achieved in conditions where the subject of the conversation is 
neither one’s emotional state nor something referring to a shared community 
identity. What is more, engaging someone in dialogue should prove equally effective 
in a situation that is purely commercial. 
Thus we decided in another of our studies to sell Indian incense sticks on the 
street. In the monologue conditions we simply pitched our product to passers-by, 
encouraging them to make a purchase. In conditions of dialogue we asked passers-
by who they thought was more sensitive to smell, men or women? After hearing 
their response, we asked for a justification. After our interlocutor provided some 
arguments, we offered to sell them some incense. It turned out that, while in 
conditions of monologue we succeeded in selling the incense to roughly 1 in 17 
people, this number was 1 in 5 when conditions of dialogue were used. We also 
noted the responses of participants regarding which sex they felt was more sensitive 
to smells. One might assume that the mechanism of commitment and consistency 
would lead to those responding that their own sex was more sensitive to smells 
would be more inclined to purchase incense than those who declared that it was 
the opposite sex whose olfactory senses were more acute (“Since I’m particularly 
predisposed to take pleasure from smells, then I should take advantage of this 
opportunity”). However, it turned out that this aspect was of no significance. This 
experiment was yet another demonstration of how using dialogue to ensnare a 
person whom we are attempting to exert social influence over is a means of 
increasing his readiness to comply with our request. 
A similar effect was recorded by Sebastien Meineri and Nicolas Gueguen 
(2011). In their experiment, they asked participants to take a telephone survey 
about their local newspaper. In the control conditions they made the request at 
once, while in the experimental conditions they began by saying “I hope I’m not 
disturbing you, am I?”, waiting in half of the cases for an answer from the 
respondent while in the remaining cases proceeding immediately to the request 
for participation in the survey. It turned out that, in comparison to the control 
group, only those who were allowed to respond to the statement “I hope I’m not 
disturbing you” agreed more frequently to participate in the survey. Those who 
were told this but had no opportunity to respond consented to take the survey as 
rarely as participants from the control group. The key element, therefore, was the 
presence of dialogue.
Because we assumed that the use of a dialogue-based mode of communication 
would automatically activate the scenario “conversation with an acquaintance”, it 
could be thought that particular sequences of that scenario associate with a positive 
reaction to the request will be automatically and without reflection carried out also 
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when the conversation concerned banal issues of minor importance for the 
individual. However, if the conversation were to turn towards important things, 
then a more detailed analysis of the issues under discussion should be expected – 
the individual should function on a more reflexive level. These expectations are a 
reflection of the rich literature on mechanisms of persuasion. Many studies have 
demonstrated that a high level of interest in information coming to us leads us to 
process it in a highly regimented manner, clearly engaging our cognitive resources 
in effortful mental processes. In turn, insignificant interest in the content of infor-
mation coming to us results in a more superficial and automatic processing of 
information, and is associated with a very low level of cognitive engagement, 
referred to as noneffortful mental processes (see e.g. Chaiken, Liberman & Eagly, 
1989; Chaiken & Stangor, 1987; Maio & Olson, 1995; Petty & Cacioppo, 1990). In 
the last case, people pay less attention to the content of the information, and more 
to so-called peripheral issues such as whether the author of the message is nice, is 
an authority, is physically attractive, etc. 
In respect of the issue of interest to us here, it may be accepted that, in the event, 
the conversation involves an issue of significance to the individual, not only the 
activation of dialogue will be important but its content will be as well. A person 
being approached in these conditions will pay attention to what his interlocutor is 
saying, as well as his attitude towards the issues under discussion. However, if the 
conversation concerns relatively unimportant matters, the simple fact of employing 
dialogue as the mode of communication will be the key issue. Dialogue as a mode 
of communication in this situation plays the same role as authority or the pleasant 
appearance of the person communicating the message does in studies on persua-
sion. Dialogue creates a positive attitude on the part of the addressee towards the 
person speaking with him, but also renders him less active, and as a result he will 
not engage in deep reflection on the information reaching him. 
Thus, from the perspective of boosting compliance – which is of interest to us 
here – of importance in a dialogue on a subject of minor significance is not 
whether the initiator of the conversation espouses the same attitude as the person 
being approached or a different one. In the event of a discussion on important 
subjects, this issue may take on real significance. Only a dialogue based on a con-
sensus of opinions should aid in boosting compliance. To examine whether this is 
really the case, we conducted another experiment in which we took advantage of 
the dramatic situation residents of Wrocław experienced following a giant flood 
that washed over the city. The experiment (Dolinski et al., 2001) was conducted 
in the streets of the city just after the flood waters had receded.
In the control group, the experimenter informed passers-by that studies were 
being conducted concerning various issue associated with daily life in the city, and 
issued a request that they respond to a few questions concerning the local press. 
He added that this would take about 15 minutes to do.
In the experimental conditions this question was preceded by a dialogue with 
the study participant, about a topic of either minor interest or of great interest. The 
topic of minor interest was the yellow colour of the new phone booths that had 
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just been put up on the streets of Wrocław. The experimenter asked some partici-
pants if they liked the new phone booths or not. The topic of great interest was 
the issue of eliminating the consequences of the flood in the city. The experi-
menter asked these participants if they felt the clean-up after the flood was 
proceeding quickly and in an orderly manner, or not. In the case of both dialogues 
the experimenter’s reaction to the opinions voiced by participants was differentiated. 
Regardless of the opinion formulated by a participant, in half of the cases the 
experimenter declared that he was of the very same opinion, while in the remain-
ing cases he said that he did not agree and had an entirely different opinion on that 
subject. Immediately after this, the experimenter asked the participant to sacrifice 
15 minutes in order to respond to questions about the local press. 
It turned out that, whether a participant agreed to the 15-minute interview 
depended on the level of engagement brought about by the initial conversation, as 
well as its course. The results of this study are presented in Table 4.4.
The rate of compliance in groups where communication with study partici-
pants was done by way of dialogue (34.6%) was greater than the analogical statistic 
for the control group, in respect of which monologue was applied (20%). A series 
of pairwise comparisons between the control group and the four experimental 
groups, however, demonstrated that the rate of compliance in the group discussing 
the topic of great interest with an experimenter expressing an analogical opinion 
was higher than in the control group, but the rate of compliance in the group 
discussing the topic of great interest with an experimenter expressing a contrary 
opinion was similar to that of the control group. When the subject was of little 
interest, agreement or disagreement with the experimenter generated similar rates 
of submission, which themselves were higher than in the control group.
The results of the experiment thus turned out to be in line with our expecta-
tions. In conditions where the dialogue touched on issues of minor importance, 
the simple fact of activating that mode of communication was sufficient to induce 
TABLE 4.4  Percentage of persons complying with the experimenter’s request to devote 15 
minutes of their time to answer questions about the local press in Dolinski, 
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compliance among participants, while in conditions involving an important 
discussion only those participants whose opinion the experimenter claimed to 
share demonstrated increased compliance. 
In a series of experiments we succeeded in demonstrating that the initiation of 
a dialogue with a stranger makes that person more likely to comply with a request 
subsequently directed towards him. Considering that the subjects broached in the 
conversations concerned various questions, and the requests involved various 
actions, we may assume that the rule we have uncovered is of a largely universal 
character. The results of the last experiment presented in this section also demonstrate 
certain limitations of this rule: when the conversation relates to important issues, 
dialogue only serves to increase submissiveness when the interlocutors are in 
possession of analogical opinions. 
The power of imagination
Our brains store an incredible amount of all sorts of information. While certain 
cognitive content is very readily accessible, gaining access to other content can be 
significantly more difficult. The essence of this phenomenon is illustrated in a study 
by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1982), who asked over 100 people 
whether there were more words in English beginning with the letter k than those 
in which the letter k appeared as the third letter of the word. While in fact there are 
more than twice as many words in which k is the third letter, compared to words 
which begin with k, the large majority of study participants declared the opposite. 
Why do people commit such obvious mistakes? The problem is that the manner 
in which our memory is organized is favourable to searching for words based on 
their first letter, but it does not facilitate a search for letters in the middle. To simplify 
even further, it was easier for people to recall words beginning with the letter k than 
to recall those in which k was the third letter. The more that something is directly 
“accessible” to our memory or our consciousness, the more it seems likely to us. 
Psychologists interested in the above rule discovered by Tversky and Kahneman 
decided to examine to what degree it constituted a general principle, and also if it 
could be applied to social phenomena. From the perspective of interest to us here, 
the most interesting question was posed by John Carroll. In an article published in 
1978 he wondered whether imagining certain events would lead to an increase in 
the subjective probability that they could actually occur. 
In his experiments – which today constitute classics in the literature – Carroll 
supplied participants with a scenario for some incident in which they themselves 
were the focal point (e.g. they took part in a trip to another continent, passed an 
exam at university, communicated successfully in a foreign language they were not 
fluent in) and asked them to imagine such a situation. It turned out that following 
this suggestion, people estimated the possibility of a given event taking place in 
their real life much higher than those who were simply asked to estimate the 
potential that they would experience an analogical situation. In Carroll’s opin-
ion, the act of imagining a given event – according to a properly constructed 
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scenario – renders the event more cognitively accessible, and by the same token it 
seems subjectively more likely to the individual. 
Larry Gregory, Robert Cialdini and Kathleen Carpenter (1982) began with 
the assumption that this rule can be used in social influence, and proposed a 
technique whose essence consists in saying the words “Imagine that . . .”. The 
researchers conducted a thought experiment, in cooperation with a television 
station from the city of Tempe, Arizona, just outside Phoenix. Suburban home-
owners were unwitting participants in the study. They were randomly assigned to 
one of two groups – control and experimental. Each of the participants was visited 
by a female experimenter. In the case of the control group, she applied typical 
marketing techniques – she said that the company offered a broad selection of 
entertainment and informational channels. She also added that buying a subscription 
was a great way to save money: rather than spending it on fuel and child care – 
normal aspects of spending time outside the home – they could spend time in a 
very pleasant manner in the home, with the family, with friends or alone. In the 
case of the experimental group she also presented basic information about the 
cable TV offer, declaring that it contained a broad range of informational and 
entertainment channels, but she then appealed to the imagination of the participant 
by presenting a scenario. She used arguments such as “Take a moment and think 
of how, instead of spending money on the babysitter and gas, and then having to 
put up with the hassles of ‘going out’, you will be able to spend your time at 
home, with your family, alone or with your friends” (p. 95). 
Participants were then asked to respond to a few questions concerning such 
topics as whether they felt people would like to have cable TV in their homes, 
would they be inclined to buy a subscription, would they have a positive attitude 
towards it, and would they be interested in receiving additional information. Study 
participants who had been asked to engage their imagination responded more 
positively to these questions.
The next portion of this experiment produced even more interesting results. 
After a few weeks had passed, each of the study participants was visited by another 
person. This time, it was an employee of the cable television company unaware of 
the group to which a given person had been assigned. He offered a one-week free 
trial loan of equipment for receiving the cable TV signal, as well as the opportunity 
to purchase a full set of equipment and programmes if the customer decided to get 
a subscription following the end of the one-week period. 
It turned out that in the group on which the “Imagine that . . .” technique was 
used, more people decided to borrow the equipment for a trial week than those in 
the control group. The differences between the two groups become even more 
visible when we compare the purchase decisions they made after the trial week. In 
the “Imagine that . . .” conditions, nearly two-and-a-half times more people 
decided to purchase a cable TV subscription than those in whose case more 
conventional marketing methods were applied.
A similar pattern of results was reported by Anna Schlosser (2003), who replaced 
the cable television subscription with a digital camera, and real behaviour with the 
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declared intention to purchase the camera. The “Imagine that . . .” technique in 
her experiment also proved more effective than conventional means of convincing 
an undecided customer to make a purchase.
Why is such a simple technique not applied on a widespread basis? One of the 
important limitations in its effectiveness could be the difficulty involved in imagin-
ing oneself in particular situations. In one experiment, student participants were 
presented with a story about an illness that spread around a university campus. 
Some of them were asked to imagine that they were exhibiting symptoms of the 
disease; half of these participants were given symptoms that are easy to imagine, 
while the other half were given symptoms difficult to imagine. The experimental 
design also included a control group that was not asked to imagine anything. Study 
participants were asked to estimate the likelihood that they could contract the 
disease. It turned out that participants given more easily imaginable symptoms felt 
they were more likely to fall ill than the control group, while those with symptoms 
more difficult to imagine felt they were not in danger of catching the disease 
(Sherman, Cialdini, Schwartzman & Reynolds, 2002). 
Petia Petrova and Robert Cialdini (2008) recorded a similar effect in studies 
concerning social influence. They proposed to their American subjects that they 
consider the possibility of spending their next vacation in Central Europe. In the 
standard conditions they were shown pictures of the landscape in Bulgaria and 
encouraged to take advantage of the opportunity to take a vacation there. In the 
experimental conditions, the participants were asked to imagine themselves spend-
ing time there. Half of those asked to do so were shown a crisp, clear picture while 
the other half were shown a fuzzy, unclear image. The latter group experienced 
difficulty in imagining themselves in the scenario that was presented to them. It 
turned out that the “Imagine that . . .” technique was only effective when partici-
pants in the experiment saw pictures they could make out easily. This means that 
the technique ceases to be effective when imagining oneself in a given situation is 
difficult. To put it differently, the technique fails when activating the imagination 
of a scenario involving oneself as the star runs into problems. 
Difficulties in imagining something can occur for a wide range of reasons – both 
objective (something can be considered highly unlikely, thus rendering it difficult 
to imagine) and purely technical (as in the experiment of Petrova and Cialdini). All 
of them, however, can render the technique of activating the imagination an 
ineffective one.
Our attention is drawn by Shelley Taylor and her collaborators (Taylor, Pham, 
Rivkin & Armor, 1998) to another important issue related to the effectiveness of 
imagining various situations in the context of evoking behavioural changes. While 
the authors do this in the context of people ridding themselves of various problems 
in their lives and achieving their desired outcomes, as we will soon see, their work 
also turned out to have important implications for the psychology of social influ-
ence and served to initiate a series of studies on that subject. Taylor and her 
collaborators drew attention to the fact that imagining a positive state of affairs is 
an extremely frequent recommendation made in popular self-help literature 
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designed to help people improve their lives. The aforementioned authors undertook 
a critical review of studies addressing this issue and stated that giving ourselves up to 
our dreams does not always bring us closer to our goals. 
They therefore proposed drawing a distinction between two types of imagina-
tion concerning desirable states of affairs. The first is imagination focused on the 
process of achieving a given state of affairs, while the second is imagination focused 
on an end result. In respect of the former, people imagine themselves engaging in 
activities that lead to their dreamed-of result. This type of fantasizing contains a 
sequence of actions exhibiting a causal link with some desired objective. It serves 
to facilitate the development of plans and courses of action, and as a result leads 
one to believe that the likelihood of achieving the dreamed-of goal is relatively 
high, but on condition of engaging in very clearly-defined actions. Such dreams 
focused on the process of achieving a goal are usually very constructive and do, in 
fact, increase the chances it will be accomplished. However, things look entirely 
different when considering dreams focused exclusively on an end result, where the 
imagination consists of only the desired final effect. This does not provide a foun-
dation for mentally working out various means of achieving that goal and 
developing plans. As a consequence, after being jolted awake from their dreams, 
people see only the contrast between the dull reality and the objective they wish 
to reach. Since the means of reaching the goal were not an element of the fantasiz-
ing, the goal itself seems equally (in extreme cases even more) unreal as it did 
before the daydreaming began. This sort of imagination is not as effective at 
improving the likelihood of an individual achieving a desired goal. To illustrate the 
idea, an alcoholic should imagine that he is capable of resisting the urge to lift a 
glass rather than being happy because he does not even feel drawn to alcohol. One 
who dreams of becoming a famous athlete, in turn, should imagine the difficult, 
day-to-day training, and gradually improving his personal bests rather than dream-
ing of standing on the top of the podium listening to the strains of his national 
anthem over the applause of the crowd. 
This differentiation of two types of dreams quickly attracted the interest of 
researchers on social influence. Jennifer Escalas and Mary Luce (2003) explored 
whether inducing people in a different way to dream could impact their readiness 
to purchase certain products. Students served as participants in their study, and the 
product was a non-existent vitamin formula – Millennium – whose formula was 
supposedly designed with students in mind. The students were asked to allow 
themselves to engage in fantasizing associated with the product; some of them were 
asked to think about how their health would improve while using the product, and 
the others were asked to focus on how they would incorporate taking the product 
into the rhythm of their everyday activities. As it turned out, students from the 
latter group declared their desire to purchase Millennium more often than their 
fellow students from the former group. The researchers recorded similar results in 
later experiments during which they examined people’s readiness to purchase 
shampoo (Escalas & Luce, 2004). In conditions of concentration on the process, the 
participants were supposed to imagine how they would feel washing their hair 
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using the shampoo. In conditions of concentration on the result, they were 
supposed to imagine how they would feel when using the shampoo improved 
their appearance. The authors also draw attention to the role of their discovery in 
marketing. While advertisements often appeal to the imaginations of their targets, 
it would seem that they order us to imagine final effects rather than the processes 
leading to them.
The aforementioned results demonstrate that the “Imagine that . . .” technique 
can prove effective in affecting people’s decision-making when making consumer 
purchases, but only in certain circumstances. The real problem for practitioners, 
however, is not how to induce desire and make people imagine buying various, 
often utterly needless, items; it is also important that they do not spontaneously 
imagine how they will run out of money for the things they really need. 
Summary
Words play a very significant role in social influence processes. Many studies have 
shown that seemingly unimportant differences in the wording of a message may 
have a serious impact on people’s readiness to carry out requests and orders 
addressed to them. The results of some experiments flew in the face of conven-
tional wisdom. While it is most certainly the case that adding the word “please” to 
a standard request will generally increase the chances of it being fulfilled, this is not 
an unconditional rule. Studies have shown, for example, that if a request for a 
donation to a charitable cause is made by a person who is only organizing the help 
(and is not a beneficiary of it), then adding the word “please” to the message may 
in fact weaken its effectiveness. 
One of the most well-known techniques exploiting the power of the word is 
“even a penny will help”. We often refuse various requests to support charity cam-
paigns, justifying the decision by saying that we can’t help everyone, or that we are 
not rich enough to support each worthy initiative. However, it turns out that if the 
phrase “even a penny will help” (or something similar) appears following a standard 
request, this manner of thinking is blocked and people are more likely to carry out 
requests being made of them. 
Another technique discussed in this chapter is based on the fact that people 
often refuse to carry out small requests without justifying the reasons for such a 
decision. It turns out that if they are directly asked to explain why they have 
refused to help out, their desire to avoid becoming ensnared in embarrassing justi-
fications boosts the chances that they will carry out the request. A similar increase 
in compliance is noted when emphasis is placed on the fact that the choice of 
whether to agree or not belongs solely to the addressee of the request. Most likely, 
people feel more appreciated when they establish that it is solely dependent on 
them whether they choose to help, rather than when they think their decision 
results to a greater or lesser degree from external pressure.
Many studies have been devoted to the phenomenon of labelling. Defining 
people using dispositional traits often leads to them behaving in a manner consistent 
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with the content of those labels. This is especially likely when the source of the 
label is trustworthy, and the label itself refers to areas of an individual’s self-awareness 
in respect of which he is not entirely sure who he really is. This technique also has 
some interesting variations such as asking questions leading the individual to label 
himself, and the expert snare in which the competences of the individual in a given 
area are emphasized. 
The next technique discussed in this chapter was foot-in-the-mouth. According 
to this technique, in order to increase the chances that a person we approach with 
a request to make a donation on behalf of a charity will react positively, we should 
first ask how he is feeling. After receiving a response that he feels good, we should 
express our satisfaction, and only then make our request for his support for charitable 
activity. Some believe that this technique’s effectiveness is based on the mechanism 
of commitment and consistency. Someone who has publicly declared that he feels 
good should feel an obligation to act in a manner that will help others to feel good 
as well. An alternative interpretation of this effect refers to a relationship of intimacy 
and closeness that is formed when the question about well-being is asked. Yet 
another interpretation assumes that of key importance is not so much the question 
about mood, but questions themselves. The answer to a question sets a conversation 
in motion. According to this interpretation, ensnaring our interlocutor in a dialogue 
about a neutral subject should boost later submissiveness. 
Another interesting social influence technique is inducing an individual to 
imagine particular circumstances. In one related experiment it was demonstrated 
that people who were induced to imagine that they could keep tabs on social and 
political importance, while also being provided a rich selection of entertainment, 
were more likely to purchase a cable television subscription than people approached 
in a more traditional manner. Later research on the consequences of imagining 
various conditions demonstrated that the effectiveness of this technique is limited 
to conditions in which the individual does not experience any difficulties in 
imagining particular conditions or behaviours.
5
INTERACTION DYNAMICS AND  
THE SURPRISE FACTOR
The techniques discussed in this chapter are based on a particular course of events 
during an interaction between the requester and the person targeted with the 
request. We are not concerned here with a sequence of two subsequent requests, as 
in the case of the techniques discussed in Chapter 2, nor with a subtle appeal to 
the feeling of the target of a request’s self-worth, as in Chapter 3, but rather with 
the situation itself in which a dynamizing element is involved in the formulation 
of expectations. There is always something exceptional taking place, something that 
removes the course of events from the sphere of the typical and routine. This unu-
sual happenstance is, of course, no accident. The individual formulating the request 
is aware that without it, the chances that the request will be fulfilled would be 
significantly lower. 
Underlying the effectiveness of such social influence techniques is the assump-
tion that we quite often vacillate as to our decisions: Should we buy a particular 
car or not? Should we vote for one presidential candidate or another? Should we 
sign a petition supporting the introduction of the death penalty or not? In the 
majority of such cases, our indecision results from weighing up the arguments “for 
and against”, with the scales failing to tip significantly in either direction. Even if 
we are inclined to follow one path over the other, the arguments in support of the 
remaining option are not so easily dismissed that we could take a decision with 
absolute certainty as to its correctness. 
The techniques described in this chapter are grounded in the common assumption 
that by introducing a particular dynamizing element into the structure of a situation 
we can ensure that, at least in the key moment during which the decision is taken, 
the individual targeted with the request will be convinced of the greater merit of 
the option that the requester would prefer to be chosen. Let us examine some of these 
social influence techniques.
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That’s not all
Although it would seem that the lower the price of a given product, the more 
people there are ready to buy it, salespeople know that quite often the opposite is 
the case. Indeed, customers often regard the price of a product as an indicator of 
its quality. They assume that “the more expensive, the better”. This way of thinking 
is particularly typical of situations when estimating the quality of some item on the 
basis of measurable criteria is difficult, or when we lack sufficient knowledge in a 
given sphere. 
Discounts present us with a special kind of situation. For example, if we know 
that a washing machine nominally costs $800, but because the end of the year is 
approaching the store’s management is holding a sale and has reduced the price of 
the washing machine to $300. We know that it is a device of good quality (the high 
initial price tells us so), while at the same time we are now able to afford it, because 
it is no longer expensive. From the psychological perspective, a discount draws its 
strength from the fact that the situation is initially characterized by arguments 
supporting the purchase of the aforementioned washing machine (it’s expensive, so 
it’s good), and by arguments against doing so ($800 is a lot of money for a washing 
machine). The exceptional opportunity created by the shop’s management results 
in the arguments “for” retaining their immediacy, while removing the arguments 
“against”. If there were no discount and the washing machine’s price was always 
$300, people who were not well-versed in home appliances would have no idea 
that this particular washing machine was so good.
Situations involving price cuts are generally static. The customer sees the old 
(higher) price and compares it with the new (lower) one. The “that’s not all” social 
influence technique is even more effective than a simple discount; what differenti-
ates it is its dynamic character. This technique was first described and subjected to 
empirical verification by Jerry Burger (1986). As in the case of many other tech-
niques, the impetus came from observing a trick played by some salespeople. Burger 
noticed that when asked about the price of a product, they gave customers an 
answer, but seeing that customers were wavering, they intervened and prevented 
them from saying “no” by immediately providing additional information that can 
be metaphorically represented as a sort of “that’s not all” statement. So, salespeople 
can say such things as “only today” or “for selected customers” a free gift comes with 
a purchased product. They can say that a “special offer” makes the price slightly 
lower, or that “until the end of the day” customers will get not one, but two pack-
ages of product for the same price. The application of the “that’s not all” technique 
can be easily spotted in TV commercials, where the main product is introduced first 
and additional bonus items are presented later using the “if you call now” format. In 
general, this technique is based either on leaving the base price untouched while 
offering an additional freebie, or by dropping the price of a given product.
In the first experiment dedicated to examining the effectiveness of the “that’s 
not all” technique, those selected as participants were people who approached a 
stall where cookies were being sold and asked about their price. The prospective 
Interaction dynamics and the surprise factor  101
clients were randomly assigned to one of two groups. In the control conditions, 
they were informed that the cookies were being sold in a set composed of two 
packages, and the price of the set was 75 cents. In the experimental conditions, the 
salesperson said that the cookies cost 75 cents, then after a short pause added that 
this was the price for a set containing two packages. As it turned out, while 40% 
of customers purchased cookies in the control conditions, this number jumped to 
73% of customers in the experimental conditions. 
It was thus demonstrated that the “that’s not all” technique is effective when a 
potential customer, wavering as to whether to buy, is unexpectedly informed that 
an additional product will also be given. Will this technique be equally successful 
if the price of the article is unexpectedly lowered? Burger decided to attempt to 
answer this question in his next experiment. This time, having asked about the 
price of cookies, participants from the experimental group were told they would 
have to pay $1. Next, the salespeople exchanged a few remarks with each other, 
and then the customer was told that since they were getting ready to close up shop, 
the cookies would be sold at a reduced price of 75 cents. Participants from the 
control group were informed at the beginning that the price was 75 cents. The 
“that’s not all” technique was effective in this case as well. Cookies were purchased 
by 44% of the control group, but by 73% of the experimental group. 
Why is this technique an effective social influence strategy? We may assume that 
the principle of reciprocity comes into play – a mechanism described previously 
during discussion of the “door-in-the-face” technique. In the case of the “that’s not 
all” technique, this principle provokes an intellectual reflection in the form of “if 
the salesperson makes a concession, I should buy the product”.
Burger’s next experiment was dedicated to confirming the correctness of the 
aforementioned interpretation. He assumed that if the technique under discussion 
is based on the principle of reciprocity, it should be particularly (and perhaps exclu-
sively?) effective when the interaction between buyer and seller resembles a 
negotiation, as was the case in the two experiments discussed previously. A similar 
situation was created for one of the conditions in the following experiment. The 
seller reduced the price from $1 to 75 cents, explaining that this resulted from the 
desire to finish work quickly. In another group, the price was also lowered from $1 
to 75 cents, but the situation clearly involved no negotiating. Here it was the case 
that a misunderstanding had occurred: the seller was just beginning work, and had 
been told by a colleague that the cookies previously cost a dollar, but were now on 
sale for 25 cents less. The control group was, of course, told straight away that the 
price was 75 cents. It turned out that more customers decided to purchase the 
cookies in the two experimental conditions (85% and 70%, respectively) than in 
the control conditions (50%).
In another experiment the effectiveness of door-to-door sellers was tested. In the 
control group, they offered to sell candles for $2. For the group in which a price cut 
of a negotiated character was applied, one of the sellers gave a price of $3, but the 
second partner loudly remarked that the real cost was a dollar lower because “(they) 
had agreed to sell them for $2 in order to sell more”. In the group for which the 
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discount was not of a negotiated character, the partner of the seller who had given 
a price of $3 remarked that $3 was the price of some other candles, while the ones 
they were offering now cost $2. In the control group the candles were offered at a 
price of $2 from the very beginning. While under the control conditions the candles 
were bought by only 14.3% of participants, the non-negotiated conditions saw this 
number rise to 37.1%, and in the negotiated conditions it jumped to as high as 
57.1%. Before we proceed to other considerations, let us stop for a moment and 
examine the procedure followed in this experiment. It is worth noting that, despite 
the intentions of the experiment designer, the conditions in which a $1 discount 
was provided differed not only in the level of negotiability. In the first group the 
participants were informed that they had the opportunity to purchase the very same 
candles that had been sold earlier for $3. In the second group, they were offered 
candles for $2 that had always been available at that price (it was other candles that 
cost $3). Only in the first condition was the price an exceptional one.
Regardless, we can easily see that, while the rates at which participants purchased 
cookies and candles were higher in groups involving a seller/client negotiation-
style interaction, this was not a precondition for the technique’s success. These 
results thus indicate that the principle of reciprocity is but one of a number of 
mechanisms underlying the effectiveness of the “that’s not all” trick. Burger, seeking 
an additional mechanism that would serve to explain this technique’s success, 
referred to a “changing the anchor” effect. In one classic study (Kenrick & 
Gutierres, 1980), men rated the attractiveness of a woman presented to them in a 
photograph quite highly. This score was lower, however, if just before they had 
watched an episode of Charlie’s Angels, in which unusually attractive and sexy 
actresses had appeared. If we view this regularity through the lens of “that’s not all” 
technique and recall the experiments previously discussed, we can say that hearing 
a price of 75 cents just after having heard “$1” seems to be a more advantageous 
offer than 75 cents without the $1 “anchor”. 
In one simple experiment, participants were provided information about the 
price of cookies thus: some people were told that the price was 75 cents, others 
that the price was a dollar, while at the same time being asked how much they 
would be willing to pay for the cookies and what they felt was a “fair price”. 
Results indicated that people from the group informed that the regular price was 
$1 declared their readiness to pay more, and that they regarded a higher price as a 
fair one, in greater numbers than the group informed that the price was 75 cents. 
During a subsequent experiment in which the sale of cookies for a price of $1 was 
accompanied by information from the seller that they had previously been mar-
keted for 25 cents more, there was no greater interest exhibited on the part of 
buyers than in the group that was simply told the price was $1 (again, significantly 
greater numbers of participants purchased cookies when the “that’s not all” tech-
nique was applied, reducing the price by 25 cents under the pretence of quickly 
winding up the day’s work). 
These results do not provide confirmation for the supposition that the mechanism 
responsible for the effectiveness of the analyzed technique results from supplying 
Interaction dynamics and the surprise factor  103
the targeted person with an anchor for judging the profitability of a decision to 
buy. To put it more precisely, such an anchor does not, in and of itself, increase one’s 
readiness to take advantage of an offer, which led Burger to conclude that the 
primary mechanism at work is the previously mentioned principle of reciprocity. 
It is possible, however, that of key importance is the surprise with which the new 
anchor appears in the “that’s not all” technique and is linked with the removal of 
an argument that previously justified refusing the offer, occurring in the moment 
at which the wavering customer was mentally reviewing the reasons “for and 
against” the purchase.
Ian Brennan and Kenneth Bahn (1991) drew attention to other problems in the 
search for the psychological mechanism underlying the effectiveness of the “that’s not 
all” technique. They observed that, in the interaction this technique assumes between 
the requester and the target of the request, there is no element of rejection by the 
target of the initial query (as was the case in the “door-in-the-face” discussed previously). 
It is thus not the case that the person issuing the request makes some sort of clear 
concession benefiting the target of the request, which would in turn provide 
motivation for that person to offer some sort of concession. What is more, a reduction 
in price by the seller may be perceived by the client as being motivated by the seller’s 
own self-interest (i.e. desire to close the stall) rather than as a favour for the customer. 
As a consequence, in conditions that Burger treats as reciprocity, essentially a mecha-
nism of contrast takes the fore. The price of $1.25 acts as an anchor point against 
which $1 appears reasonable. In situations that Burger views as a contrast effect 
condition, the price of $1.25 is, in turn, a weaker and less-definitive anchor point, 
coming as it does only after the real price of $1 is given. Brennan and Bahn (1991) 
thus conclude that the issue concerning the mechanism responsible for the effective-
ness of this technique is not resolved. Yun-Oh Whang (2012) also feels that the mixed 
results recorded by Burger failed to provide a clear theoretical explanation for the 
process. Whang observes that, from the perspective of the contrast effect, the attrac-
tiveness of the discount offered by the seller is not associated with the amount of the 
difference as much as whether the final offer consists of a price higher than the 
anchor point or lower. If, for example, a customer feels that a particular television 
should cost $200, a discount from $240 to $210 fails to be attractive, while one from 
$220 to $190 renders the offer tempting. From the perspective of the principle of 
reciprocity, we can say that in both cases we are dealing with a concession – the price 
has been lowered by $30. In one experiment conducted by Whang, students were 
invited to participate in a computer simulation of a purchase decision-making task. 
They were initially asked how much they would be willing to pay for a 27-inch LCD 
TV, and this figure was treated as the anchor point (Whang uses the term “reservation 
price”). Next, the participant’s computer screen displayed an offer to sell that very 
television at a price slightly higher than the declared reservation price. In the control 
conditions, information was simultaneously provided about a price change: the 
television could now be bought at a reduced price. In the “that’s not all” conditions, 
the information about the price change appeared after 15 seconds. Independently of 
the conditions, the value of the bonus was constructed such that in half of the cases 
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the final offer remained higher than the anchor point (or, as Whang calls it, the level 
of the reservation price), while in the remaining cases it was lower. At the end, 
participants were requested to indicate on a 7-point scale the likelihood of their 
taking the opportunity to purchase the television. The effectiveness of the “that’s not 
all” technique will be confirmed if this declaration is stronger in conditions when the 
information about a drop in price appeared following a delay, as opposed to analogical 
conditions in which this information was provided alongside the regular price. As it 
occurred, in the case of the unattractive conditions (i.e. when the final price remained 
higher than the anchor point), the technique described here was effective (increase 
in declared inclination to buy from 3.92 to 5.00), while in the attractive conditions 
(i.e. when the final price was lower than the anchor point), this technique was not 
effective (inclination to accept the offer remained at the same level: 4.77 and 4.82, 
respectively). In Whang’s opinion, these results offer little support for the contrast 
mechanism – indeed, contrast should bring the technique’s mechanisms to life in 
attractive conditions, not in unattractive ones. The author concludes that it is the 
principle of reciprocity that constitutes the psychological mechanism activating the 
technique described here. Be that as it may, how can we explain the fact that it only 
functions in conditions viewed as unfavourable? It is worth noting that in the attrac-
tive conditions, the participants had already declared a rather strong inclination to 
buy. The attractiveness of the offer itself was at work in this case. The technique had 
no opportunity to improve the situation, it could not increase the likelihood 
participants would buy the television. These results, besides casting a certain light on 
the mechanism underlying the effectiveness of the “that’s not all” technique, would 
also seem to be of practical value: this sales trick should be applied first and foremost 
when the final asking price remains quite high. If the proposed discount proves to be 
truly attractive, it is sufficient to offer a traditional reduction in price without any 
dynamizing element. The question arises, however, to what degree the effect achieved 
by Whang can be generalized and applied to all situations involving sales. We should 
keep in mind the fact that this researcher explored decisions by consumers related to 
the purchase of a television, which is a product used in the private sphere (at home), 
technologically advanced and quite costly. 
Carrie Pollock, Shane Smith, Eric Knowles and Heather Bruce (1998) observed 
that people behave in different ways when making the decision to purchase various 
types of products. If we focus on the aspect of price, in the case of inexpensive 
items the customer does not carefully review all the information provided by the 
seller. It is sufficient that the interaction gives the impression of a price negotiation, 
and that the seller backs down from the original price, for the customer to be likely 
to purchase the article in question at the lower price. This would serve to explain 
why, in Burger’s experiments, situations in which a lower price was quoted follow-
ing a higher one was sufficient to induce greater customer interest than conditions 
in which the sale price was given at the start. 
The aforementioned researchers feel that the concept of automaticity developed 
by Ellen Langer (1978) can be helpful in understanding the behaviour of Burger’s 
research participants. 
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In many social situations we react automatically, limiting the volume of data 
processed and the complexity of the processing itself to a minimum, reducing our 
cognitive activity. The simplest way to convince ourselves of this truth is to ask 
people the time after they have just glanced at their watch. They will invariably look 
at their watch again, and this time they will do so for a bit longer. As another example 
of mindlessness, we may cite the course of an experiment I conducted some time 
ago with my collaborators (Dolinski, Gromski & Szmajke, 1988). We were interested 
in judgements about the responsibility of the perpetrator of a bad act, more 
specifically, in the effect of being the person wronged by said perpetrator. The 
design of the experiment thus required that a portion of participants experienced 
the feeling of being harmed. To achieve this aim, we decided to cheat the partici-
pants out of some money (which we naturally returned to them after the experiment 
had finished). One of us came into a lecture hall occupied by first-year students, 
introduced himself as an employee of the university and announced that the 
students had paid too little during registration. The researcher then took out a 
plastic bag that already contained a small sum of money, as well as a clean sheet of 
paper, and began taking payments. We did not present any documents to the students, 
nor did we issue any sort of receipts. As the design of our experiment was rather 
complex, we had to repeat the situation four times. In each case, we observed to our 
surprise that nobody expressed any concern; students who didn’t have any cash on 
hand borrowed some from their classmates, and all of them were careful to ensure 
that their names were written down on the piece of paper. We collected money 
from several dozen students, and in half of the cases the sums were significant.
While it may be debated whether automaticity is the product of our mind’s 
limitations, as suggested by Michael Posner and Charles Snyder (1975) and Shelley 
Taylor (1981), or rather from motivational deficits, as would argue Ulric Neisser 
(1976) and David Navon (1984), in a range of situations we apply ready schemes 
of behaviours learned and formulated in the past. Langer (1978) suggests that if a 
message targeted at us is structurally similar to ones we have reacted positively to 
in the past, it is highly likely that we will refrain from analyzing its content and the 
context in which it is transmitted; rather, we will mindlessly and automatically 
activate an established response pattern. An example of this manner of functioning 
is supplied by Ellen Langer, Arthur Blank and Benzion Chanowitz (1978). In this 
study, individuals waiting for a copy machine were asked to give up their place in 
line. Depending on the experimental conditions, the person doing the asking 
either made only a simple request (“Excuse me . . . may I use the Xerox machine?”), 
or added a fragment with only the grammatical and structural form of a justifica-
tion for the request (“because I have to make a copy?”), or appended the request 
with a real justification (“because I am in a rush?”). When the experimenter added 
that there were only 5 pages to be copied, participants gave up their place in the 
queue equally often in cases when the justification was a real one (being in a rush) 
as in those when it was spurious (needing to make copies), even though in the 
second situation the content of the remark provided absolutely no additional real 
explanation. It was obvious that the person addressing the participants wanted to 
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make photocopies. Clearly, nobody would use a photocopier to fry pancakes. At 
the same time, participants very rarely allowed experimenters to jump the queue 
when only a request without any sort of justification was provided. Because 
participants in the past had probably reacted to requests aimed at them and accom-
panied with a justification on multiple occasions, in the situation described above 
they simply activated mindlessly the script for agreement to displaying politeness. 
The oddity and novelty of a situation involving a request with no justification at 
all, however, put them on their guard and shifted their reaction to a qualitatively 
higher level of reflection. Participants also reacted in a reflective manner when the 
experimenter said that there were 20 (and not 5, as in the conditions described 
above) pages for copying. In this situation the experimenter was far more likely to 
receive consent to use the photocopier when the provided justification was a real 
one than when only an apparent one. Automaticity here would be too costly 
(significant loss of time). Thus, the participants analyzed not only the structure of 
messages targeting them, but also their content. Langer et al. (1978) suggest that in 
these situations there is sufficient motivation to shift one’s attention from the 
simple structural characteristics of the message to its semantic elements, which 
results in processing of the actual information streaming in.
Pollock et al. (1998) suggest that the “that’s not all” technique exploits the fact 
that customers being offered inexpensive goods are in a state of automaticity. If this 
is essentially the case, it may be assumed that the technique will cease to be effec-
tive when the item in question is expensive. This should generate a shift in the 
individual’s functioning to a reflective level, as well as neutralizing the effect of 
information about circumstances making it cheaper to buy at the present moment. 
In addition, by applying the technique of Langer and her associates involving the 
use of real or apparent justifications for requests or propositions, it is possible to 
determine whether and when people are in a state of automaticity or are not.
In one experimental study, the reactions of people given the chance to purchase 
sweets were observed. In some conditions these were small bombonieres, sold for 
$1. In the version involving the application of the “that’s not all” technique, the 
initial price was $1.25; following a short conversation between sellers, it was 
announced that the bomboniere cost $1. In other conditions, the bombonieres 
were significantly larger, and their price was $5. When the “that’s not all” technique 
was used, a price of $5.25 was first quoted, and after the sellers engaged in a brief 
conversation between themselves, a price of $5 was subsequently given. In addition, 
in some cases the sellers provided an additional remark designed to justify the 
purchase of the bomboniere. Similarly to the experiment by Langer et al., some-
times this justification was real while in others it was spurious. In the first case, it 
was said that the manufacturer was a recognized brand, present on the market for 
many years, and that the chocolates contained titbits hand-dipped in liquid choco-
late mixed with cashews. In the case of the spurious justification, it was said that 
the chocolates were made of chocolate and were sold in that very box. Some 
participants were not provided with any additional justification for purchasing the 
bombonieres. Analysis of the results showed that the “that’s not all” technique was 
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only effective when the price of the bomboniere was not high. In these cases, 76% 
of customers purchased them as opposed to the 45% who did so in the control 
group. If, however, the bombonieres were expensive, the differences between the 
control group and the group on which the technique under analysis was applied 
was no longer statistically significant. Additionally, it turned out that if the sweets 
cost $1, the spurious justification was equally effective in boosting customers’ 
readiness to buy them as the real justification. The opposite was the case, however, 
when the bombonieres were expensive. Without any justification at all provided for 
making the purchase, roughly the same number of participants decided to buy 
them compared to those receiving a spurious justification; the percentage of those 
buying the bombonieres was significantly higher when a real justification was 
given. These results thus suggest that people stop behaving mindlessly in the case 
of relatively costly purchases. The “that’s not all” technique also ceases to be effective 
in these situations.
It would seem, however, that a lone experiment is not a sufficient basis for 
claiming that the analyzed technique is never effective in such cases. Perhaps, if the 
discount or additional product offered is of substantial value, the individual receiving 
the offer can make a more or less rational decision to take advantage of it. Although 
I have not conducted any empirical research in this area, I have been led to this 
conclusion by observing the behaviour of a knife salesman working in the main 
railway station in Wrocław, the city where I work and live. He offers passers-by a 
set of knives in a wood block for $50, and when he observes they are taking a 
moment to think, he adds that as part of a grand promotion every purchasing 
customer can receive a surprise gift worth $100. Tempted by this highly exceptional 
opportunity, customers often purchase the knives and then receive their surprise 
gift of . . . two additional sets of knives (each worth $50). 
It would seem that the essence of the “that’s not all” technique’s effectiveness 
consists primarily of the initial offer itself being rather attractive (for example, it is 
worth noting that in the aforementioned experiments, cookies were bought by 
around 40% of people in the control group, while the small bomboniere was 
purchased by 45% of participants). At the moment when someone is wavering and 
exploring the arguments for and against both potential decisions (buy/don’t buy), 
a new argument suddenly appears, which often tips the scales. Unlike those 
researchers who refer to the theory of automaticity, I do not think that this argument 
proved decisive only in conditions involving the potential purchase of inexpensive 
goods. I would rather say that in the case of cheaper products, it is enough that the 
aforementioned argument is simply raised. In the case of expensive items, however, 
it must be of significantly greater weight. 
Disruption-then-reframe
The disruption-then-reframe (DTR) technique is based on the assumption that 
people of whom some request is made then experience an approach/avoidance 
conflict. The approach is associated with the desire to provide assistance to another 
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person who needs and asks for it. It can also be linked with the desire to acquire 
particular goods. Avoidance, however, is related to the necessary effort or loss of 
time and/or money. Individuals thus resist the thing others are encouraging them 
to do. Many social influence techniques are oriented on enhancing the incentive 
to do something, such as by highlighting the benefits that can result. The best 
example of this may be the “that’s not all” trick discussed above. The technique to 
be discussed now consists of both reducing resistance and boosting incentive. What 
lies at its core? The act of “knocking someone out of their comfort zone”, of 
making the course of an interaction a bit surprising and unusual, then presenting 
a new argument to encourage our interlocutor to accede to a particular request. 
Barbara Davis and Eric Knowles (1999) suggest that at least two psychological 
theories provide a foundation for the prediction that a cognitive reframing tech-
nique will be effective. The first of them is based in the work of Erickson – the 
founder of modern hypnosis. Erickson (1964) observed that people came to him 
in order to be subjected to a state of hypnosis, but at the same time they experi-
enced a feeling of resistance. To overcome this recalcitrance, it becomes necessary 
to do something that will put them off balance, at least for a moment. For example, 
we may suddenly and forcefully squeeze a patient’s hand during our greeting. This 
event will occupy the patient’s conscious thoughts, at the same time preventing the 
exercise of control over self in the face of hypnosis. This particular state of con-
foundment results in an increased submissiveness to the efforts of the clinician/
hypnotist, maximizing the chances for successful hypnosis therapy. Of course, the 
content of the hypnosis itself is a new cognitive quality, and can be expressed in 
categories of cognitive reinterpretation.
The second concept mentioned by Davis and Knowles is action identification 
theory, which is the work of Robin Vallacher and Daniel Wegner (1985, 1987). 
These psychologists drew attention to the fact that not only do individuals func-
tion rationally and assign meaning to their behaviours, but that they can also 
identify them cognitively on multiple levels. A handyman pounding a nail with his 
hammer can identify this activity in such ways as active recreation or building a 
shelf for books, but also as pounding in a nail or hitting a nail on the head with a 
hammer. More general and abstract labels (e.g. active recreation) are viewed by 
Vallacher and Wegner as the equivalent of action identification on a higher level. 
Specific and detailed identifications (such as hitting a nail on the head with a ham-
mer) are equivalent to identifying de facto the same action on a lower level. From 
this perspective, of interest to us here is one particular element in Vallacher and 
Wegner’s theory: people generally prefer higher levels of identification (because 
they give their actions meaning and place them in the service of some objective), 
but various situations that disrupt their routine functioning generally cause this 
level of action identification to temporarily shift lower. One particularly suggestive 
illustration of this truth can be found in experiments by Wegner and his collabora-
tors concerning consumption. In one of them, study participants were given a cup 
of coffee, and then asked to give a description of what they were doing. Some of 
them were drinking coffee in normal coffee cups, while the remaining participants 
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were served coffee in cups weighing 1 pound. People in the former group generally 
stated that they were drinking coffee, giving themselves a shot of energy, or satisfying 
their caffeine addiction. Those in the latter group generally identified their actions 
on a lower level, declaring that they were raising a coffee cup to their lips with 
some difficulty, that they were sipping, or that they were swallowing coffee 
(Wegner, Vallacher, Macomber, Wood & Arps, 1984). Participants in another exper-
iment were given snacks to eat, with some being allowed to grasp them normally 
(using their fingers), and others in an atypical manner (using chopsticks). People in 
the former group generally identified their actions with such designations as “I’m 
eating”, “I’m satisfying my appetite”, or “I’m filling up”. The latter group’s participants, 
in turn, applied such terms as “I’m placing food into my mouth” or “I’m chewing”. 
Vallacher and Wegner emphasize that a disruption in routine behaviour results 
in people shifting their focus to details, which enables them to regain their bearings in 
the situation at hand. Only after this is accomplished can the individual engage 
in shifting action identification to a higher level. Davis and Knowles, concurring 
with this view, simultaneously draw attention to the fact that this level need not be 
the same high one as before. In particular, if we engage in cognitive reframing then 
the probability is increased that this level will be a different one.
Thus, as Davis and Knowles (1999) conclude – from both the perspective of 
Erickson’s work on the conditions for effective hypnosis as well as from that of the 
theory of action identification advanced by Vallacher and Wegner – that subjecting 
people to a sequence of disruption to the normal course of interaction, then 
cognitive reframing, should constitute an effective social influence technique. These 
psychologists present four research studies that are designed to establish that this is 
in fact the case.
The experiments involved the sale of either Christmas cards (study 1) or note 
cards (studies 2 and 3). They were sold by door-to-door salespeople, who declared 
that the income from the sale would go to support charitable organizations. Faced 
with the choice to buy or not to buy, those queried experienced the aforemen-
tioned approach/avoidance conflict. Why might one decide to purchase the cards? 
Doubtlessly, the desire to support a charitable organization and, in doing so, to help 
people in need. The cards themselves may also be of some benefit. If we have yet 
to send out our Christmas cards, these will be “just the job”. Note cards can also 
be useful in some way. What reasons could we then have for not buying? The 
necessity to engage in extended contact with an unknown door-to-door salesper-
son, to open the door, to spend money and, perhaps, to deal later with the 
unpleasant feeling that we have succumbed to the pressure of a smooth-talker.
The experimenters applied the following technique: after introducing them-
selves, they announced the price of the cards in a very unusual way. They said “The 
price of these notes/Christmas cards is 300 pennies.” After a moment they added 
“That’s three dollars. It’s a bargain.” The wholly unusual manner of giving the price 
in pennies disrupted the routine course of the interaction. The cognitive reframing 
here consists of providing an additional, previously unmentioned justification for 
why the purchase of the cards is a sensible one. This justification is the “bargain”.
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For the first experiment three groups were formed. Participants from the first 
group were told of the charitable cause associated with the sale of the cards, and then 
were told only of their price. They were told that the cards cost $3. The second group 
was subjected only to cognitive reframing. After giving the price in dollars, the 
experimenters waited around 2 seconds and then added: “It’s a bargain.” In the third 
group, the technique recommended by Davis and Knowles was utilized: first, jolt 
people out of their routine, then supply them with cognitive reframing. Participants 
were informed that the cards cost 300 cents, then after 2 seconds they heard “That’s 
three dollars. It’s a bargain.” In each of the first two groups the cards were bought by 
35% of participants. In the third, nearly twice as many (65%) did so. 
In the second study, the experimenters added yet another group to the experi-
mental design: only a procedure jolting participants out of their routine was 
applied. In these conditions, potential customers were told that the cards cost 300 
cents, and after 2 seconds it was explained that this was $3. As it transpired, this 
measure was not sufficient. The percentage of people deciding to buy the cards was 
only slightly greater than in the group informed about their price in a more nor-
mal manner (35% and 25%, respectively: a statistically insignificant difference). 
However, the technique recommended by Davis and Knowles again proved 
successful. This time, 70% of participants decided to purchase the cards. Why is 
jolting people out of their routine not enough? The scholars refer to the concept 
of action identification. If a cognitive reinterpretation is not performed, following 
the disorganization resulting from the destabilization of routine the individual in 
question will return to the previously applied framing of the issue. Such doubts 
come back into play as “What do I need these cards for?” If, however, a cognitive 
reframing is proposed in the form of “It’s a bargain”, this statement, in turn, 
becomes a new rallying point for the individual’s actions. This effect does not take 
place without disruption to a routinely proceeding activity: in such cases the person 
will remain focused on the first decision motive (“What do I need these cards 
for?”). If this line of thought is correct, then the technique proposed by the authors 
should prove effective exclusively in the following sequence: first, a routine course 
of events, then supplying a cognitive reinterpretation. Not only would the presence 
of both elements be of importance, but their sequence would prove decisive as well. 
To determine if this really is the case, Davis and Knowles conducted further 
empirical study. This time, aside from the control group informed of the price in 
the standard manner, and the group on which the scholars’ proposed technique was 
tested, the experimental design included conditions in which the sequence of 
elements constituting the technique was reversed. When offering the cards, the 
experimenter/seller said “It’s a bargain”, and after 2 seconds added “It costs 300 
cents, that’s three dollars”. It turned out that this procedure was not enough to 
result in a higher number of people deciding to purchase the cards than in the case 
of the control group. Again, however, the effectiveness of the technique consisting 
of disrupting the routine course of events followed by supplying cognitive refram-
ing is demonstrated. The proportion of individuals who complied in the three 
aforementioned Davis and Knowles experiments are presented in Table 5.1.
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The effectiveness of the technique under discussion was also confirmed by 
Davis and Knowles in a fourth study. In this experiment, it was decided to 
exclude the hypothesis that the effectiveness of the technique being tested is an 
artefact resulting from the occurrence of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Eight experi-
menters/door-to-door salespeople were employed, each of whom received 
either the instruction to sell cards using the DTR system, or was additionally 
asked to give the standard price ($3) and to add “It’s a bargain” (cognitive reframing). 
It turned out that in the first of these conditions, 90% of those solicited purchased 
the cards, while in the second condition this number was 50%. The methodological 
value of this experiment is diluted, however, by the fact that its design failed 
to include conditions involving disruption to a routine and the sequence of 
reframing-then-disruption. 
Bob Fennis, Enny Das and Ad Pruyn (2004) examined whether the DTR 
technique could be effective in convincing people to participate in a lottery. A 
female experimenter stood in the main square of a large city and approached passers-
by, singing the praises of the Dayzers lottery, which had a structure different from 
traditional lotteries; instead of one lucky winner taking the whole prize pool, 
Dayzers gave a million people smaller prizes. In the control conditions she informed 
people that one entry cost €3.50. In the experimental conditions she gave the price 
in cents (350 euro cents), and after a moment clarified that this was the equivalent 
of €3.50. In both cases, the lottery ticket sales pitch was concluded with the argu-
ment that it was a bargain. While in the control conditions every fourth person 
approached took the chance to purchase a ticket; when the DTR technique was 
applied the percentage of those acceding to the request jumped to 43%. The authors 
of the experiment also demonstrated that people subjected to the technique being 
analyzed here were less inclined to present arguments against buying the ticket. 
They treat this fact as a piece of indirect evidence that cognitive disorientation 
(resulting here from the reporting of the price in cents) disrupts the efficient pro-
cessing of thoughts linked with the offer just received, and the additional argument 
(the bargain) functions as a cue for thinking to take a heuristic turn. 
TABLE 5.1  Percentage of targets who complied in each condition in Davis and Knowles 
(1999) experiments
Condition Study 1 Study 2 Study 3
Disrupt-then-reframe (“They’re 300 pennies…that’s 
$3. It’s a bargain”)
Price only (“They’re $3”)
Reframe only (“They’re $3. It’s a bargain”
Disruption only (“They’re 300 pennies… That’s $3”)
Reframe-then-disrupt (“It’s a bargain… They’re 300 
















Source: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1999, vol. 76, p. 194.
Copyright 1999 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
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We have also confirmed the potential for using the DTR technique in sales 
transactions during research in which one of my masters students (Katarzyna 
Selwant) sold jars of prepared soup at a bazaar. Participants were drawn from 
customers at the bazaar doing their normal grocery shopping (they had been buying 
milk, cream, butter, etc.). The saleswoman also offered to sell them soup, producing 
a jar with its contents. In the standard conditions she said that it cost 2 zlotys and 
that it was very tasty. In the DTR conditions she gave the price as 200 groszs, and 
after 2 seconds she explained that this was two zlotys, then provided the argument 
about the soup’s good taste. Results showed that the sales pitch including the ‘200 
groszs’ induced roughly twice as many people to buy the soup (Dolinski, 2005). A 
similar effect was noted by Frank Kardes, Bob Fennis, Edward Hirt, Zakary 
Tormala and Brian Bullington (2007), selling candies in a supermarket for 100 euro 
cents while adding the argument “It’s a bargain”. Of course, giving the price in an 
unusual manner is not the only use of the DTR technique in a sales situation. 
“Oddness” can also concern the very name of the product. Eric Knowles, Shannon 
Butler and Jay Linn (2001) sold cupcakes for 50 cents. In the control conditions, 
they simply said “These cupcakes are 50 cents, they are really delicious”. In the 
DTR conditions, they only changed the word “cupcakes” to “halfcakes”, which 
was enough to boost sales. 
While Davis and Knowles (1999), Knowles et al. (2001), Kardes et al. (2007) and 
Katarzyna Selwant (see: Dolinski, 2005) demonstrated that the DTR technique can 
be an effective tool of social influence during commercial transactions, and Fennis 
et al. (2004) provided evidence of its usefulness in convincing people to buy lottery 
tickets, Izabela Kubala (2002) showed the potential for it to be applied in an 
entirely different field. It is well-known that the scourge of research companies 
carrying out surveys and opinion polling is the high rate of respondents who refuse 
to participate. This situation generates at least two types of difficulties. First, it 
renders the sample poorly differentiated, as people refusing to participate may 
exhibit a range of differences from those who consent to take part. Second, it 
increases the costs of studies and the amount of time needed to conduct them. 
Refusal is obviously far more likely in conditions when respondents do not receive 
any gratification for their participation and spend a long time on it. Even in the 
case of a short telephone survey, the percentage of those refusing to answer a few 
questions can be very high. 
With these considerations as a starting point, Kubala decided to examine 
whether the DTR technique could prove helpful in raising the percentage of 
people agreeing to participate in a telephone marketing study. In the control 
conditions, the canvasser called randomly selected residents of Wrocław and intro-
duced herself as an employee of the (non-existent) Lower Silesia Social Research 
Centre. She then asked if her interlocutor would agree to answer a few questions 
concerning consumer goods, simultaneously confirming that the conversation 
would last around 7 minutes. In the DTR conditions, instead of 7 minutes it was 
said that the survey would last “around 420 seconds”, and after about 2 seconds it 
was added that “that’s 7 minutes”, and then the argument “it’ll just take a moment” 
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was thrown in. The experimental design also included other conditions in order to 
see whether potential differences between the aforementioned groups did in fact 
result from the application of the disorientation–cognitive reshuffling sequence. 
Therefore, in another group the order of information given to respondents was 
reversed. First, the argument that the conversation would be “short” was given, 
then the statement “around 420 seconds”, completed with the information “that’s 
7 minutes”. In another group, only the effect of the additional argument itself was 
examined. Here it was said that the survey would last around 7 minutes and that 
“it’ll just take a moment”. Finally, in the last group the effects of disrupting the 
routine without appealing to an additional argument were tested. The survey time 
was given in seconds, then after a moment it was explained that this was 7 minutes.
It was tested whether the person called would agree to participate in the survey, 
or refuse (in the latter case, no attempt to change people’s minds was made and the 
interaction was concluded). Analyses of results revealed that applying the DTR 
technique more than doubled the chances that respondents would agree to partici-
pate in the survey. The numbers of people consenting to participate in a marketing 
survey in the remaining experimental conditions did not display significant statistical 
differences from the control conditions, while they were different from the levels of 
compliance recorded in the situation involving the DTR conditions. 
Izabela Kubala proved that the DTR technique is also effective when individu-
als are targeted with a request by telephone, and fulfilling the request does not 
provide them with any benefit. She thus demonstrated that the technique discussed 
here can also be applied in other spheres than those assumed by Davis and 
Knowles. The experiment by Kubala was replicated by Christopher Carpenter and 
Franklin Boster (2009a), who conducted their research, not by telephone, but 
rather face to face, asking students on campus if they would like to participate in 
a survey study that would last 20 minutes and would be very interesting. In the 
DTR version, the phrase “one thousand two hundred seconds” was used, followed 
by an explanation that this was 20 minutes. In this case as well, more participants 
agreed to fill in the survey in DTR conditions than in control conditions. 
Fennis et al. (2004) decided to examine the effects generated by linking the 
DTR technique with another classic social influence technique already discussed 
in this volume: the foot-in-the-door technique. In an experiment exploring this 
particular issue, a young man appealed to students on a university campus to sign 
a petition supporting an increase in tuition fees. In half of the conditions, the 
students were first asked to answer a few questions about studies and scientific 
research. This was treated as an application of the foot-in-the-door technique. The 
remaining students were not asked these questions. Regardless of the aforemen-
tioned, some of them were told directly that the matter concerned a tuition fee 
increase of €75, while others heard that the cost of education would go up by 
7,500 euro cents . . . €75, that is. In both cases, the message was rounded out by the 
argument that this was quite a small investment. Analysis of the results showed that 
application of the DTR technique significantly increased people’s readiness to sign 
the petition (from 28% to 63%). Preceding the primary request with a series of 
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questions also generated the expected result (an increase from 29% to 63%). The 
joint application of both of these social influence techniques, however, proved to 
be unbelievably effective. The petition to increase tuition fees was signed by 90% 
of those queried! The DTR technique not only demonstrated its effectiveness, but 
when combined intelligently with the foot-in-the-door technique it became an 
extraordinarily successful technique for exerting influence on others. 
A meta-analysis of 14 empirical studies performed by Carpenter and Boster 
(2009b) confirmed the strength of the DTR technique. It also demonstrated that 
this technique was more effective in a non-profit context than in a sales context. 
The psychological mechanism itself underlying the success of this technique is not 
entirely clear. Insofar as the authors of the pioneering paper on the DTR tech-
nique referred to the assumptions girding Erickson’s hypnosis technique and the 
concept of action identification by Vallacher and Wegner, other scholars offer still 
more points of view on the mechanism explaining why people subjected to these 
influences comply with requests directed towards them. Kardes and his collabora-
tors (Kardes et. al., 2007) make reference to the concept of the need for cognitive 
closure, proffered many years ago by Arie Kruglansky (1989). He remarked that 
people are characterized by “the desire for a firm answer to a question and an aver-
sion toward ambiguity” (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996, p. 264); this desire, however, 
displays different levels of strength in different individuals (individual difference), 
yet on the other hand, is greater or lesser depending on particular circumstances 
(situational factor). Kardes et al. (2007) observed a link between DTR and the so-
called need for closure. The DTR technique is grounded in creating ambiguity by 
giving a price in cents/euro cents instead of dollars/euros, or by using a strange 
word. The argument appearing at the end of the message, in turn, is an element 
associated with certainty and explicitness. It can be expected that this technique 
will be particularly effective on people exhibiting a strong need for cognitive 
closure. On the one hand, they have a strong aversion to ambiguity, and on the 
other hand they are deeply interested in achieving a state of certainty as to a defined 
fragment of reality. 
The authors spent time on a university campus inviting students to become 
members of a student interest group, and to pay a related semi-annual membership 
fee. In the control conditions, they were told that the fee was €3, while in the DTR 
conditions a figure of 300 euro cents was given, then clarified as €3. In both cases 
the proposition was concluded with the same argument: “That’s a really small 
investment”. Regardless of whether those approached expressed their desire to join 
the student interest group or not, they were also asked to fill in a questionnaire, 
which was a de facto measurement of their need for cognitive closure. The DTR 
turned out to be effective. Compared to the control conditions (13%), the percent-
age of students deciding to join the interest group and pay the semi-annual fees 
was clearly higher (30%). Of even greater importance from the perspective taken 
here is that in DTR conditions the membership fee was paid by 43% of those 
individuals who recorded a need for cognitive closure score above the median, 
while only 17% of those whose score was below the median did so. The role played 
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by the need for cognitive closure in the disrupt-then-reframe technique was later 
confirmed in another experiment by the authors.
Carpenter and Boster (2009a) proposed, in turn, a very simple explanation for 
the effectiveness of this technique, referring to the Spinozan model of information 
processing in which comprehension and acceptance happen immediately and 
simultaneously (Gilbert, 1991). The disruption contained in the DTR technique 
can prevent someone from comprehending that the subsequent argument is 
unsound. This model predicts that people who are distracted when exposed to an 
argument will be more likely to believe it and comply, even if this argument is 
obviously flawed. In their experiments the authors demonstrated that, indeed, the 
quality of the argument applied in the message and designed to induce participants 
to accede to a request or proposition is of no significance for the effectiveness of 
the DTR technique.
The pique technique – requesting in an unusual manner
While the DTR technique requires quite a complicated sequence of actions (initiating 
an interaction in a normal manner; doing something surprising and unusual; then 
presenting an argument after a few seconds designed to induce compliance in the 
interlocutor) the technique proposed by Michael Santos, Craig Leve and Anthony 
Pratkanis (1994), itself also based on the appearance of “something strange”, is far 
simpler. During an experiment conducted by the aforementioned authors, a young 
woman (around 21 years old) dressed in jeans and a t-shirt pretended to be a vagrant. 
She asked passers-by for money, either using a typical expression (“a quarter” or “any 
change”) or in an unusual manner – for 17 or 37 cents. It turned out that the unusual 
request led experiment subjects to reach for their wallets with greater frequency. It 
was the authors’ view that if an automatic, habitual refusal of a request is expected, 
we are better off forming the request in a manner that will induce those to whom 
the request is made to behave in a less automated manner. It may then turn out that 
they take a moment to think, and come to the conclusion that in this one particular 
case the offering of monetary alms is a worthwhile activity. The actual results would 
seem to confirm this interpretation, considering that when the request was formu-
lated in a standard fashion (a request for “a quarter” or “some change”), people 
practically never asked any questions (only 0.7% of subjects did so), while when the 
request was non-standard, far more people did so (11% of participants). That said, it 
should also be observed that in the latter case asking questions was not a universal 
practice. Perhaps this resulted from the fact that people did not wish to maintain 
contact longer than necessary with the vagrant, having their own comfort in mind, 
or maybe they did not wish to cause her embarrassment with additional questions. 
Santos et al. thus came to the conclusion that an examination of what people think 
in these typical and untypical situations would best be facilitated by a closely-monitored 
laboratory experiment. 
Participants were presented one of four real situations from the first experiment 
(a young female vagrant on the street asking for 17 cents, a quarter, 37 cents or 
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‘some change’) and asked them to write down how they would behave in such a 
situation, as well as what would likely enter their mind. Contrary to the authors’ 
expectations, research participants who were expected to imagine themselves in a 
non-typical situation reported the same thoughts as those who were asked to 
imagine the vagrant making a request of them in a typical manner. The former, 
however, said with greater frequency that they would ask the woman what she 
needed the money for.
The question of whether an atypical or unusual request in fact shifts an indi-
vidual’s functioning from a non-reflective level (mindless) to a more reflective one 
(mindful) was the theme of research carried out by Jerry Burger, Joy Hornisher, 
Valerie Martin, Garry Newman and Summer Pringle, 2007). The authors began 
from the assumption that an experiment patterned after that of Langer et al. (1978), 
discussed earlier in this chapter, would be useful in answering the question posed 
above. Let us recall that if the experimenter asked an individual standing in a queue 
at a copy machine for permission to push in, adding that there were only 5 pages 
to be copied, participants let the experimenter go ahead with the same frequency 
as when the request was accompanied by a sensible explanation (“because I’m in a 
rush”) as when it came with an explanation that essentially didn’t explain anything 
(“because I have to make copies”). Thus in both conditions the study’s participants 
allowed the experimenter to go to the front of the queue with far greater frequency 
than when the request was not accompanied by any justification. The researchers 
explained this by claiming that participants asked to fulfil a minor request remained 
in a state of mindlessness and participants relied on a script that called for them to 
agree whenever a reason is given. However, if the experimenter said initially that 
there were 20 pages to be copied, only would a request accompanied by a sensible 
justification (“because I’m in a rush”) lead to more frequent consent to go to the 
front of the queue compared to situations when the request came with no justifica-
tion. Langer et al. (1978) suggest that the increased burden of the request (if 
someone has 20 pages to copy this will lead to a much longer wait) shifts the 
functioning of the recipient of the request into the reflective domain. In this case 
the script for automatic consent upon hearing an explanation (of any kind) is not 
activated, but the content itself of the request is placed under examination. 
Burger and his collaborators thus concluded that if those who were asked by 
the vagrant for 37 cents ceased to function mindlessly and began to think about 
just what was going on, they should react in the same way as participants in the 
experiment by Langer et al. who were told that someone had 20 pages to copy. Put 
differently, they should agree more frequently when the atypical request for a 
handout comes with a realistic justification compared to situations in which the 
explanation does not provide any real information. As in the experiment by Santos 
et al. (1994), a young person asked passers-by for a handout in either a standard 
manner (“Excuse me, can you spare any change?”) or an atypical one (“Excuse me, 
can you spare 37 cents?”). In conditions when the addressee of the request asked 
the “vagrant” what the money was needed for, either a concrete response was 
offered (“Because I need to buy a stamp”), or an answer that in fact failed to 
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clarify anything (“Because I need to buy some things”). It should be emphasized 
here that no questions of that type came up in conditions when the “beggar” asked 
for “any change”, but in conditions when a request for 37 cents was made, 29.9% 
of request addressees posed that question. 
As for the results of this experiment, in the main the effect generated by Santos 
et al. (1994) was replicated: in conditions of an atypical request, participants 
decided with greater frequency to give money than in conditions of a typical 
request. The former circumstance also led to greater sums being given. In addition, 
it turned out that both the frequency and the average value of handouts were 
higher in conditions when, in the course of the interaction between the participant 
and the “vagrant”, questions were asked regarding the purpose for which the 
money was being collected, compared to when the participant did not pose such 
questions. However, the content of the response given by the “beggar” turned out 
to be irrelevant. The generousness of research subjects was nearly identical when 
they heard “because I need to buy a stamp” (a specific reason), when compared 
with a situation in which the word “stamp” was replaced by the content-free 
expression “some things” (a vague reason). Table 5.2 shows the amount of money 
given and compliance percentage in particular conditions of this experiment.
In a second study, Burger and his collaborators swapped a request for “any 
change” with entreaties for 25 or 50 cents. The result was that an atypical request 
(for 37 cents) was more effective in increasing both the frequency of giving and 
the average sum given, and it again turned out that experiment participants were 
more likely to reach for their purses when they first asked why the vagrant needed 
the money and then received an answer to their query. Again, however, the content 
of the answer was immaterial. This pattern of results suggests that while an unusual 
request disrupted some participants’ refusal scripts, there is no confirmation for the 
thesis that the atypical request also led these individuals to consider the request 
mindfully. If, however, an atypically-formulated request does not lead to the 
addressee of that request functioning in a more mindful manner, how can the 
increased pliability in these conditions be explained? Burger and his collaborators 
offered two explanations. The first of them assumes that individuals in these condi-
tions apply the heuristic “I will help acquaintances, particularly when they ask for 
a small favour” rather than one such as “I don’t give money to beggars”. This 
acquaintance script is not, however, restricted to real acquaintances, but is also 
TABLE 5.2  Money given and compliance percentage in Burger et al. (2007) experiment

















Source: Journal of Applied Social psychology, 2007, vol. 37, p. 2090.
Copyright 2007 John Wiley and Sons.
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activated when people unknown to us act as if they were acquaintances. One such 
situation is a simple conversation. It has been demonstrated in a range of studies 
that when a request directed at a stranger is preceded by even a brief conversation 
on an anodyne topic, the chances that the request will be fulfilled are greater 
(Dolinski et al., 2001; Dolinski, Grzyb, Olejnik, Prusakowski & Urban, 2005) – for 
more on this topic see the deliberations contained in Chapter 4. We may observe 
in this context that Burger and his collaborators demonstrated that a strange 
request in and of itself does not cause a rise in compliance. This effect is only 
observed when the request for a handout was followed by the subjects asking what 
it was needed for – thus, in conditions in which they initiated a dialogue. 
An alternative interpretation presented by the authors of the article under 
discussion is based on the assumption that the question about what the 37 cents 
would be spent on was given by people who had already decided they would give 
out the money. However, it remains unclear “why disrupting a refusal script with 
an unusual request led some people to comply, but not others” (Burger et al., 2007, 
p. 2095). In summary, it may be said that the experiments by Burger provide a 
clearer demonstration of what mechanism does not underlie the effectiveness of the 
pique technique (i.e. not an increased mindfulness on the part of the addressee 
resulting from the atypicality of the request) rather than of what mechanism is 
responsible. Further research is thus necessary to explain this phenomenon. It 
would also be worth conducting studies in another context than that of begging. 
Indeed, it may be supposed that the unusual formulation of a request may increase 
the effectiveness of measures intended to induce fellow humans to help in many 
other situations in which they are accustomed to being constantly asked for some-
thing and have already developed the habit of saying “no”. The opposite would, of 
course, be true if the standard, automatic response to a given request were to accept 
it. In these circumstances, the unconventional formulation of a request would 
increase the risk of its going unfulfilled. 
Gaze
The norms in place in particular cultures provide more or less strict guidelines 
concerning whom we may address in respect of what matter and in what fashion. 
At times these norms are very strictly defined, such as in the army, where a private 
should directly and verbally address his corporal whenever he has any doubts at all. 
The same private must not, however, disturb the army’s generals with the excep-
tion of absolutely exceptional situations. In the “civilian” world there is also a wide 
range of diverse regulations governing this aspect of social life. The greater the 
difference in the status of an individual wishing to broach a subject and the status 
of the individual who is to be addressed, the greater the asymmetry in respect of 
the most appropriate form of contact. There are, however, situations (particularly 
when there is no evident difference in status) when the choice of form of address 
is a matter for the individual wishing to make a request. Of greatest significance 
from the perspective that interests us in this book is whether the greatest success 
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will be had by a request submitted directly in face-to-face circumstances, by 
telephone, or in writing (letter or e-mail). During a normal conversation we are 
faced with a situation in which communication takes place via all available channels, 
and both participants in the interaction are located in the same place. In the case 
of a telephone communication, the only means of communication is through the 
use of the faculty of hearing. Although the interaction’s participants engage each 
other at the same time, a spatial divide exists between them. As for a letter or 
e-mail, the degree of directness in the communication is severely limited. The 
people engaged in communication are not only to be found in different areas, but 
they exchange information at different times. As a rule, they also have a significant 
amount of time to think their decisions over. 
Which communication channel is the most effective? In one experiment dedi-
cated to this issue, holidaymakers were invited to take an anonymous psychological 
examination that would take around 15 minutes (Dolinski, 2005). Some of them 
were visited in their hotel rooms, others were contacted by telephone, and the rest 
were issued with a written invitation wedged in their room door. It transpired that 
as contact became less direct, the frequency with which people decided to accede 
to the request of the psychologists also decreased. The percentage of individuals 
meeting the request was the greatest in the case of invitations submitted during a 
face-to-face conversation (56%), lower in the case of a telephone invitation (28%), 
and the lowest when invitations to participate were left in doorframes (6%). These 
results led to simple conclusions about how best to maximize the chances of get-
ting the agreement of others in matters of importance to us, as well as how to 
arrange situations so as to allow us to behave optimally when confronted with a 
request that we do not necessarily want to fulfil. Thus, if we would like to turn to 
someone with a request that is important to us, but we are not sure if we can count 
on a positive decision, the best course of action is to meet with this person directly 
and ask directly for consent. On the other hand, if we expect that someone would 
like to ask us for a favour that would run contrary to our interests, and we have 
reason to doubt in our capacity to refuse directly, we should attempt to direct the 
course of events so that the request comes to us in writing, or – at a minimum – 
limit the contact to a telephone conversation. 
Why is this so? Why is it that the more direct the form in which a request is 
submitted, the greater the chances of compliance? It would seem that directness of 
contact leads to difficulties in refusing someone asking us for help. Indeed, when 
we refuse, we risk receiving verbal or non-verbal signals that we have caused some-
one grief. It is far easier to say “no” when someone asks us for something in 
writing. We can refuse in writing, or we can leave such a request unanswered. The 
particularly high effectiveness of requests submitted in conditions of direct interac-
tion may be closely linked with eye contact. A large body of research in social 
psychology has indicated that people fulfil requests with greater frequency when 
such contact is maintained by the individual making the request.
For example, it has been shown that if an experimenter deliberately leaves a 
coin in a pay phone, exits the booth, waits for someone to enter then opens the 
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door and asks the person inside to return the money, the chances of the coin being 
returned are greater when the experimenter looks that person in the eyes 
(Brockner, Pressman, Cabitt & Moran, 1982). Similarly, if someone leans out of a 
telephone booth and asks a passer-by for a coin because of an urgent need to call 
someone, the chances of receiving the money grow when the request is made 
while looking the person in the eyes (Ernest & Cooper, 1974). Chris Kleinke and 
David Singer (1979) demonstrated that when a person handing out flyers looks in 
the eyes of passers-by, more flyers are taken. This effect was observed when the 
person handing out the flyers politely encouraged people to take them (“Excuse 
me. Would you like one?”), when a categorical tone accompanied the distribution 
of the flyer (“Take one”), and when the flyer was simply placed before passers-by 
without saying anything. Further experiments led to the conclusion that volunteers 
making eye contact with those being asked for a charitable donation received 
larger sums (Bull & Gibson-Robinson, 1981; Linskold, Forte, Haake & Schmidt, 
1977). Eye contact may also help people who have had the misfortune of dropping 
their change (Valentine, 1980) or a pile of surveys (Goldman & Fordyce, 1983), or 
when they have injured themselves while jogging (Shotland & Johnson, 1978). The 
beneficial impact of eye contact has also been observed in studies on the effective-
ness of hitchhikers. They were picked up more often by drivers if they looked them 
squarely in the eyes while waving their hands than if they looked off to the side 
(Morgan, Lockard, Fahrenbruch & Smith, 1975; Snyder, Grether & Keller, 1974). 
“Eye contact” is a rather imprecise phrase. Nicolas Gueguen and Celine Jacob 
(2002) decided to compare a situation in which the requester maintained constant 
eye contact with the person being asked for something to one in which eye contact 
was broken off and returned to at intervals. Their experiment consisted of asking 
passers-by on a city street to participate in a marketing research survey. When eye 
contact was constantly maintained, 66% of participants consented to fill in the 
questionnaire, while in conditions when the experimenter’s eyes “danced around”, 
only 34% did so.
Why does eye contact increase the chances that a request will be fulfilled? The 
simplest interpretation of the link between looking in the eyes of people we are 
directing a request to and their compliance refers to studies suggesting that more 
desirable personality traits are assigned to those who look their interlocutors 
straight in the eyes (e.g. Brooks, Church & Fraser, 1986; Droney & Brooks, 1993) 
and they also benefit from greater affinity (e.g. Cook & Smith, 1975; Scherer, 
1974) than those who avoid eye contact. Because there is an assumption that the 
perception of people’s personalities as “better” and greater affinity towards such 
people are accompanied by a greater readiness to comply with their requests, it 
should come as no surprise that those who maintain eye contact with their 
partners in conversation get what they want more often than those who do not 
establish such contact. 
A more nuanced alternative explanation of the connection between eye contact 
and compliance was offered by Phoebe Ellsworth and Ellen Langer (1976). Their 
proposed model even attempted to predict situations in which eye contact would 
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enhance pliability and when this effect should not be expected. Ellsworth and 
Langer observed that emotional excitation increases when we conclude that 
someone is looking at us. In interpersonal situations, this is usually a signal that some 
behaviour should be performed. If nothing in particular happens to indicate what 
behaviour is desired, an unpleasant tension will continue until the moment when 
the looked-upon individual is able to get away and by doing so terminate the inter-
personal contact giving rise to that tension. However, if the feeling that “someone 
is eyeing me” is accompanied by a clear signal of what reaction is expected from the 
person doing the looking, a reduction in the uncomfortable tension may be effected 
simply by engaging in the desired behaviour. The researchers conducted a very 
clever experiment to examine this assumption. The first of them engaged individuals 
coming up to the entrance of a shopping centre, informing them that on the other 
side there was a woman in need of help but that the experimenter herself was in a 
hurry to catch a train. In addition, half of the experiment’s participants were 
informed specifically that the woman on the other side of the door was behaving 
as though looking for her lost contact lenses, while the other half were given 
ambiguous information – they were told that the woman “looks like she’s not feeling 
well”. Just behind the door, the second experimenter waited for participants in a 
rather unusual position – half crouching and leaning against the wall. This position 
is, obviously, helpful when searching for something that has gone missing, but may 
also be associated with an individual who has begun to feel ill (e.g. experiencing 
stomach pain). Regardless of what a given participant said to the first experimenter, 
the second either avoided eye contact or looked the participant straight in the eyes. 
As it turned out, looking participants in the eyes enhanced their altruistic tendencies 
but only when the situation was unambiguous and it was obvious what needed to 
be done in order to help the woman (look together for her contact lenses). When 
the situation was left vague, looking participants in the eyes did not increase the 
likelihood that they would render assistance. 
A similar view on the mechanism underlying the connection between eye 
contact and compliance is held by Chris Kleinke (1977), who suggests that gaze 
performs the function of a non-specific activator. The conclusion that someone is 
looking us in the eyes leads to a slight physiological stimulation of the body, and 
our attention (at least initially) is directed towards the person looking at us. The 
ascertainment that we are being observed leads in turn to increased public self-
consciousness, and we start paying at least slightly more attention to the situation 
we are in while attempting to ensure that our behaviour complies with social 
norms and internalized value system (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Morin, 2011; 
Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1987). Extensive experimental data demonstrates that a 
mere photograph of human eyes “looking at us” can make us more honest. Melissa 
Bateson, Daniel Nettle and Gilbert Roberts (2006) examined the effect of an 
image of a pair of eyes on contributions to an honesty box used to collect money 
for drinks in a university coffee room. University employees tossed three times as 
much money into the box than in the control conditions where the eyes were not 
“checking them out”. In another experiment, conducted at a supermarket, the 
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researchers displayed either eye images or control images on charity collection 
buckets for 11 consecutive weeks (Powell, Roberts & Nettle, 2012). Charitable 
contributions were greater in conditions when they “looked customers in the eyes” – 
see Figure 5.1. 
In accordance with the assumption that the conclusion that someone is watching 
us sharpens our focus on social norms and activates our readiness to engage in 
activities consistent with those norms, it may be supposed that gaze will increase 
compliance only when associated with socially desirable, or at least socially 
approved, behaviours. (We should note that it was just these types of behaviours 
present in the experiments described above). What will happen if the request is of 
a different nature? Kleinke (1980) conducted a pair of studies examining this ques-
tion. In the first of them, young women approached people walking around an 
airport. In half of the cases they asked for a 10-cent coin, justifying this by saying 
that they had no money on them and urgently needed to make a phone call. In 
the other cases, they said the 10 cents was necessary to buy a chocolate bar. 
Regardless of the justification, in half of the cases the experimenters made eye 
contact with the participant while presenting their request, and in the other half 
they did not. It transpired that directing one’s gaze towards a person to whom a 
request is being issued only increased the chances of that request being fulfilled 
when it was socially justified. Thus eye contact increased the chance of obtaining 
the 10 cents needed for using the phone, but it failed to make a difference when 
the money was for a chocolate bar. In the second experiment it turned out that 
making eye contact (this time coupled with touching the arm of the person being 
addressed) actually reduced the chance that change intended to be spent on chewing 
gum would be received. 
FIGURE 5.1 Eye (left) and control (right) images in situ in the supermarket
Source: Ethology: International Journal of Behavioural Biology, 2012, vol. 118, p. 1098.
Copyright Blackwels Verlag GmbH.
Interaction dynamics and the surprise factor  123
Touch 
Both animals and people mark their territory and defend it against those who 
would encroach upon it. Dogs urinate on trees and bushes in the vicinity of their 
lairs and try to scare off other dogs that enter that area. People erect fences around 
their homes, build walls or put up signs that read “Private property” or “Entry 
forbidden”. They also have a tendency to defend their territory, but as a rule 
people are more elastic than animals in matters of territorialism. We eagerly invite 
guests into our home, or slightly less eagerly permit an unknown letter carrier with 
a large package to enter our abode. A meter reader from the electricity company 
is allowed in with still less enthusiasm, but neither do we shut the door in his face. 
For people, territory is not inevitably linked with a specific and constant space. 
Indeed, a group of people conducting a conversation also acquire the status of 
territory. This group is surrounded by a consensual and invisible border that others 
who are not members of that group will not violate without a clear need to do so 
(Lyman & Scott, 1967). A good illustration of this border is to be found in studies 
analyzing the behaviour of passers-by towards a group standing on the pavement 
near a shop window. If the members of the group were speaking among themselves 
(thus establishing a territory of interaction), passers-by avoided the entire group. 
However, if the members of the group were not communicating with one another, 
but rather examining the window display, passers-by were far more likely to walk 
between members of the group (Lindskold, Albert, Baer & Moore, 1976). 
From the perspective of greatest interest to us here, research concerning the 
territory directly linked with the human body is particularly important. Individual 
cultures are characterized by clear preferences regarding what is referred to as per-
sonal space. If two Americans or Europeans engaged in conversation and standing 
up are not familiar with each other, they will assume a face-to-face position. How 
far apart do they stand? Setting aside particular situations such as a crowded bus, 
this distance will typically be the equivalent of an outstretched arm from the shoul-
der to the fingertips, measuring around 90 centimetres. In Latin American cultures 
this distance will be reduced by about a hand’s length, measuring around 70 
centimetres. Thus, if an American is engaged in conversation with a Haitian, the 
former will attempt to increase the distance between them while the latter will try 
to reduce it. As a result, the American may come to the conclusion that the Haitian 
is a boor without manners, while the Haitian may perceive the American as cold, 
distant or even calculating (Hall, 1969). 
The need to maintain at least a minimal distance between one’s own body and 
that of another person depends on a very large number of factors. The most obvi-
ous of them concerns the parts of the body one wishes to keep away from others. 
As a rule we have no problem shaking hands with a stranger. European and 
American politicians shake millions of potential voters’ hands in the hope of get-
ting their support, in spite of the absence of direct evidence that such activity really 
helps them. There is, however, evidence related to the acquisition of donations for 
charitable causes. Nicolas Gueguen (2013b) examined the reactions of people 
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visited in their homes by volunteers who asked them for a donation of €1 for 
children from Madagascar. It occurred that when the greeting was accompanied by 
a handshake, the proportion of people supporting the charitable campaign rose 
dramatically (from 53.3% to 95.5%). 
Mutual contact of the inside portions of hands is a gesture with a long tradition 
in our culture, both in situations involving two people familiar with each other and 
in conditions where they are not acquainted. What would happen, however, if 
someone touched a part of a stranger’s body other than the inside of the hand? This 
would obviously contradict the rules in place in our culture, but would it influence 
that person’s compliance with a request addressed to him/her? 
A large number of studies have demonstrated that people are more disposed to 
fulfilling requests made by strangers when those requests are accompanied by a 
gentle touch on the arm or forearm. The first experiments exploring this area were 
conducted by Chris Kleinke (1977). In his research a scenario was set up in which 
a female experimenter exited a phone booth at the moment another person walked 
up to it. The individual approaching the phone booth thus automatically became a 
participant in the study. After a moment, the experimenter came back and asked for 
the return of 10 cents that she had left in the pay phone. When this request was 
accompanied by a light touch of the participant’s arm, the chances of recovering the 
coin increased. Indeed, in these conditions 96% of participants gave the money back, 
compared to 63% who returned the 10-cent coin in the control conditions.
In a second study, a female experimenter attempted to borrow a 10-cent coin 
from a stranger, ostensibly needing it to make a phone call. She succeeded in 
receiving the coin with greater frequency when the request was accompanied by 
a gentle touch on the arm. When she did so, the experimenter received money in 
every second case (51% to be precise), while in control conditions she only 
received money in 29% of cases. 
In another study dedicated to the role of touch (Smith, Gier & Willis, 1982) 
shoppers at a supermarket were offered a piece of pizza. In some instances this 
request was coupled with the shopper’s arm being held for a brief moment. It 
turned out that this simple act increased not only the chances that shoppers would 
agree to test the quality of the product on offer, but also that they would buy it. 
Frank Willis and Hellen Hamm (1980) demonstrated that an individual asked to 
sign a petition would do so more readily when gently held by the arm while the 
request was being made. A personality test was also more likely to be completed by 
those who were asked to do so while their arm was gently held at the moment the 
request was submitted (Patterson, Powell & Lenihan, 1986). Other studies con-
ducted in a department store showed that customers whose arm was grasped by 
those conducting a survey were more likely to accede to the request that they 
answer a series of questions (Hornik, 1987; Hornik & Ellis, 1988). Interestingly, 
those touched on the arm also expressed more favourable opinions about the 
structure of the survey itself, declared with greater frequency that they would par-
ticipate in similar studies, and also were more likely to place their signatures on 
their survey. 
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door and asks the person inside to return the money, the chances of the coin being 
returned are greater when the experimenter looks that person in the eyes 
(Brockner, Pressman, Cabitt & Moran, 1982). Similarly, if someone leans out of a 
telephone booth and asks a passer-by for a coin because of an urgent need to call 
someone, the chances of receiving the money grow when the request is made 
while looking the person in the eyes (Ernest & Cooper, 1974). Chris Kleinke and 
David Singer (1979) demonstrated that when a person handing out flyers looks in 
the eyes of passers-by, more flyers are taken. This effect was observed when the 
person handing out the flyers politely encouraged people to take them (“Excuse 
me. Would you like one?”), when a categorical tone accompanied the distribution 
of the flyer (“Take one”), and when the flyer was simply placed before passers-by 
without saying anything. Further experiments led to the conclusion that volunteers 
making eye contact with those being asked for a charitable donation received 
larger sums (Bull & Gibson-Robinson, 1981; Linskold, Forte, Haake & Schmidt, 
1977). Eye contact may also help people who have had the misfortune of dropping 
their change (Valentine, 1980) or a pile of surveys (Goldman & Fordyce, 1983), or 
when they have injured themselves while jogging (Shotland & Johnson, 1978). The 
beneficial impact of eye contact has also been observed in studies on the effective-
ness of hitchhikers. They were picked up more often by drivers if they looked them 
squarely in the eyes while waving their hands than if they looked off to the side 
(Morgan, Lockard, Fahrenbruch & Smith, 1975; Snyder, Grether & Keller, 1974). 
“Eye contact” is a rather imprecise phrase. Nicolas Gueguen and Celine Jacob 
(2002) decided to compare a situation in which the requester maintained constant 
eye contact with the person being asked for something to one in which eye contact 
was broken off and returned to at intervals. Their experiment consisted of asking 
passers-by on a city street to participate in a marketing research survey. When eye 
contact was constantly maintained, 66% of participants consented to fill in the 
questionnaire, while in conditions when the experimenter’s eyes “danced around”, 
only 34% did so.
Why does eye contact increase the chances that a request will be fulfilled? The 
simplest interpretation of the link between looking in the eyes of people we are 
directing a request to and their compliance refers to studies suggesting that more 
desirable personality traits are assigned to those who look their interlocutors 
straight in the eyes (e.g. Brooks, Church & Fraser, 1986; Droney & Brooks, 1993) 
and they also benefit from greater affinity (e.g. Cook & Smith, 1975; Scherer, 
1974) than those who avoid eye contact. Because there is an assumption that the 
perception of people’s personalities as “better” and greater affinity towards such 
people are accompanied by a greater readiness to comply with their requests, it 
should come as no surprise that those who maintain eye contact with their 
partners in conversation get what they want more often than those who do not 
establish such contact. 
A more nuanced alternative explanation of the connection between eye contact 
and compliance was offered by Phoebe Ellsworth and Ellen Langer (1976). Their 
proposed model even attempted to predict situations in which eye contact would 
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Research has also shown that the effect on compliance that results from a touch 
on another person’s arm can also appear following a certain period of time. Nicolas 
Gueguen and a group of collaborators (Gueguen, Meineri & Charles-Sire, 2010; 
Gueguen & Vion, 2009) demonstrated that if a doctor touches the arm of a patient 
leaving the surgery, that patient will be more likely to adhere to the medical advice 
given. This was determined by reviewing how many of the recommended pills had 
not been swallowed after a few days by those patients who were touched on the 
arm in comparison with those who were given a standard farewell (meaning with-
out being touched). 
Morton Goldman, Odette Kiyohara and Dorothy Pfannesteil (1985) made a 
rather simple request of study participants. Just in front of the entrance to a uni-
versity library they asked people how to get to the education faculty building. In 
some conditions, they touched the forearm of the individual to whom their ques-
tion was posed. Of course, those (unknowingly) participating in the study gave 
their assistance and explained the easiest way to get there. Inside the library another 
experimenter waited and invited these individuals to participate in a charitable 
campaign to help disabled children. This participation was to consist of a two-hour 
shift at a phone bank. Among those who had been touched on the arm, 40% gave 
their consent to participate while only 5% of those who were just asked about the 
way to the education faculty building agreed to man the phone.
Other interesting studies are those conducted by Jane Nannberg and Christie 
Hansen (1994), who examined whether touching another person on the arm 
would affect the quality of work done on a task that person had previously agreed 
to do. They approached students of both sexes with the request to fill in a question-
naire, which they did in a conventional manner, maintaining a certain physical 
distance. Individuals who agreed to complete the questionnaire were given a bundle 
of papers containing 150 questions, then were asked to sit down somewhere in the 
vicinity, familiarize themselves with the instructions and answer the questions in 
the survey. In half of the cases this information was given as the forearm of the 
participant was gently touched (for approximately 2 seconds). The questionnaire 
itself generally focused on controversial issues (e.g. assisted suicide, homosexuality, 
abortion, death penalty) or the private life of the respondent. The instructions 
given at the beginning stated that every response was valuable, but that it wasn’t 
necessary to answer every single question. It turned out that those whose forearms 
had been grasped answered 25% more questions on average than those who were 
not touched. However, the subtle social influence technique being analyzed here 
was not helpful in distinguishing the manner in which participants responded to 
the questions they had answered. 
What is the mechanism underlying the effectiveness of such a simple device as 
grasping someone by the arm while addressing a request, or even afterwards, as 
done in the last of the experiments described above? The relevant literature offers 
two competing explanations. First, attention is drawn to how touch is associated 
with not only the physical dimension of interpersonal closeness, but also its 
psychological aspect. This may also lead us to perceive an individual who delicately 
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126  Interaction dynamics and the surprise factor
touches us as friendly and likable, enamouring that person to us and making us 
more likely to help (e.g. Patterson et al., 1986). This results primarily from the 
individual biographies of nearly every person. In the vast majority of cases people 
have positive experiences associated with being touched by someone. This assump-
tion would also concur with the results of research demonstrating that hospital 
patients more favourably rated nurses that touched them frequently, and also were 
also more eager to engage them in conversation (Algulera, 1967), and that psycho-
therapists touching the hands and arms of their patients succeeded in motivating 
them to more quickly open up and discuss their pressing problems (Paulsell & 
Goldman, 1984). 
The second interpretation refers to the social privilege motive (e.g. Henley, 
1973). If someone grabs us by the arm, a signal is sent at the same time that this 
individual is authorized to address certain demands and expectations to us. Nancy 
Henley showed study participants photographs of pairs of people between whom 
there was a clear difference in status (e.g. master–slave, police officer–suspect). The 
participants’ task consisted of indicating the person in the photograph who would 
initiate any sort of touching behaviour. The decisive majority of participants 
declared that it was the higher-status individual who would do so. The potential that 
the lower-status individual would engage in this behaviour was perceived as untact-
ful (see Henley & LaFrance, 1984). In another study Brenda Major and Richard 
Heslin (1982) showed participants a series of slides containing pairs of individuals 
(some of the same sex, some of different sexes). Sometimes one of them was touch-
ing the other, sometimes there was no touch involved. The study participants were 
supposed to determine what kind of people were on display. It turned out that the 
estimation of individual figures’ assertiveness and domination went up when they 
were shown touching others, and decreased when they were presented as being 
touched by others. Gueguen (2002) demonstrated in his study, during which men 
asked passers-by to participate in a brief research survey, that touch was particularly 
helpful for those men whose clothing suggested high status (suit and tie). If an 
experimenter who was dressed in this manner touched the hand of a passer-by, the 
chance that he would receive agreement for participation in the survey increased by 
more than twofold. When the experimenter was dressed in jeans and a t-shirt, the 
positive effect of touch on gaining compliance was clearly reduced.
Unfortunately, psychologists have demonstrated unusually deep reluctance to 
conduct research directly examining the question of which of the aforementioned 
factors (interpersonal closeness vs social privilege) is actually at the core of this 
simple social influence technique’s efficacy. During one of our attempts at grap-
pling with this problem (Dolinski, 2005) we assumed that certain verbal messages 
can be viewed as coherent or incoherent with these mechanisms. An unambiguous 
order would seem more consistent with the social privilege motive than with the 
interpersonal closeness motive, while the opposite would be true of a polite, sincere 
request. In our experiment we turned to participants with a request to help find a 
gold earring ostensibly lost on the sidewalk, either with an order (“Help me look 
for this!”) or a polite request (“Would you be so kind as to help me look for this?”); 
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regardless of the form of the message, we either simultaneously touched their arm/
forearm or did not do so.
We assumed that if the efficacy of touch as a social influence technique rests 
in the social privilege motive, this technique should be more effective in condi-
tions where an order is given rather than in conditions of a request, while if the 
mechanism responsible is interpersonal closeness then the pattern of results should 
be reversed. Results indicated that, while touching passers-by increased the 
possibility that they would help search for the lost object, there was no association 
demonstrated between touch and the manner in which the message was formu-
lated. This experiment also failed to resolve the issue of which of the hypothesized 
mechanisms plays the fundamental role in the touch technique. Studies by Jack 
Powell and his collaborators proved equally inconclusive (Powell et al., 1994), as 
they confirmed neither the mechanism associated with affinity nor the one linked 
with signalling the authority to formulate expectations and requirements. 
Patterson et al. (1986) performed an experiment in which they examined whether 
people felt greater affinity towards an individual who touched their arm while 
addressing a request to them. If this were the case, the result would suggest that 
the social closeness motive came into play. However, there were no differences 
observed in judgements on the experimenter depending on whether he touched 
a study participant or not. The experiment’s authors thus conclude that the social 
privilege motive is, in their view, a more likely mechanism for explaining the 
effectiveness of touch as a social influence technique. The problem is that such a 
conclusion would seem to be unjustified. Indeed, as of yet nobody has succeeded 
in demonstrating convincingly that this motive in fact plays a key role. There are, 
however, results indirectly indicating that an unobtrusive touch enhances affinity. 
During an experiment conducted in a university library, the library employees 
sometimes (ostensibly by accident) touched students’ arms while returning their 
library cards. As they exited the building, students were asked to take a survey in 
which they were to assess the functioning of the library and its employees. It 
turned out that those students who had been touched on the arm by a librarian 
expressed more favourable opinions than those served in a standard manner 
(Fisher, Rytting & Heslin, 1976). 
Perhaps the inconclusivity in the patterns of results discussed above derives from 
the co-occurrence of the two mechanisms. On the other hand, we also cannot 
exclude the conclusion that neither of them is involved. Indeed, it is possible that 
the essence of the technique consisting of touching the arm or forearm of an indi-
vidual approached with a request is grounded in something else. A situation in 
which a stranger grabs us by the arm may shake us out of our routine, much as in 
the case of the pique and DTR, which have already been discussed earlier in this 
chapter. We should observe that this is a rather unusual situation, one which disrupts 
the course of a routine situation involving a request made of us by an unfamiliar 
individual. To a certain degree this interpretation would be in line with the pattern 
of results attained by one experiment in which it was examined whether touch 
would be an effective social influence technique when asking someone for help in 
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tabulating the scores achieved by others in a questionnaire. The results proved less 
than clear-cut. Those individuals who were held by the arm during the addressing 
of the request then sacrificed more of their time counting scores on questionnaires 
than those who were not touched by the experimenter. However, the average num-
ber of questionnaires reviewed in both conditions was nearly the same (Patterson 
et al., 1986). It can therefore be said that those who were grabbed by the arm did 
work longer, but when converting their work into time units they were less efficient. 
Perhaps their functioning was disrupted by being knocked off balance. Participants 
who were held by the arm while having a request made of them may have been 
thinking (at least from time to time) about this odd situation while counting scores, 
which would have led to reduced intellectual efficiency. This assumption would also 
be consistent with the results of another experiment involving an examination of 
the efficiency of people who were touched during the course of performing tasks. 
Nan Sussman and Howard Rosenfeld (1978), the study’s authors, came to the 
conclusion that the efficiency of an individual’s functioning does not proceed from 
the mere fact of being touched by someone, but rather from the justification for 
such activity. A portion of participants were told that an individual keeping track of 
time would be seated next to them, and if that person felt that the task was being 
performed too slowly, an indication of this would be given by gently squeezing their 
arm and telling them how many seconds remained for completion of the task. The 
other participants were not given this information. In all cases, the woman whose 
purported task was to keep an eye on the time either held the study participant by 
the arm or did not. The task involved perception and its proper completion required 
the focus of one’s concentration. As it turned out, male participants performed the 
task worse in conditions when they had not been told the reason for being touched 
by the experimenter than when they had been informed of why she was doing so. 
An analogous effect was noted in a second experiment conducted following a 
similar procedure. 
Thus the question arises of whether holding someone by the arm while 
addressing a request is a separate social influence technique, or rather a variation of 
techniques based on strange or surprising situations (DTR, the pique). This ques-
tion can only be answered through empirical research, and presently remains an 
entirely open one.
Chris Kleinke (1977, 1980) proposes an entirely different interpretation of the 
dependencies being discussed here. He suggests that touch functions in a similar 
manner to eye contact, and performs the role of a non-specific activator. If we are 
touched on the arm or forearm by a stranger, our state of physiological arousal is 
enhanced, our attention is directed towards the “here and now”, and we adopt a 
more reflective approach to the matter of our behaviour and its compliance with 
our attitudes and value system. The conviction that touch and the maintenance of 
eye contact are based on the same mechanism of the non-specific activator would 
seem to be shared by a large number of researchers, as both of them are employed 
jointly in the course of some experiments. Presenting a request, the experimenter 
touches the arm or forearm of a participant while simultaneously looking that 
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person in the eyes (e.g. Hornik, 1987; Hornik & Ellis, 1988; Kleinke, 1977). 
Unfortunately, while Chris Kleinke’s theory – that touch operates as a non-specific 
activator – seems an interesting idea, in light of the lack of sufficient empirical 
evidence it remains merely an intriguing hypothesis. 
Another issue concerns the sex of the people touching and being touched 
when the former is making a request of the latter. Experiments have typically 
accounted for the factor of sex. In a clear majority of published studies, a touch of 
the hand or arm of the addressee of a request increased the chances that the request 
would meet with acceptance in all possible configurations (and thus without regard 
to the sex of the person asking or the sex of the person being asked). Discrepancies 
across research results only concerned the strength of the effect in particular condi-
tions. The most common results pattern observed was one indicating that touch is 
most effective if the participants in the interaction are of different sexes (e.g. Heslin, 
Nguyen & Nguyen, 1983; Stier & Hall, 1984) or when both are women (Patterson 
et al., 1986). However, in Poland we recorded a different pattern of results. The 
experiment (Dolinski, 2010) was conducted in the vicinity of a railway station. The 
experimenter (depending on the conditions this was either a young woman or a 
young man) asked a lone pedestrian – who appeared to be an adult – for a favour. 
Both women and men were addressed. The experimenter requested that the study 
participant send a letter for him/her, explaining that he/she was in a hurry to catch 
a train. In half of the cases the experimenter held the forearm of the individual 
with whom the interaction was taking place. 
Every letter was appended with the same address, and a stamp was already stuck 
to the envelope. The envelope contained a piece of paper with a description of the 
experimental conditions (e.g. experimenter – woman; participant – man; condition – 
no touch). This facilitated the application of two indicators of compliance – verbal 
expression of consent to send the letter and actual sending of the letter (which was 
of course identified later). The results of this experiment are presented in Figure 5.2.
As we can see, the technique of touching a person to whom a request is 
addressed turned out to be effective in both the conditions in which a woman 
formulated the request, and when a man addressed the request to a woman. 
However, it was entirely ineffective when a man asked another man to send the 
letter. To be more precise, in these conclusions we observed a clear decline in the 
frequency of request fulfilment. We observed a similar pattern of results in a subse-
quent experiment involving the sale of incense sticks on the street to passers-by. 
Why is it that in Poland a man touching another man not only fails to increase the 
chance that he will fulfil his request, but in fact reduces it? Our conclusion was that 
the root may lie in this country’s strong male homophobia. A typical (heterosexual) 
Polish man may react with aversion to the touch of another, unknown man and 
perceive the gesture in sexual terms. We confirmed the correctness of this inter-
pretation in an additional study (Dolinski, 2010). 
Concluding these deliberations over touch as a social influence technique, we 
should note that certain issues of a technical, or perhaps practical, nature are in 
need of clarification. First, an important parameter of touch is its strength. “Touch 
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someone on the arm or forearm” can signify a very delicate laying of the arm on 
that part of the body, a clear hold, or a squeeze of the hand with such force as to 
cause pain. Chris Segrin (1993), the author of a meta-analysis of studies addressing 
the link between touch and compliance, draws attention to this factor in stating 
that it may be of significance but that there is no clear criterion for determining 
what strength of touch is optimal in enhancing the compliance of study partici-
pants. The authors of experimental studies generally do provide information in that 
regard, but they use vague terms such as “delicate” or “light” touch, which can 
mean something entirely different to two different researchers. 
Second, we should observe that the experiments concerning the efficacy of 
touch as a social influence technique discussed above most frequently involve 
touching either the arm or forearm of the addressee. Which part of the body 
should we touch for the greatest effect? Or, to put it more precisely, which part of 
the arm should we touch for the greatest effect? Shari Paulsell and Morton 
Goldman (1984) posed just this question. Shoppers in a large mall were used as 
study participants, and they were asked to respond to four questions concerning 
literature. Depending on the experimental conditions, they were either not 
touched at all, or were touched while being asked to agree to a short interview; 
the touch was either on the arm above the elbow, between the elbow and the hand, 
or on the hand. Generally the mere fact of being touched was sufficient to spur 
compliance on the part of the addressee of the request, but this effect was clearly 
FIGURE 5.2  Percentage of compliance with the request to mail a letter in each of the 
experimental conditions. N = 40 in each condition. F-F: Female asking 
female; F-M: Female asking male; M-F: Male asking female; M-M: Male 
asking male
Source: Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 2010, vol. 34, p. 183.
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moderated by the sex of the person touching and the person being touched, as well 
as by the particular part of the body that was touched by the experimenter. A 
woman’s touch raised to a much greater degree the chances that shoppers would 
agree to participate than did the touch of a man. A woman submitting the request 
was particularly effective when she touched the addressee of the request either 
above or below the shoulder, especially if she was touching a man.
It should be recalled, however, that this is the result of only one study, and in 
addition it involved only two experimenters (one man and one woman), which 
may have facilitated unwanted specific effects. For example, one may imagine that 
the different consequences of touching particular parts of the arm may result from 
the fact that the individual making the request was moving his/her hand up, down, 
or held it level. In this situation the experimenter’s height could be the key factor. 
In studies concerning touch, the physical attractiveness of the experimenter may 
also play a significant role, and this factor may in turn interact with the portion of 
the arm being touched, etc. When several experimenters are performing a study, 
the absence of interaction effects with the variable of the experimenter him/her-
self is an argument in support of the claim that we are dealing with a real rule. The 
studies being discussed here obviously do not fulfil this condition. 
Summary
In many decision-making situations, we waver. It is no different in situations 
involving social influence, in which one person wants to induce another to engage 
in some defined behaviour. Certain arguments make the person being cajoled 
likely to give in, while other factors make this less likely. The two techniques 
described in this chapter are designed to break through this resistance. The first of 
them is rather simple, while the second is exceptionally sophisticated.
The origins of the “that’s not all” technique are to be found in the classic idea of 
the sale. A normal discount is static in nature. The customer sees the old (higher) price 
and compares it with the new (lower) one. The “that’s not all” social influence tech-
nique, in contrast to the previously described discounts, has a dynamic nature. Its 
essence consists of the initial offer being so interesting that the customer deliberates 
whether to take advantage or not. Then, an additional argument is supplied, offering 
something beneficial. This argument tips the scales, and the person targeted takes the 
decision. Research conducted by J. Burger, who was the first to describe this tech-
nique in the literature, demonstrated that when selling goods this technique is 
effective, both when a reduction in price is suddenly offered and when an additional 
product is proposed as a gift. Further studies on this technique generated results 
suggesting that it is only effective in the sale of less expensive goods, and a condition 
of its effectiveness is inducing a state of automaticity in people targeted with it. 
The “disrupt-then-reframe” technique is based on the assumption that people 
who are asked for something experience an approach/avoid conflict. Approaching is 
associated with the desire to provide aid to a person in need and who asks for it, or 
with the desire to take advantage of an offer presented by someone. Avoidance, how-
ever, is linked with the attendant effort and loss of time or money. People resist doing 
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what someone else encourages them to do. Many social influence techniques are 
aimed at increasing others’ desire to do something by highlighting the benefits that 
may result (the perfect example of which may by the “that’s not all” trick discussed 
earlier) or by minimizing the losses resulting from it. The “disrupt-then-reframe” 
technique, however, is aimed simultaneously at reducing resistance and boosting 
incentive. This operation consists of finding a way to “jolt people out of their 
routine”, making the course of the interaction a bit surprising and unusual (e.g. by 
giving a price in cents instead of dollars), and then supplying a new argument 
encouraging them to concede to a given request. In the light of what is now a very 
extensive body of research, this technique has proved itself effective not only in sales 
transactions, but also (perhaps first and foremost) in such areas as getting respondents 
to agree to participate in a telephone survey or encouraging people to sign a petition.
While the DTR technique requires a quite complex sequence of actions, the 
pique is far simpler. The idea is to present a request that people usually reject out 
of hand in an unusual manner (for example, asking for 37 cents instead of a quarter). 
While the experiments did demonstrate the effectiveness of this technique, its 
psychological mechanism remains unclear.
There is no codification of cultural norms determining the permissible (and 
optimal) physical distance that should exist between two people interacting directly 
with each other. The issue of physical distance is also important from the perspective 
of social influence. In this chapter we have considered two issues within this area in 
particular: eye contact and touch. A significant number of studies have demonstrated 
that people are more apt to fulfil requests directed to them when the person making 
the request looks straight into the eyes of the individual receiving it. Eye contact 
most likely performs the role of a so-called “non-specific activator”. Awareness that 
someone is looking us in the eyes serves to increase our body’s level of physiological 
stimulation, and our attention (at least initially) is drawn to the person looking at us. 
This leads us to engaging in a more careful analysis of the situation, and we begin 
to take care that our behaviour is consistent with our attitudes. 
The second issue analyzed in this chapter concerns the role of touch. Many 
studies have demonstrated that people are more inclined to fulfil requests made by 
strangers if the request is accompanied by a delicate touch of the arm or shoulder. 
It has also been shown that touching someone on the shoulder or arm leads to that 
person improving the performance of a task taken up earlier. 
What is the mechanism underlying the efficacy of such a simple device as grasping 
someone by the arm while addressing a request, or even after the request has been 
expressed? The subject literature generally presents two competing explanations. 
One of them draws attention to association between touch and interpersonal close-
ness, not only in the physical sense but also the psychological aspect. This leads to 
us perceiving a person touching us as nice and affable, which leads to affinity, and 
in turn increases the likelihood that we will provide assistance to that individual. The 
alternative interpretation refers to the social privilege motive. While being held by 
the arm, we simultaneously receive the signal that the person doing so is authorized 
to address certain expectations and demands to us. Research done on the subject 
has yet to establish which of these interpretations is closer to the truth.
6 
TECHNIQUES OF SOCIAL  
INFLUENCE USING MOOD  
AND EMOTION
On an almost daily basis, each of us experiences a myriad of affective states – some 
lasting longer, some shorter, some more intense, some less, with a colourful diversity 
of content. What, if any, is the impact of such states on our willingness to fulfil 
requests made of us? Does it increase, or perhaps reduce our compliance? Why are 
we inclined to react positively or negatively? This chapter is an attempt to answer 
these and other questions. First, I will address the role of the physiological stimulation 
experienced by individuals making a request or having a request addressed to them. 
Next, I will present studies that demonstrate the importance our mood has in 
affecting our susceptibility to social influence techniques; I will close the chapter 
with an analysis of the role played in social influence by specific (discrete) emotions. 
Emotional arousal is a temporary state existing in the human body that is 
characterized by somatic energy and changes in consciousness, consisting of a 
narrowing of its field. This condition facilitates the body’s engagement of adaptive 
behaviours under conditions of increased demands imposed either by the external 
environment or by the individual concerned. In this state of arousal the heart beats 
quickly, blood is directed to muscles as well as to the brain, whose bioelectric activity 
increases. It is assumed that arousal is a non-specific affective state in the sense that 
it may exhibit a sign (which may be perceived as pleasant or unpleasant), but it does 
not have the particular content possessed by emotions (Frijda, 1986). Insofar as 
emotional arousal is treated in psychology as a non-specific state, emotions are 
specific. For example, while sadness and fear are both negative emotions, we clearly 
perceive the differences between them. In turn, what links emotional arousal and 
emotions is the latter’s intensity (high) and duration (short – usually seconds, rarely 
minutes). It is precisely these parameters that differentiate the two emotional states 
mentioned above from moods. A mood is low-intensity, but may last longer (hours, 
days, even weeks at a time). And while emotions are directed at an object (“I’m sad 
because”, “I’m furious with”), moods are often objectless and undirected (Niedenthal, 
Krauth-Gruber & Ric, 2006).
134  Techniques using mood and emotion
We shall begin our analysis of the role played by affective states in social influence 
processes by examining some matters concerning physiological arousal.
Physiological arousal
Research conducted over half a century ago (Back, Bogdonoff, Shaw & Klein, 
1963), during which the initial stage of the experiment involved measuring 
participants’ levels of physiological arousal, demonstrated that this arousal is associ-
ated with the conformity later observed in their behaviour. Conformity in this 
study was tested using the Asch procedure, in which other experiment partici-
pants (de facto confederates of the experimenter) uniformly provide an erroneous 
answer in order to observe whether the “true” participant adopted their opinion. 
It turned out that the greater the real participant’s physiological arousal at the very 
beginning of the experiment, the more likely he or she was to engage in conform-
ist behaviour. Similarly enhanced conformist tendencies were observed by John 
Darley (1966) among study participants who were initially informed that they 
could expect to experience electric shocks. Information about the threat of expe-
riencing a jolt of electricity naturally led to a significant increase in physiological 
arousal.
The role of arousal has also been examined in experiments on susceptibility to 
persuasion. In one of them, several of the participants were induced to engage in 
physical activity, which led to their physiological arousal (Sanbonmatsu & Kardes, 
1988). It turned out that this state led them to attach less importance to the content 
of messages and the quality of the arguments contained in them, at the same time 
increasing their tendency to make use of peripheral cues (such as the authority of 
the individual issuing the communique).
Vera Corfield (1969) observed that the majority of situations involving social 
influence are accompanied by an increase in physiological arousal. The simple pres-
ence of other people (often strangers to us) evokes arousal. It may be further 
enhanced by the physical attractiveness of those people, or by the fact that they are 
famous. People attempting to exert influence over us often stand very close, touch 
us, look us in the eyes (see Chapter 5), additionally increasing the levels of arousal 
we experience. Another source of enhanced arousal may be the content of verbal 
messages that reach us. Someone collecting donations for a charitable cause may, 
for example, tell us graphic stories of people suffering pain or hunger. Various sensory 
experiences may also serve as stimulants of physiological arousal. Alternatively, it 
could be a black patch over the eye of a vagrant, or the perfume of a salesperson 
encouraging us to sample some cheese in the supermarket. Still another source of 
arousal may be the very object at the centre of our attention during a situation in 
which social influence is being applied to us. Thus, if we are expected to buy a new 
car, the very presence of that car and all accompanying information about its 
qualities will perform that role. If, however, we are in the process of selling our own 
used car, arousal may be generated by the sight or even the mere imagination of 
the pile of cash we may obtain. 
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Among people who have already experienced one source of arousal and then 
find themselves in another situation that gives rise to emotions, a synergistic effect 
from the accumulation of stimuli may occur. If the arousal is perceived as an 
unpleasant thing, this condition is obviously very disagreeable for such an individual, 
and in extreme cases may even be aversive. Acquiescence, the fulfilment of a request, 
consent to a proposal or performance of a task often become a means of reducing 
arousal. It thus comes as no surprise that, as a general proposition, high arousal 
levels are conducive to compliance. A good demonstration of this effect can be 
found in a study whose participants were students exiting a public toilet facility in 
a university building. An experimenter waited for prospective participants by the 
exit, and made an unexpected request of them. He said that he was in a hurry, and 
that a friend of his was waiting in another part of the building for some notes that 
he urgently needed. The request, obviously, concerned delivering the notes. An 
analogical request was made to students who were simply walking down the hallway. 
It was assumed that, because a public toilet and its surroundings are an area in which 
people experience a particularly salient need for privacy, contact with a stranger in 
such a place will generate unpleasant physiological arousal. This state of arousal 
should, however, be much weaker in a corridor, where contact with another person, 
even a stranger, is nothing out of the ordinary. Significantly, it turned out that while 
only 45% of people approached in the corridor agreed to pass the notes along to 
the other student, this figure rose sharply (to 80%) when the request was lodged in 
front of the door to the public toilet (Cann & Blackwelder, 1984).The question thus 
arises of why emotional arousal induced individuals to give their consent to the 
request of an experimenter whose very presence and behaviour served as the source 
of that arousal. In other words, could participants be unable to minimize this 
unpleasant emotional state by refusing to accede to the request and be quickly 
retreating from the place in which they were approached? It would seem that the 
key factor is that refusal to fulfil the simple, polite request may have served to addi-
tionally enhance the unpleasant arousal, as it could have led to unpleasant internal 
reflections by the participants as to their own person (“As it turns out, I’m disobliging 
and rude”, “I behaved rudely for no good reason”). 
An alternative explanation for the compliance of individuals approached by the 
toilet may be based on the assumption that their capacity for processing informa-
tion was at that moment slightly disrupted. A situation in which we are subjected 
to social influence often requires the engagement of our cognitive instrumentation 
in order to adequately assess the circumstances. For example, we must properly 
judge whether the fulfilment of a given request or agreement to some proposal is 
compliant with our system of values, or whether it runs contrary to our own inter-
ests. A significant body of empirical data (see e.g. Baron & Moore, 1987; 
Bodenhausen, 1993) allows us to assume that a high level of emotional arousal is 
not conducive to such rational analysis. Indeed, it is an exemplification of a general 
principle that assumes that while medium-intensity arousal optimizes the functioning 
of an individual, strong arousal leads to inhibited functioning (Lacey & Lacey, 1978; 
Pribram & McGuinness, 1975).ess, 1975).
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There is essentially universal agreement among psychologists that arousal evokes 
neurophysiological processes that induce disruption in the processing of information. 
However, there is no such agreement as to just which processes those are. Robert 
Baron (2000) offers three competing explanations for this phenomenon. 
Supporters of what has assumed the mantle of the classic interpretation feel 
that physiological arousal leads to activation of certain areas of the cerebral cortex, 
but the consequence of stimulation of these areas is a reduction in the activity of 
neighbouring areas. It is the suppression of these areas of the brain that leads to 
reduced cognitive efficiency. Supporters of another interpretation make reference 
to data suggesting that strong physiological arousal reduces the volume of blood 
flowing into the brain. The presence of insufficient “power” leads to the brain 
behaving in the manner of a car on its last drop of petrol. Indeed, the car continues 
to move forward, but the engine splutters without a break. While these two 
approaches suggest that we are dealing with an automatic process that is com-
pletely independent of the individual concerned, those who subscribe to a third 
interpretation suggest that arousal, rather than impairing, actually induces thinking. 
The problem is, such thinking is not always directed towards the issue presented 
by the matter at hand. Thus a physiologically aroused customer in a shop may, for 
example, begin to wonder intensely about the sources of said arousal, but not 
about whether she really needs a pair of light-yellow trousers. Presently there is 
insufficient empirical evidence to definitively support any particular one of those 
three interpretations.
The role of positive and negative mood
In the early 1970s, Gordon Bower began studying the effect of mood on memory 
processes (e.g. Bower, Monteiro & Gilligan, 1971). In 1981 he published a widely-
discussed article in which he described the numerous consequences of hypnotic 
induction on individuals experiencing joyful or gloomy moods. In one experi-
ment, participants were requested to recall various episodes from their childhood. 
The following day, they categorized each of them as pleasant, unpleasant or neutral. 
The day after that, a positive or negative mood was induced among the partici-
pants, and they were then again asked to recall as many episodes as possible. 
Individuals experiencing a positive mood easily recalled pleasant episodes, but had 
difficulty in remembering unpleasant ones. The opposite was observed among 
participants experiencing a negative mood – they had an easier time recalling 
episodes that they had previously labelled as unpleasant. Attempting to explain this 
effect, the author formulated a rule known as “mood-state-dependent retention”. 
According to this rule, one’s mood (as well as – it may be assumed – other affective 
states) activates memories of those experiences that are affectively congruent with 
the mood. The obvious consequence of this is that it becomes easier to recall con-
tent that is consistent with a given affective state rather than inconsistent content. 
Symmetry in the relation between mood and cognitive processes does not apply 
only to memory. Bower observed that people attend to and learn more about 
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events that correspond to their emotional state, and labels this as the mood-congruity 
effect (Bower, 1981).
As in the case of determinants of the course of cognitive processes, psychologists 
have devoted considerable attention to the role of mood in their work on the 
determinants of social behaviours. Results of exploratory research indicate that the 
mood-congruity effect concerns not only the relationship between emotional 
states and cognitive processes, but also with behaviours of a social character. A 
positive mood, evoked by various experimental procedures, led to increased readi-
ness to help others. In one experiment it was demonstrated that individuals who 
have unexpectedly received a refund of 10 cents after a conversation in a phone 
booth were then more inclined to provide assistance to an individual who had 
dropped a pile of papers (Isen & Levin, 1972). Predisposition to altruism also rose 
during sunny days (Cunningham, 1979; Gueguen & Lamy, 2013), after listening to 
a pleasant piece of music (Wilson, 1981), and after receiving a cookie (Isen & 
Levin, 1972). A good mood also induced customers in shops to spend more money 
(Baker, Levy & Grewal, 1992; Sajjad & Tausif, 2012). 
Other research, however, has demonstrated that people do not always react in a 
manner consistent with the emotional state they are experiencing. In one experi-
ment, people in a good mood provided assistance to another person only 
sporadically. This help consisted of reading fragments of a book. When the partici-
pants were told that the contents to be read were cheerful in nature, and that 
reading and listening to them would improve one’s mood, those who were in a 
positive mood were especially inclined to engage in such activity. However, when 
it was mentioned that the contents were sad, and that reading them would lead to 
a worse mood, it was precisely those people who were in a positive mood that very 
rarely agreed to perform the suggested actions (Isen & Simmonds, 1978). Similar 
effects were also observed in a number of other studies (e.g. Cunningham, Steiberg 
& Grev, 1980; Rosenhan, Salovey & Hargis, 1981). This led Alice Isen (1984; Clark 
& Isen, 1982) to formulate a rule according to which – since one of the motiva-
tions for human activity is the desire to maintain a good mood – people avoid 
behaviours that may lead to its worsening. This concerns not only engagement in 
emotionally costly forms of aiding others. People in a positive mood are, for example, 
unlikely to undertake serious financial risks (Isen & Geva, 1987). Obviously, 
financial loss may impair one from achieving the desired positive mood.
If the experience of positive emotional states is something that people fight to 
protect when it is happening to them, do people experiencing negative emotional 
states engage in activity that will help them feel better? Clark and Isen (1982) claim 
that this is often the case. Good examples of strategic improvements in mood are 
supplied by studies in which individuals experiencing depressive states eagerly 
engage in altruistic behaviour that has been presented as pleasant and attractive 
(Cunningham, Schaffer, Barbee, Wolff & Kelley, 1990). However, it is not always the 
case that negative emotional states lead to increased readiness to help others. 
Particularly, this is not the case when these states are intense, and people are focused 
on their own difficulties and problems (Berkowitz, 1993).
ff  s r  i  a nu ber of other studies (e.g. Cun ingham, Stein
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Research conducted by the Australian psychologist Joseph Forgas (1998) is 
important for understanding the role of mood in proclivity to accede to the 
requests of others. This researcher focused on the manner in which people react to 
a request for help and how they evaluate that request, as well as the manner in 
which they process the information that is reaching them. Forgas adopted the 
assumption that particular requests differ in their degree of complexity and pecu-
liarity. At one extreme we may locate routine requests – generally polite requests 
concerning small favours; at the other – requests concerning unusual things, which 
are formulated in a highly atypical manner. It may be assumed that typical, con-
ventional requests meet with automatic reactions, and that individuals don’t “worry 
their heads too much”, quickly forgetting about their content. The situation is 
different in the case of uncommon requests, and also those formulated in an unu-
sual way (e.g. not very polite, or just the opposite: extraordinarily elaborate). In this 
event, the individual being approached with the request will process information 
more attentively, subject it to extensive analysis, and will, as a result, remember the 
content of the request and the circumstances in which it was lodged. 
The application of an automatic or deliberative mode of processing information 
also facilitates distinct affective states. The experience of positive states is conducive 
to the application of intuitive formulae and “mental shortcuts”. Experiencing nega-
tive emotional states, however, leads people to apply more systematic, and one may 
even say rational, cognitive strategies (Clark & Isen, 1982; Schwarz & Bless, 1991).
The affective state one feels also exerts an influence on the perception of various 
events. The mood-congruity effect discussed above suggests that viewpoints of such 
events will be “filtered” through the affect an individual is going through at the time. 
Forgas therefore concluded that individuals in a positive mood will generally for-
mulate more positive interpretations of requests directed at them in comparison to 
those experiencing a negative emotional state. People experiencing a good mood 
should, as a result, be more inclined to fulfil requests made of them than those in a 
negative mood. The eventual fulfilment of a request depends (often primarily) on 
the subjective interpretation of the entire event. What is more, he assumed that a 
request of a conventional nature (e.g. formed in a polite, standard way) should be 
accepted more or less automatically. Performance of a request should therefore not 
be directly dependent on the mood experienced by its addressee. However, things 
should be different in respect of untypical requests (e.g. formulated in a manner 
inconsistent with established tradition). In these cases the processing of information 
should be more systematic rather than automatic. Thus, in such a situation – 
according to Forgas – the affective state being experienced by the individual has a 
significant impact on the processing of information, even determining to a certain 
degree the assessments made and judgements reached. Assessment of a situation 
associated with being the addressee of another person’s request will therefore be 
influenced by the affective state being experienced. Thus, concludes Forgas, the type 
of mood felt should exert a minimal impact on assessment of conventional requests 
and tendency to fulfil them, whereas the impact will be much stronger in respect of 
unconventional requests and decisions about their fulfilment. 
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In the first experiment dedicated to this issue, large envelopes were placed on 
desks in the reading room of a university library. Some of them contained sets of 
humorous cartoons, while the others contained pictures of automobile accidents. 
Library patrons were observed as they sat down at their desks and became unwitting 
participants in the experiment; they were given a few moments to familiarize them-
selves with the contents of the envelope. It was assumed that viewing a series of 
humorous cartoons would induce a good mood among the majority who saw them, 
while images of automobile accidents would result in experiencing a bad mood. 
After a few moments, an experimenter approached the subject and asked to borrow 
a piece of paper for the purpose of taking notes, or – in other conditions – ten pages 
of paper. Sometimes the request was formulated in a pleasant, conventional manner, 
while in others it took a direct and almost rude tone, contrary to convention (“Give 
me . . .”). Several minutes after that incident, another experimenter approached the 
participant and explained that the request for a piece of paper is part of a psycho-
logical experiment. Participants were then asked to evaluate the request that had been 
addressed using several different criteria (e.g. how unusual the request was, how 
polite, etc.), and also to evaluate their own mood. In line with expectations, it turned 
out that those who had seen the humorous drawings were in a better mood than 
those who were exposed to images of car accidents. The former were also more likely 
to fulfil the request for note-taking paper than were the latter. Participants also 
responded more positively to a request for one piece of paper than for ten pages. 
However, the most interesting data was that concerning the impact of mood in con-
ditions differentiated by the politeness of the request as formulated. Consistent with 
Forgas’s hypothesis, mood had practically no significance with respect to conditions 
in which the request was formulated in a pleasant, conventional manner. However, 
when the request was direct and inconsistent with custom, it was much more often 
met with acceptance by those in a positive mood than by participants experiencing 
negative emotions. Interestingly, an analogical pattern was observed regarding evalu-
ation of the request itself. The conventional request was viewed as equally polite by 
both participants in a good mood and those in a bad mood. The unconventional 
request (“Give me . . .”), however, was clearly viewed with greater lenience by those 
in a good mood compared to those whose mood had been influenced negatively.
In the second experiment, these dependencies were successfully replicated 
while applying a different manner of mood induction. This time, the envelopes 
prepared for reading-room patrons contained either humorous short stories, or 
descriptions of the deaths of people ill with cancer (there was also a control group 
that read emotionally neutral texts with information about the library). The degree 
to which participants remembered the precise content of the request addressed to 
them was also examined. This last element facilitated the determination that polite, 
conventional requests are not remembered very accurately (which is entirely consistent 
with Forgas’s assumptions that such situations are not analyzed with great attention 
to detail). Recollection of direct, unconventional requests, however, was significantly 
higher (which, obviously, is consistent with the assumption that people apply a 
more deliberate and systematic information processing strategy). 
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Generally, it can be said that the experiments conducted by Forgas allow us to 
understand the subtle differences in the reactions of people in different moods, but 
on the other hand their results concur with the theory that it is positive emotional 
states, rather than negative ones, that facilitate submission to requests. It should be 
added here that there are three points of view concerning research demonstrating 
an association between mood and tendency to fulfil various requests. The first of 
them holds that the mood an individual is experiencing has a direct influence on 
compliance. One supporter of this approach is Alice Isen, who assumes that people 
are motivated to attain and maintain a positive mood, and a decision about engaging 
or not engaging in a particular activity may be a means of achieving those 
objectives Clark & Isen, 1982; (Isen & Simmonds, 1978). A supporter of a second 
approach is Forgas, who suggests that mood may modify the very assessment of 
politeness and appropriateness of a request, and may alter the manner in which 
information concerning that request is processed. Under the third approach, 
however, mood induces associated cognitive states, such as thought, imagination 
and recollection (e.g. Niedenthal & Setterlund, 1994). In many cases, they may be 
consistent in content with the decision to provide assistance to a person asking for 
it. If we in fact are encountering the following sequence: positive mood – activation 
of positive cognitive elements – fulfilment of requests made by others, then the 
question arises of whether compliance can be induced by the mere activation of 
the aforementioned positive cognitive elements. Perhaps what comes into play here 
is not so much the content of such elements, but rather their positive or negative 
valence. The question of whether positive cognitive states alone are sufficient to 
induce compliance was asked by Bruce Rind (1997), who operated on the assump-
tion that positive cognitive states are composed primarily of elements such as 
curiosity and interest, which in turn are mainly manifested in the response to a 
particular type of stimulus. Indeed, curiosity and interest are strongly intertwined, 
as it is generally the case that curiosity is the foundation of interest. Both of these 
states are rewarding for the individual, and in the subject literature they are contrasted 
with such states as boredom and monotony. This is particularly well put (albeit 
metaphorically) by Sudhir Kakar (1976), who says “what the libido is to sexuality, 
curiosity is to cognition” (p. 197). 
In an experiment by Rind, the interest of participants selected from among 
students sitting alone in a university library was generated in such an original man-
ner that I would like to describe it in detail here. Imagine, dear Reader, that you 
are participating in an experiment conducted by this researcher. Someone 
approaches you, apologizes for disturbing you, and shows you a white piece of 
paper containing the following message:
FINISHED FILES ARE THE RE-
SULT OF YEARS OF SCIENTIF-
IC STUDY COMBINED WITH THE
EXPERIENCE OF MANY YEARS.
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Your task is to count the number of times the letter ‘F’ appears in the text. Have 
you done it already? I’m curious how many ‘F’s you’ve found . . . People generally 
declare that the letter ‘F’ appears in the text three times. However, the correct 
answer is six. In solving this exceptionally simple task, people generally do not take 
into consideration the letter ‘F’ that appears in the word “of”, which appears in the 
text three times. If you, dear Reader, were a participant in Rind’s study, you would 
certainly be surprised that you had made such a “serious” mistake, and you would 
be interested how this had occurred. That is precisely Rind’s point. He then 
explained to his participants that the error results from the fact that ‘F’ in the word 
“of” sounds like ‘V’, and this is why the ‘F’ goes unnoticed when reading the text. 
These participants were treated as those exhibiting the element of interest. Another 
group was asked by the experimenter to review the same text, but rather than 
counting occurrences of the letter ‘F’, they were asked to find the letter ‘R’. This 
task was also quite simple, and participants did not make any mistakes. However, 
there was no element that would induce interest among them. 
Regardless of which letters participants had been asked to count, the experi-
menter then requested them for their participation in a survey. He informed them 
that the questionnaire was quite long, comprising 80 questions. It was not, however, 
necessary to respond to all of them. Participants were then asked how many of the 
questions they would agree to answer. The experimental design also included a 
control group, which was not asked at the beginning to perform any task. It turned 
out that the participants who had counted the letter ‘F’ declared that they would 
answer more questions than the remaining two groups. 
The problem is, however, that the pattern of results recorded in this study may 
result from other factors than stimulation of cognitive interest. Above all, it is dif-
ficult to exclude the possibility that self-assessment of participants was impacted 
under the influence of information that they had performed poorly on such a 
seemingly simple task. Such a state is conducive to inducing compliance with 
regard to the requests of others. Doing something for them, insofar as it does not 
violate one’s own moral principles, may aid in rebuilding one’s self-image. Indeed, 
it supplies the conditions necessary for engaging in positive thinking about oneself 
in the form of “I’m an altruistic person” (e.g. Carlsmith & Gross, 1969; Cunningham 
et al., 1980). It can also not be excluded that participants experienced a feeling akin 
to guilt resulting from their poor execution of the task. A feeling of guilt – as many 
studies have shown, including those later on in this chapter – facilitates pliability 
in the face of requests. The mechanism that underlies this truth is, however, quite 
complex, and is discussed more broadly in a further section of this chapter.
Rind thus conducted another experiment based on a similar plan (this time, 
however, he eliminated the group that did not seek any letters in the text). 
Participants did have to complete a short questionnaire, in which they offered their 
views on how much their interest was sparked by the task involving a search for 
certain letters in the text, as well as the degree to which they felt performance of 
that task impacted their self-assessment, and of their feeling of guilt following the 
task. This experiment replicated the results indicating that after failing in their 
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search for the letter ‘F’, participants were more inclined to provide answers to the 
questions in the survey, and regression analyses demonstrated that both interest and 
the experience of a feeling of guilt exerted an influence on compliance; the former 
element, however, was slightly more significant. 
Unfortunately, Rind did not take account of two alternative explanations for 
the results he received. First, he failed to notice that the enhanced subservience 
of the participants who had been asked to find the letter ‘F’ may have resulted from 
the desire to show their gratitude to the experimenter for giving them the oppor-
tunity to have a very interesting experience. Thus the mechanism of reciprocity, 
universally acknowledged as one of the primary forces governing social influence, 
would come into play (Cialdini, 2001). Second, there is an even simpler explana-
tion, the truth of which may not be excluded: participants may have felt that if the 
experiment involving searching for the letter ‘F’ was so fascinating, then the survey 
questions may also be interesting and original. Obviously, those who were tasked 
with looking for the letter ‘R’, a boring job, had no reason to think that way (more 
precisely, they had reason to believe that the survey would be equally boring). 
In order to exclude these two interpretations, it would be necessary to create 
an experimental situation in which the request to fulfil the key request would be 
advanced by an entirely different person than the one who aroused cognitive 
interest. Together with Tomasz Grzyb and Slawomir Spiewak I’m currently con-
ducting such research, but there is still some time before the results come in. In 
any event, reliable evaluation of the theory that generalized positive cognitive 
states can generate compliance requires much more research.
Let us return to the issue of the relationship between the experience of affective 
states and submissiveness in the face of requests. We have already discussed the 
consequences of feeling physiological arousal and experiencing moods. Now it is 
time to proceed to analysis of the role of discrete emotions. 
Among the various emotions familiar to all of us from personal experience, we 
may distinguish those whose occurrence (or even the potential that they might 
occur) provoke individuals to behaviours compliant with the norms and princi-
ples which they or their social surroundings find acceptable. These emotions 
primarily include fear, guilt, shame and embarrassment. Of particular interest in 
the area of social influence is how the experience of such emotions (or at least 
the anticipation that they will occur) impacts people’s compliance with requests, 
orders and commands.
Fear and anxiety
Most likely owing to the obviousness of the fact that people under the influence 
of fright or fear are often prepared to fulfil all sorts of threats and commands, 
researchers have engaged this issue extremely infrequently, focusing rather on the 
impact of the concentration of such emotions on the effectiveness of persuasive 
messages. In other words, psychologists have been interested in the way that fear 
induced by those messages influences changes in the attitudes of those to whom 
Techniques using mood and emotion  143
the messages are addressed. In these studies a range of interesting truths have been 
uncovered concerning the mechanisms of changes in attitudes (see e.g. Gass & 
Seiter, 2011; O’Keefe, 2002). 
Because this book is focused on techniques that directly lead to changes in 
behaviour, it must be said that there are very few studies that have trained their 
fire at precisely the issue of the link between the degree of fear experienced by 
individuals and their tendency to submit to commands, requests and appeals 
addressed to them. Interestingly, the majority of research carried out in this area 
was done in the relatively distant past. In the 1950s, Irving Janis and Seymour 
Feshbach (1953) conducted an experiment in which the dependent variable was 
human behaviour. The experiment began by unsettling the participants with 
information that teeth infections might migrate to other parts of the body: the 
eyes, heart and joints. This information was accompanied by suggestive, revolting 
slides showing rotten teeth. By reducing the number of such slides as well as 
the volume of information about the negative consequences of dental illness, the 
researchers created two more versions of the same message. A portion of the participants 
was presented with a message inducing moderate fear, while another received a 
message evoking merely slight disquiet. It occurred that in the week following 
receipt of the message, those who had been frightened to a moderate degree had 
most frequently visited the dentist’s office. 
The curvilinear association between the saturation of a persuasive message with 
threatening elements and its effectiveness is described by Janis and Feshbach (1953) 
as being a result of a very weak fear being insufficient to pique an individual’s 
interest, never mind to motivate people to change their beliefs. However, an exces-
sively strong fear results in the occurrence of defensive reactions: information 
received by the individual is considered unreliable, or it is immediately subjected 
to interpretation and the assumption is made that, for example, while a particular 
threat does indeed concern the majority of people, the individual in question is 
not one of those at risk. In natural conditions such messages may, considering their 
aversiveness, prompt individuals to ignore them – for example, by turning off the 
TV or by putting down the newspaper mid-article (Wood, 2000). 
The majority of psychological studies, however, have recorded a straight-line 
relationship between fear and effectiveness of a persuasive message (see Boster & 
Mongeau, 1984; O’Keefe, 2002). Lijiang Shen & James Dillard (2014) argue 
convincingly that this is exclusively due to their failure to account for the degree 
to which participants are scared. If this factor is taken into consideration, the 
analyzed dependency becomes curvilinear. It would seem that an analogical truth 
operates in respect of the link between fear and behavioural docility towards 
persuasive messages. 
This is the precise effect observed in an experiment conducted by Clive 
Skilbeck, James Tulips and Philip Ley (1977), in which they examined the link 
between fear felt by obese people and their long-term actions aimed at reducing 
their body’s fat content. Study participants were visibly overweight women aged 
20–60. They were randomly allocated to various experimental conditions. Initially, 
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all of the women listened to a 20-minute lecture on various dangers associated 
with obesity, but the content of the lecture was different for each group. In the 
condition of weak fear induction, the lecture focused on how obese people at older 
ages are more frequently at risk of various diseases, and that they have problems 
getting around. In the condition of moderate fear induction, the focus was on 
information about rather minor problems with the heart and arthritis. Strong fear 
induction conditions involved the lecturer discussing the very high risk of dangerous 
heart diseases and serious problems associated with arthritis. A special survey was 
used to assess how much the information had unsettled each participant. The 
participants were also weighed, and given special instructions concerning the diet 
they should follow in order to shed excess kilograms. The women participants were 
weighed four more times, at 2, 4, 8 and 16 weeks after the beginning of the 
experiment. What is of particular interest and importance to us here is the drop in 
weight among particular groups of participants. It turned out that the degree of 
saturation of the introductory lecture with fear-inducing information had no 
influence on the number of kilograms lost by the women undergoing therapy. 
However, a large role was played by the extent to which a given person was scared 
by the information contained in the lecture (after all, it is known that some people 
may be made more upset by the information that in 20 years they will have diffi-
culty moving compared to others who have been told they may experience serious 
heart disease). This dependency is presented in Figure 6.1.
FIGURE 6.1 Fear exposure and weight loss
Source: European Journal of Social Psychology, 1977, vol. 7, p. 229.
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The feeling of guilt and shame
The feeling of guilt is an averse experience. It is associated with the feeling of 
unpleasant tension and arousal, as well as the experience of regret and contrition 
(Baumeister, Reis & Delespaul, 1995). The feeling of guilt is frequently accompa-
nied by the experience of shame (Izard, 1977; Tangney, 1995). The emotions of 
shame and of guilt are associated with an individual’s feeling of violating a norm 
or a rule. The primary difference is that the first of these emotions is primarily of 
a public nature, while the second is private. In respect of the feeling of shame, the 
individual sends signals to those around informing them it is understood that a 
social norm has been violated, and that the very person responsible for the viola-
tion disapproves of it. This signal is a blush – men display it on their faces, while 
women show it along the neck and upper chest. Guilt, however, does not result in 
any obvious signal being sent to the external environment. 
In the cases of both guilt and shame, it generally takes quite a long time for people 
to stop entertaining negative thoughts about themselves. These thoughts endanger 
one’s feeling self-worth. The feeling of one’s self-worth can be recovered by doing 
something considered socially acceptable. Fulfilment of the requests of others can 
therefore sometimes be a means of regaining the feeling that one is a positive and 
valuable individual (e.g. Konoske, Staple & Graf, 1979). If this requires sacrifice on 
the part of the individual – a significant engagement of time, effort or material 
resources – it can become a form of “penance”. In many cultures (e.g. Catholic), 
people have internalized the belief that such a “penance” can cleanse a person, erasing 
a previous sin. People experiencing guilt or shame may also be inclined to punish 
themselves. This particular emotional state may induce individuals to think badly of 
themselves, which in turn may lead to inwardly-directed punitive behaviour 
(Freedman, Wallington & Bless, 1967). Fulfilling the requests of others when experi-
encing guilt or shame may also be a chance to engage in a cognitive escape from the 
unpleasant focus on oneself. Getting involved in any activity at all allows individuals 
to extricate themselves from negative reflections on themselves and their actions, and 
to focus on the new activity. We may assume that people generally aim to avoid 
experiencing negative emotions and seek opportunities to experience positive ones. 
Engaging in an activity that assists people in freeing themselves from the feeling of 
guilt or the experience of shame will thus be far more attractive (Cialdini, Darby & 
Vincent, 1973). The feelings of guilt and shame may also be associated with the 
conviction that one has lost control over the course of events. These emotions appear 
when we are subjected to conditions in our surrounding environment that we 
ourselves do not accept. Commencing an intentional behaviour aimed at achieving 
a specific, positive objective may be a means of recovering the desired feeling of 
control, on the condition that this activity proves successful (McMillen, 1971). In the 
past, the general consensus was that while the feeling of guilt led to increased compliance, 
shame did not do so; currently, a different position dominates the subject literature. 
Because the feeling of shame is a public emotion, submissiveness only becomes a 
consequence of it when it is witnessed by others. Only then can the feeling of shame 
be reduced (Whatley, Webster, Smith & Rhodes, 1999). 
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It is likely that the first researchers who conducted empirical research on the 
consequences of experiencing shame and guilt were John Wallace and Edward 
Sadalla (1966). In their experiment, participants worked on completing a Thematic 
Apperception Test (TAT test). In the meantime, an experimenter examined – in a 
quite ostentatious manner – the condition of various laboratory instruments, and 
then left the laboratory under the pretext of needing to transport some question-
naires. In his absence, the participants either waited passively for him to return, or 
they were egged on by another participant (in fact a confederate of the experi-
menter) to play around with one of the laboratory instruments. Inevitably, this led 
to damage to the device. The participant saw a flash of light and smoke rising up 
over the machine, and could clearly smell the odour of burning electrical cables. 
Upon the experimenter’s return, his confederate either confessed that he and 
another participant wanted to test the device out but unfortunately damaged it, or 
said that something strange had happened to the device while he and the other 
participant were working on completing the TAT test. The experimenter then 
examined the equipment, and depending on the experimental conditions either said 
that the participants had damaged the unit, or that he completely accepted their 
explanation that the device had failed on its own. In the control conditions (i.e. 
those in which the participant was not induced to play with the equipment), the 
experimenter examined the device after his return, and declared that it was mal-
functioning. In all three conditions this led to the cancellation of the next portion 
of the experiment for the same reason: damage to the instrument. After that, the 
experimenter thanked participants for taking part, at the same time requesting that 
they agree to participate in another study during which they would, at times, be 
given an electric shock (the study was supposed to concern physiological determi-
nants of reactions to stress). As it turned out, participants who had previously broken 
the device were more often willing to participate in the new experiment than those 
in the control group. The variable of informing the experimenter about who the 
real culprits of the device’s failure were did not have a statistically significant impact 
on the tendency to accept the proposal to engage in the unpleasant experiment.
Similar effects, indicating an association between pliancy and the experience of 
shame and guilt, were also reported in later experiments. In one of them (Carlsmith 
& Gross, 1969), participants were encouraged to submit other people to suffering. 
In half of the cases, this suffering consisted of giving them jolts of electricity of 
increasing strength. In the others, the suffering was far less serious – the electrical 
current was replaced with sounds of increasing loudness. After this experiment was 
completed, the individuals who were the purported recipients of the unpleasant 
stimuli approached the participants with a request for help in a campaign to save 
Californian sequoia trees. As it turned out, participants who had administered elec-
tric shocks agreed to participate in the campaign more frequently than those who 
had administered the loud sounds. In addition, the study demonstrated that this 
effect did not result from increased sympathy towards the people who had suffered 
as the result of experiencing the shocks. Other participants who merely observed 
the experiences of people being shocked were not eager to join in the campaign 
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to save the sequoia. Thus, the most likely factor contributing to the fulfilment of 
the request to take part in a social campaign was the experience of guilt or shame 
on the part of participants. 
In other experiments (Freedman et al., 1967), the emotions being discussed here 
were evoked in a different manner. Participants were provoked into lying to the 
person conducting the study, or they were induced to make a mistake that was 
difficult to repair and rendered the work of another person pointless. It turned out 
that in both cases, participants in the experimental conditions more frequently 
agreed to fulfil requests addressed to them than in control conditions. The study’s 
authors demonstrated that, at least in some cases, an increase in submissiveness only 
occurred when fulfilling the request was not associated with the necessity of meeting 
the person who had been harmed. It may be said that contact with a wronged 
individual serves as a constant reminder to people of their earlier inappropriate 
behaviour. The prospect of this manner of spending time is thus subjectively very 
unpleasant. Helping someone else, however, is very attractive: it both facilitates 
“erasing the guilt” and eliminating negative thoughts about oneself. This “someone 
else” can even be an entirely anonymous person. For example, Richard Darlington 
and Clifford Macker (1966) demonstrated that people among whom a feeling of 
guilt had been induced were more likely to donate blood for their local hospital. 
Another interesting experiment is one conducted by Nicolas Gueguen (2001), 
in which participants were approached by a female experimenter who asked them 
to assist her by keeping watch over a heavy bag. She explained that she wanted to 
purchase a magazine in a bookstore around the corner. If the participant agreed, 
the experimenter then walked away. On the surface of the bag, there was a package 
with the phrase “horse meat” visibly written on it. After a short while another 
female experimenter appeared, who looked disapprovingly at the woman guarding 
the bag and said that consumption of horse meat was vile, and that people who eat 
it should be ashamed. Without waiting for a response, she walked away. After 
20 seconds the owner of the bag reappeared, thanked the participant, then left. The 
participant, left alone, was shortly thereafter asked by yet a third female experi-
menter to sign a petition. Depending on the experimental conditions the petition 
either concerned protection of animal rights, or reducing air pollution in large 
cities. Of course, participants in control conditions were also asked to sign petitions. 
While in the situation where the petition was associated with greater care for the 
fate of animals, the tendency to sign it was clearly greater among those from the 
experimental group (70%) than the control group (40%); in the case of the petition 
regarding pollution there was practically no difference (35% in the experimental 
group, 37.5% in the control group). It could be said that signing a petition on the 
matter of protection for animals was a better means of erasing guilt than was 
signing a petition concerning something entirely unrelated to the relationship 
between man and horse.
In another experiment, Paul Konoske, Sandra Staple and Richard Graf (1979) 
engaged in a more direct examination of the psychological mechanism that leads 
people burdened by guilt to accede to the requests and suggestions of others. These 
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authors took as their starting point the assumption that if such a request or sugges-
tion involved participation in a laudable goal to the benefit of society, people 
affected by the emotion of interest to us here would consent to it both in order to 
punish themselves, and to recover their feeling of self-worth or to create the 
opportunity to feel positive emotions. If, however, such a request exhibits a clearly 
different and non-altruistic character, the increased compliance of individuals 
experiencing the feeling of guilt could not be explained in terms of maintaining 
self-worth or seeking positive emotions. If compliance actually occurred in such a 
situation, it could be explained only by the tendency to inflict punishment on 
oneself. Conditions for the experiment were created in which a portion of par-
ticipants accidentally knocked over a pile of perforated computer cards, which led 
to their being scattered about and to the inability to restore the order in which 
they had been sorted. Participants were then asked to place a call to potential suc-
cessive participants. Some of them were told that this was to remind them of the 
time and place in which the experiment would be held. The others were informed 
that they were assisting in recruiting for research concerning reactions to fear-
inducing stimuli. Because it was difficult to acquire participants for this particular 
experiment, the researchers requested those making the phone calls to mislead the 
people they would be speaking to. The participants were to inform their inter-
locutors that they themselves had taken part in the very same experiment, and that 
it was not at all unpleasant. Similar requests (i.e. to remind others of the time and 
place of an experiment, or to lie to them by saying that the planned experiment is 
not unpleasant) were also made of participants from the control group. The number 
of people whom each participant agreed to call was recorded. It turned out that 
the feeling of guilt only enhanced the tendency to fulfil requests made by others 
when they were of a purely pro-social nature, and thus served as an opportunity to 
experience positive emotions and recover their positive self-image. If an attempt 
was made to induce experiment participants to lie to others, their experiences of 
the feeling of guilt did not have any influence on their behaviour. By the same 
token, we may reject the hypothesis that people experiencing the emotions being 
analyzed here fulfil the requests of others so as to punish themselves by engaging 
in activity that is a source of discomfort and unpleasantness. 
Discovering the psychological mechanism underlying the susceptibility to social 
influence of people experiencing the emotions discussed here was the objective of 
research by Brad Kelln and John Ellard (1999). Participants in the experiment 
conducted by these authors worked on a task associated with memory. They used 
a special device in the course of the experiment that – allegedly – was damaged. 
The cause of the damage, which had of course been planned as a part of the 
experimental design, was supposedly due to a mistake committed by the partici-
pant. In some cases, the experimenter only stated that the experiment had to be 
stopped owing to the failure. In other conditions, the experimenter declared that 
he had forgiven the participant for the error. He said not to be worried about what 
had happened. In further conditions, participants were told that since the failure 
required the involvement of more people in the experiment, they would not 
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receive the compensation they had been promised for taking part in the experi-
ment ($4). The experiment plan also included conditions in which the experimenter 
both forgave participants and cheered them up, and informed them that they 
would not receive any money. All of the participants were asked to do the experi-
menter a favour. He said that he needed to deliver 50 envelopes to various 
individuals working at the university campus, and asked participants to help him in 
that task: every quantity of envelopes that a given participant agreed to deliver to 
the addresses on them would be of invaluable assistance. An analogous request was 
made of participants from the control group, who had not experienced the situa-
tion with the supposed failure of research instrumentation. It turned out that in 
“pure” conditions of experiencing the feeling of guilt and shame (i.e. when the 
experimenter did not comment on the causes of the device’s failure), participants 
on average delivered more envelopes than in control conditions. An even higher 
degree of compliance was recorded in the group of participants whom the 
experimenter forgave and cheered up. When participants were informed that they 
would not receive the promised sum of $4, the level of compliance was the same 
as in the “pure” conditions of experiencing guilt and shame. The mere withdrawal 
of payment of the $4, however, led to participants taking fewer envelopes than 
those from the control group. 
How should these results be interpreted? Kelln and Ellard refer to the concept 
of striving for equity in interpersonal relationships (see e.g. Walster, Walster & 
Berscheid, 1978). The assumptions of this concept state that the majority of people 
prefer situations in which their relations with others are equitable. Thus, people do 
not want to be in debt to anyone, nor have anyone in their debt. This rule is not 
limited to money, but rather has a far broader reach. From the perspective that is 
of interest to us here, we may say that participants who believe that it was their 
mistake that led to the device’s failure and resultant problems felt that they were in 
debt to the experimenter. This is why they were eager to accede to his request to 
deliver envelopes. This assistance served as an opportunity to do something for him 
and to restore equity in the interpersonal relationship that had been disrupted by 
the participants’ own mistake. If the experimenter reacted with empathy, assuring 
the participant that it was no big deal, then the equity of the relationship became 
even more imbalanced. The experimenter’s pleasant behaviour is a sort of unde-
served “present” received by the participants. From this perspective it is not 
surprising that these were the conditions in which participants took the largest 
number of envelopes. However, if the experimenter did not behave empathetically, 
but rather took a participant’s money away, equity was by the same token restored 
to the relationship between the experimenter and the participant. The arrangement 
became equitable: while the participant had indeed damaged the instrument, this 
was balanced by the loss of the remuneration. The balance present in the exchange 
results in participants being not particularly inclined to assist the experimenter. If 
the retention of the money is accompanied by cheering up of the participant, the 
arrangement becomes inequitable, but only to a limited degree. The participant’s 
loss of $4 is balanced out by the problems that the experimenter experiences. 
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The pleasant behaviour of the experimenter towards the participant requires 
reciprocity, but it need not be particularly elaborate. In this case, the submissiveness 
of participants is thus higher than in the control conditions, but it does not exceed 
the level recorded in conditions of a “pure” feeling of guilt. 
It would seem that the theory of equity under discussion here may, in some 
conditions, be a good predictor of behaviour by people experiencing the feeling 
of guilt or shame. However, its utility is limited to one particular class of situations. 
Above all, it does not facilitate an explanation of the readiness of people experienc-
ing the emotions analyzed here to execute the requests and orders of people whom 
they had not previously harmed in any way. 
Embarrassment
Embarrassment is an emotion that we experience relatively infrequently, but also 
one which practically every adult person has undoubtedly experienced. The 
majority of psychological experiments concerning the consequences of experienc-
ing this state have been oriented towards demonstrating that it gives rise to a 
tendency to avoid others and to isolate oneself (e.g. Jankowski & Takahashi, 2014). 
The issue of whether the state of embarrassment enhances submission to requests, 
suggestions or orders of others has been relatively rarely examined in empirical 
studies. Among the few exceptions are two experiments conducted by Robert 
Apsler (1975). In the first of them, two students came to a laboratory, of which only 
one was an actual study participant; the other was a confederate of the female 
experimenter, which was, of course, a secret to the participant. The experimenter 
explained that the study was focused on the process of forming impressions about 
other people, and that one of the invited participants would perform certain tasks, 
while the other would observe through a one-way mirror. Next, the experimenter 
tossed a coin and asked the “real” participant to choose a side. Whether the choice 
was heads or tails, it “turned out” that the real participant would remain in the 
laboratory and perform some tasks. The experimenter’s confederate went into the 
neighbouring room to engage in observation. Depending on the experimental 
conditions the participant performed either four relatively neutral tasks (turning on 
a radio and listening to a song; walking around the room for 1.5 minutes; counting 
out loud to 50; reading a fragment of a book out loud), or tasks which, if per-
formed in public, would result in embarrassment (turning on a radio and dancing 
alone; laughing for 30 seconds as though a very funny joke had been told; singing 
a particular song; and imitating the hysterical reaction of a child who desperately 
refuses to go to preschool). After performing the last task, the participant again met 
with the experimenter’s confederate, who then asked for help in performing a 
certain task. The confederate explained that he had to conduct research on the 
mood of a large group of people as a class assignment. Participants in this research 
undertaking had to complete a survey taking around 30 minutes. It would be best 
if they completed the questionnaire for the next 20 days, but even a shorter period 
would also supply valuable information. The experimenter’s assistant asked 
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participants to agree to participate in the experiment, and to declare in how many 
days they would be willing to complete the questionnaire. This request was also 
addressed to participants from a control group in which the students did not work 
on any specific tasks, but rather just completed a standard psychological survey. It 
turned out that in conditions in which the participants were embarrassed by the 
tasks they were asked to perform, the average number of days for which they 
declared their readiness to complete the mood survey was greater than in the 
remaining conditions. 
Of course, the question arises of why the state of embarrassment facilitates 
compliance. Apsler looks primarily at two possibilities. First, it may be thought that 
the motivation to “recover one’s lost face” may be present. Participants are aware 
that another student observing them through the one-way mirror was a witness to 
their idiotic activity. Consent to engage in beneficial and desirable behaviour may 
be a way of making a good impression on that witness, a means of proving that we 
are far more valuable as people than would result from the activity we engaged in 
during the experiment. An alternative possibility refers to an intrapsychic mecha-
nism. Involvement in helping another person who not only needs but asks for that 
help may be a vehicle for achieving a positive mood or for recovering positive 
self-image. Both mood and self-image suffered while “making an idiot of 
ourselves” during the experiment. Apsler arrived at the conclusion that a situation 
in which the request for assistance in psychological experiments was formed by 
person other than the witness to the performance of “stupid” tasks by the partici-
pants would settle the matter. If increased compliance were to also appear in those 
conditions, it would mean that intrapsychic mechanisms were at the heart of the 
matter (i.e. the desire to improve mood or self-image). If, however, no such jump 
in compliance were recorded, this would serve as support for the motivation to 
“recover face”. 
In Apsler’s second experiment, study participants were female students and the 
experiment was conducted by a male experimenter. The experiment was based 
on the same plan, with three exceptions. The first of them concerned the 
dependent variable. This time it was determined that the maximum time for 
completing the mood survey was the following 30 days. The second difference 
concerned the person who asked for help in conducting the study. The person 
requesting participation in the experiment was either a person about whom 
participants knew had witnessed their behaviour during part of the experiment, 
or an entirely different person who, as the participants were aware, had no idea 
about their previous behaviour. The third difference was associated with the 
elimination of the control group.
The results of this experiment are presented in Table 6.1.
As we can see, in conditions under which the students were experiencing 
embarrassment, their compliance with the request was greater than in conditions 
in which they performed neutral tasks. Importantly, it was of no significance who 
(witness to their behaviour vs an individual with no knowledge of it) requested 
help in their research. In Apsler’s opinion, this reflected the presence of an intrapsychic 
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mechanism. Without excluding the foregoing in any way, I am rather inclined to 
think that the motivation to recover face can also not be excluded. The point, 
however, is not about making a good impression on precisely the very same person 
who had cause to think poorly about the individual, but rather about “people in 
general”. Put differently, what may come into play is a general motivation to make 
a good impression on others. Of course, the mechanisms being analyzed here need 
not necessarily be considered alternatives. It is not excluded (in fact, it is even 
rather likely) that all of them lie at the foundation of the relationship between the 
experience of embarrassment and submissiveness. Whether, in fact, this is the case, 
can only be determined by future experiments. 
Emotional see-saw
Ryszard Nawrat and I (Dolinski & Nawrat, 1998) examined the functioning of an 
individual who experiences strong fear, then encounters a situation in which the 
stimulus evoking that emotion suddenly and unexpectedly disappears. One example 
of this kind of situation is an interrogation conducted according to the “good cop/
bad cop” script. As we know from books and action films, the interrogee first 
experiences exceptionally brutal treatment – he is threatened with death, yelled at 
and humiliated. However, everything suddenly and unexpectedly changes. The 
phone rings, and the bad cop leaves the interrogation room. He is replaced by 
another – kind, polite, calm. He offers the interrogee a cup of coffee and a cigarette, 
and conducts a normal conversation. In films and books it is often the case that the 
person being questioned, previously refusing to cooperate, begins to testify and 
incriminates himself and his associates. It would seem that books and films do a 
good job of presenting the situation. This was in fact the way that statements from 
political prisoners were obtained in the Soviet Union (Herling-Grudzinski, 1965).
Of course, the sudden withdrawal of a source of fear does not necessarily apply 
to a situation as specific as a police interrogation, and compliance need not be 
associated with making statements and admitting one’s guilt. Let us imagine a 
situation in which we are jaywalking, and when we are in the middle of the street 
we hear the sound of a police whistle. We would naturally be frightened. We also 
feel a similar emotion when we leave our car in a forbidden place, then upon 
TABLE 6.1  Means of the transformed compliance measure as a function of embarrassment 









Source: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, vol. 32, p. 151.
Copyright 1975 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
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returning we see a small piece of paper placed under the wiper blade. What, 
however, happens when we turn around on the street and discover that the whistler 
is not a police officer, but rather a smiling jokester, and after we pick up the paper 
underneath our wiper, it turns out to be not a fine but rather an advert for a hair 
formula or an appeal to donate blood? At this moment we experience a sudden 
feeling of relief. The dynamics of emotions experienced in such situations are 
similar to those that occur in the case of a person being interrogated by a bad cop 
followed by a good cop.
These are precisely the situations that we created in our experiments. In one of 
them, the participants were drivers parking their cars in a forbidden spot. We placed 
pieces of paper behind their windscreen wipers that had the appearance of a fine 
issued by the police. At the moment when a driver returned to his car and picked 
up the paper, it turned out to be an advert for Vitapan – an incredible (supposedly, 
for it did not actually exist) substance for stimulating hair growth, or an appeal to 
donate blood. In other situations, the same pieces of paper were stuck on doors 
using adhesive tape. Because the police never issue fines to drivers by sticking them 
to car doors, participants treated in this manner had no reason to experience fear. 
The experiment plan also included an additional control group in which the car 
owners were not given any papers.
At the moment when the driver/participant was preparing to leave, an experi-
menter approached him, presented himself as a student conducting an experiment 
for his MA thesis, then asked for the completion of a survey concerning possibili-
ties for improving vehicle traffic in the city. We treated consent to the request as an 
indicator of compliance. As can be seen in Table 6.2, individuals who had occasion 
to experience the condition of “fear-relief ” more frequently agreed to participate 
in that study than did people from the remaining groups.
In later experiments we succeeded in demonstrating that compliance to such 
requests does not result from the simple fact of experiencing fear (we intro-
duced a group in which participants did in fact receive a police fine for parking 
in an unauthorized place), nor from the experiencing of positive emotions 
resulting from the state of relief (we measured the level at which positive 
emotions were experienced in particular experimental conditions). Thus, it is a 
specific situation involving the experience of fear-then-relief that leads to people 
TABLE 6.2  Percentage of subjects who complied with a request in Dolinski and Nawrat 
(1998) experiment
Behind a wiper/Advert for Vitapan
Behind a wiper/Appeal for blood donation
Car door/Advert for Vitapan












Source: Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1998, vol. 34, p. 31
Copyright 1998 Academic Press. Reproduced by permission of Elsevier.
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subjected to such an influence demonstrating pliancy towards requests and 
commands addressed to them.
Why is this the case? Every emotion experienced by an individual sets into 
motion a unique plan of action characteristic to that individual (e.g. Frijda, 1986; 
Niedenthal et al., 2006). For example, a feeling of happiness emerges under the 
influence of achievement of a milestone in some activity, which in turn activates a 
programme directed at continuing the action plan and introducing any necessary 
modifications. Sadness appears as a consequence of failure in achieving an impor-
tant goal, or missing a milestone, and leads to the inception of a programme 
consisting of passivity, the creation of another plan, or perhaps a search for assis-
tance. Anger is the result of frustration resulting from the inability to carry out 
one’s intentions, and leads to a redoubling of efforts to achieve that goal, or to 
aggression. Contempt, in turn, appears when one individual meets with another 
who hails from a social milieu that the former does not accept and considers to be 
worthless. The programme initiated by this emotion involves treating the other 
person with a total lack of respect. 
The emotion of fear that interests us here initiates a reaction consisting of sus-
pending our current activity coupled with a simultaneous increase of wariness 
towards the surrounding environment, immobility or flight (e.g. Denny, 1991; 
Tomkins, 1991; Tuma & Maser, 1985). Because fear, in the majority of cases, appears 
in conditions of threat to an individual or conflict between an individual’s chosen 
objectives, such a reaction is usually sufficient. However, if the sources of fear sud-
denly disappear, the programme of action activated by that emotion becomes 
inadequate in relation to the transformed circumstances. A new programme, appro-
priate for the new situation, still remains to be initiated. Thus we find ourselves in 
a specific (and surely short-term) state of being “between programmes”. The execu-
tion of one of them has been suspended by the sudden absence of the stimulus 
giving rise to the experience of fear, while a new programme in response to the 
evolving situation has not yet been activated. It would also seem very likely that 
when the source of an emotion suddenly disappears, an individual may engage in 
retrospective reflections concerning the events that have taken place, or which could 
have taken place. Both concentration on the past and engaging in hypothetical 
thinking may lead to insufficient cognitive resources for dealing effectively with the 
task at hand. The absence of free cognitive resources that could be devoted to 
analysis of the current situation in turn leads to automatic and mindless reactions to 
external stimuli. These automatic and mindless behaviours are unusually frequent in 
our everyday lives. People undertake a number of everyday decisions without reflec-
tion, they communicate mindlessly, and they learn and teach mindlessly (Langer, 
1989, 1992). However, while it is generally assumed that the state of mindlessness is 
induced by a routine situation that has occurred frequently in the past, and thus one 
which is accompanied by a low level of physiological arousal (Langer & Moldoveanu, 
2000), we feel that a similar state may also be evoked by a sudden and unexpected 
source of arousal and the equally sudden and unexpected withdrawal of the stimulus 
evoking this condition; in other words, the fear-than-relief sequence. 
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In one of our studies (Dolinski & Nawrat, 1998) we applied the aforementioned 
paradigm of using a whistle on people crossing the street in an unauthorized place. 
The experimenter then held out a collections box and asked for a donation. 
Similarly to the original 1978 study by Langer et al. (see also Chapter 5 of this 
book), the experimenter either formulated a simple request (“Madam/Sir, would 
you please give us some money?”), a request accompanied by a superficial (placebo) 
justification (“Madam/Sir, we are collecting money. Would you please give us some 
money because we have to collect as much money as possible?”), or a request 
accompanied with a real justification (“Madam/Sir, we are members of the ‘Students 
for the Handicapped’ organization. Would you please join our charity campaign, 
because we have to collect as much money as possible to cover the cost of a holiday 
camp for mentally handicapped children?”). It turned out that in emotionally neu-
tral conditions (e.g. those in which participants crossed the street without being 
disturbed by the whistle), people behaved in a rational, mindful manner. Only very 
infrequently did they place money in the donation can when the request had no 
justification or when it had a superficial justification, but they did so with far greater 
frequency when the request was accompanied by an explanation of who was gath-
ering the money and for what purpose. People experiencing an emotional see-saw, 
however, reacted in an entirely different manner. In this case it was enough to have 
any kind of justification at all for participants to be more likely to reach into their 
wallets when compared to conditions in which the request was made without any 
accompanying justification (see Table 6.3).
It also transpired that in conditions of fear-then-relief, people to whom an 
unusual message was addressed (i.e. a request accompanied by an entirely superficial 
justification) extremely rarely decided to ask any questions at all concerning the 
TABLE 6.3  Percentage of people who offered money, mean amounts of money given, and a tendency 
to seek additional information under each condition in Dolinski and Nawrat (1998) 
experiment
Jaywalkers with whistle Jaywalkers
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Source: Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1998, vol. 34, p. 44
Copyright 1998 Academic Press. Reproduced by permission of Elsevier.
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purpose and the organizers of the campaign. Such a reaction was nearly universal 
among people in a neutral emotional state. 
This pattern of results concerning both the frequency of request fulfilment and 
the verbal expression of doubts is therefore entirely consistent with the assumption 
that conditions of relief occurring after the experience of fear induce a condition 
of mindlessness, which in turn facilitates compliance. We have also demonstrated in 
other studies that a sudden feeling of relief puts people into a condition of com-
promised intellectual functioning, such as a study in which participants were 
required to solve simple mathematical tasks, or point as quickly as possible to a face 
in a picture that displayed a different emotion from all the others presented in it 
(Dolinski, Ciszek, Godlewski & Zawadzki, 2002). Results of a study on drivers 
were also consistent with this assumption. In experiments conducted using driving 
simulators (Dolinski & Odachowska, 2015), we demonstrated that drivers who had 
avoided a collision (and thus were in a state of relief) very frequently committed a 
simple mistake in the period immediately following the first incident, leading to 
an accident. 
If compliance with requests and propositions is undergirded by a sudden with-
drawal of the source of emotions, one should expect that we will encounter such 
a truth not only in the event of withdrawal of a source of fear, but also when the 
causes of other emotions are suddenly removed as well. Is this, in fact, the case? In 
one of the experiments I conducted jointly with Ryszard Nawrat (Nawrat & 
Dolinski, 2007), a female experimenter called randomly selected people and pre-
sented herself as an employee of a telecommunications company. In one condition 
she informed her interlocutor that the computer indicated a large overpayment, 
and that he would soon be refunded a significant sum of money (evoking a positive 
emotion); in another, she said that the computer indicated a significant underpay-
ment, and that the interlocutor would soon have to make up the difference 
(evoking a negative emotion). In half of the cases, participants were left in the 
induced emotional state, while in the remaining cases the experimenter “in order 
to make sure there was no mistake” asked participants for their address, and after a 
moment explained that the matter in fact concerned another customer with the 
same surname. Regardless of the type of manipulation, the experimenter then said 
“Polish Telecom is testing the sound quality of the telephone transmission using 
the new TELPOCOL system. Would you put the receiver to your other ear, 
please?” After 3 seconds she asked “Have you done so already?”
In the control group where no emotional states were induced among partici-
pants, this message was communicated by the experimenter immediately after 
introducing herself as an employee of the phone company. Confirmation by par-
ticipants of shifting the receiver to their other ear was treated as mindless 
compliance with a senseless request. While such a reaction occurred sporadically in 
both the control group and in groups where only negative or positive emotions 
were induced, it was recorded with far greater frequency (a statistically significant 
difference) in conditions involving the unexpected withdrawal of information 
justifying the experience of both negative and positive emotions.
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Other research we have conducted (Nawrat & Dolinski, 2007) also indicates 
that compliance may be induced not only by the sudden withdrawal of sources of 
the emotion of fear, but also of entirely different ones – positive emotional states. 
It should, however, be emphasized that these effects were generally weaker than in 
conditions involving the application of the fear-then-relief sequence, while in the 
case of withdrawal of sources of some emotions (e.g. disgust), we were entirely 
unsuccessful in achieving increased compliance. 
Summary
The majority of social influence situations are associated with increased physiological 
arousal. Just the simple presence of other people is a source of arousal. It may be 
additionally enhanced by the physical attractiveness of such people, by the fact 
that they are famous people or otherwise authorities, and by many other factors. 
A synergetic effect involving the accumulation of stimuli may occur among 
individuals who are emotionally aroused for some reason and then find them-
selves in another situation giving rise to emotions. If such a state is perceived as 
unpleasant, the individual aims to reduce the level of arousal. Compliance, 
acceding to a request, proposal or demand is often the most readily-available 
means of achieving that desired state. It is thus no surprise that the majority of 
studies devoted to this question generated results indicating that increased arousal 
was conducive to compliance.
Because one of the natural human motivations is the desire to attain and 
maintain a positive mood, people avoid behaviours that may lead to a worsening 
of mood, and strive to engage in those which lead to that very state. It is often the 
case that improving and maintaining a good mood may be achieved by agreeing 
to the requests of others. This is particularly true when fulfilling the request is not 
associated with actions that themselves would cause discomfort. On the other 
hand, in some situations fulfilling the request of another person may lead to a 
worsening of one’s positive mood. This happens, for example, when the activity 
involved in fulfilment of the request is time-consuming or boring. In such cases 
the positive mood being experienced by the individual reduces (rather than 
increases) the chances that the request will be fulfilled.
In many cases, the potential for fulfilment of a request depends not so much on 
its level of difficulty, but rather a subjective interpretation of the entire event. This, 
in turn, may remain under the influence of the affective state being experienced. 
Studies have shown that the type of mood one experiences has a minimal impact 
on evaluation of conventional requests and the tendency to fulfil them, but has a 
relatively large influence on the assessment of unconventional requests and on the 
decision to carry them out. 
Among the emotions well known to all of us, we may distinguish those whose 
occurrence motivates us to behave in a manner consistent with the norms and rules 
accepted internally and by our social surroundings. These emotions include fear, guilt 
and shame, and also embarrassment. It has been demonstrated that the experience of 
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these emotions (or even the mere anticipation of their emergence) often influences 
people’s submissiveness towards requests, recommendations and commands.
Psychologists have rarely studied situations in which an individual experiencing 
some emotion is faced with the sudden and unexpected withdrawal of the stimulus 
that evoked it and was responsible for its continuation. In the meantime, this type 
of situation occurs quite frequently in the daily life of every person. The studies 
presented in this chapter demonstrate that in these situations, given the label 
“emotional see-saw”, individuals’ tendency to comply with requests, orders and 
suggestions addressed to us is increased. 
The most likely mechanism at the heart of pliancy in such conditions is associ-
ated with the manner in which every emotion generates a specific programme of 
action. When one is in a situation where this programme suddenly becomes utterly 
inadequate in the face of altered external circumstances, individuals begin func-
tioning mindlessly. This gives rise to automatic reactions that do not take into 
account the particulars of the situation at hand. This assumption was confirmed by 
an experiment that applied the classic paradigm of studies on the mindless fulfilment 
of requests. The results of other research, presented in this chapter, are also consistent 
with this assumption. They demonstrate that the emotional see-saw leads to the 
individual experiencing disruptions in cognitive functioning.
7
A FEW MORE ISSUES AND  
FINAL REMARKS
Academic researchers vs practitioners of social influence
While those who research techniques of social influence are interested in their 
effectiveness and the psychological mechanisms underlying their success, practi-
tioners of social influence are, for obvious reasons, interested (exclusively, or at least 
primarily) in only the former of these two issues. This does not, however, mean 
that practitioners take into account fewer factors than researchers do. A beggar may 
be very interested in knowing the part of the city and the time of the day when 
people toss the most change into a hat, as well as when and where they do it the 
least. His thinking can also take on an interactive character: entirely different tech-
niques and tricks may prove effective in neighbourhoods inhabited by people of 
average wealth compared to those populated by richer individuals. An employee of 
a real estate agency might, in turn, apply completely different techniques of persua-
sion on a student looking to rent a small apartment for nine months compared to 
a businessman looking to purchase a large house with a pool. Arnie Cann and Jill 
Blackwelder (1984) correctly observe that in order to fully grasp the mechanisms 
leading to effectiveness of a social influence technique in real social life, we must 
consider who is addressing whom, at what time, in what place, and with what 
objective. At times it may be the case that seemingly insignificant details are of key 
significance. For example, it is known that women pick up hitchhikers far less often 
than men. However, if a male hitchhiker is holding a bouquet of flowers in his 
hand, there is an eight-fold greater chance that a female driver will pick him up 
(Gueguen, Meineri & Stefan, 2012). 
Also of importance is that a practitioner of social influence must frequently 
select the people he will approach with a request or a proposition. Let us imagine, 
for example, that we are collecting donations in the city centre for some charitable 
cause. There are so many people that we have no chance of approaching all of them 
160  A few more issues and final remarks
with our donation boxes; we have to decide who will be asked for a gift, and who 
will not. In such situations it seems unlikely that people simply leave things to 
chance; rather they assess the subjective likelihood that a given passer-by will agree 
to their request. Jaroslaw Kulbat (2003) asked his study participants to imagine that 
they worked for a charitable organization, then showed them films presenting 
adults walking along the sidewalk. The participants were asked to assess the prob-
ability that the person being shown to them would toss money into a donation 
can. It turned out that, regardless of the sex of the person making the judgement, 
higher estimations of the likelihood of making a donation were made when a 
woman appeared on the screen than when a man was shown.
Practitioners may also be very interested in the results of studies concerning 
long-term campaigns, as is the case with the majority of collections taken up for 
charitable purposes, or for marketing campaigns. The effectiveness of particular 
efforts to exert influence may depend on whether the campaign is just getting 
underway, in progress, or approaching its conclusion. One example of this can be 
found in the experiments of Jakob Jensen, Andy King and Nick Carcioppolo 
(2013). These researchers observed that behaviourists conducting studies on rats 
had previously recorded increased motivation in individual rats when they were 
close to achieving a goal (laboratory rats ran faster as they got closer to food). The 
organizers of various collection drives could provide not only information about 
the objective (e.g. “We’re trying to raise $20,000 for a wheelchair for our paralyzed 
friend”), but also about the progress of the campaign (e.g. “We’ve already got 
$2,000” or “We’ve already got $18,000”). The first piece of information indicates 
that there is a long way to the goal, while the second shows how close it is. In 
accordance with the goal-gradient hypothesis, people approached for a donation 
and hearing the latter piece of information should be more motivated to give 
money than in the first case. While the experiments conducted by the aforemen-
tioned researchers did not provide entirely definitive results, it would seem that this 
dynamic approach to social influence techniques is worthy of close attention. 
Publicizing information about sums collected can at times benefit a charity drive, 
while at times it can be detrimental. 
Also of potential importance for the practitioner of social influence is the 
amount of time and the level of effort necessary to apply particular tech-
niques. Adding the phrase “even a penny will help” (see Chapter 4) is, from 
this perspective, far more tempting than using the time-and energy-consuming 
“foot-in-the-door” technique (see Chapter 2). This does not mean, however, that 
those practising social influence always seek to expend the minimum amount of 
effort. Quite the opposite, if they see there is a real chance of achieving their 
objectives, they may not stop at applying time- and resource-intensive influence 
techniques, but may even go so far as to combine them in chains of complex 
techniques (Howard, 1995). Are such “chains of techniques” more effective than 
applying individual techniques? The issue is far more complicated than it might 
appear at first glance and, interestingly, has already been studied quite extensively 
by social psychologists. Morton Goldman (1986) posed questions about the 
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effectiveness of the combined application of the classic foot-in-the-door and 
door-in-the-face sequential techniques. His starting point was the assumption 
that the main limitation in the former technique’s effectiveness is associated with 
the difficulty of the introductory request. If it is too easy then nearly everyone 
will agree, but the fact that it is so easy means that the addressee does not analyze 
the reasons why he carried it out. As a result, self-perception does not occur, and 
the technique is ineffective. On the other hand, if the request is overly difficult, 
a large percentage of people will refuse to accede (and thus they will – even more 
so – refuse to carry out the second, target request). Thus, the technique also fails 
in this case. What can be done? There are two potential remedies. One is to 
ensure that people think about why they have fulfilled the easier request and that 
they do not find simple explanations that refer to external factors, or another is 
to make them more inclined to fulfil a relatively difficult request. Goldman 
focuses on the second of those possibilities. He suggests using three requests 
rather than two. The third request should be the most difficult one, and it should 
serve as the initial request in the interaction with the person whom we wish to 
influence. It will most likely be rejected but, as with the door-in-the-face technique, 
it is now time to submit the easiest request of the three. When this request is 
fulfilled (which is quite probable in light of what we know about this technique), 
we should then, in accordance with the foot-in-the-door technique, submit the 
target request. Goldman therefore proposes applying a chain of techniques 
consisting of door-in-the-face + foot-in-the-door. 
His experimental design included conditions designed to measure the effec-
tiveness of the foot-in-the-door technique, door-in-the-face, and a sequence 
consisting of door-in-the-face + foot-in-the-door, as well as control conditions 
in which the target request was directly formulated. The experimenter called 
study participants and introduced himself as a member of an organization 
supporting the local zoo. The individual requests concerned various activities 
benefiting the zoological gardens (such as an easy request consisting of answering 
survey questions, or conducting individual surveys with 150 people in the case 
of the very difficult request). The target request concerned the study participant 
addressing 75 envelopes to various people and institutions containing letters with 
a request to provide financial support to the zoo. Both foot-in-the-door (first the 
request for a response to the survey, then the request to address the envelope) and 
door-in-the-face (first the request for conducting 150 interviews, then – after 
hearing a refusal – the request to address the envelopes) techniques proved 
successful. In both conditions more people agreed to carry out the target request 
than in the control conditions. However, the most effective technique was one 
based on the sequence of door-in-the-face + foot-in-the-door, in which the 
very difficult request was first issued (conducting an interview with 150 people), 
then after the refusal the easy request was lodged (giving answers to survey ques-
tions), and then after the easy request was fulfilled, the target request was made 
(addressing the envelopes). In these conditions the target request was agreed to 
by 57% of participants compared to 46% in door-in-the-face conditions, and 
162  A few more issues and final remarks
42% in foot-in-the-door conditions. In the control conditions 22% of participants 
agreed to address the envelopes.
Jacob Hornik, Tamar Zaig and Dori Shadmon (1991) linked the foot-in-the-door 
technique with low ball, also described in Chapter 2. People who work profes-
sionally conducting public opinion surveys by telephone are aware that the high 
percentage of people who refuse to answer questions is a frequent source of 
difficulty. This percentage goes even higher when the questions are of a personal 
nature and touch on private issues. The high proportion of people who refuse to 
speak to those conducting surveys renders the sample far from representative, 
which can frequently undermine the entire sense of such studies. Hornik et al. 
examined whether using the foot-in-the-door technique, low ball, or a sequence 
containing those techniques would increase people’s readiness to respond to inter-
view questions. In the foot-in-the-door conditions a respondent was called and 
then asked three questions concerning personal matters; these did not, however, 
involve sensitive issues the respondent would be unlikely to discuss with a stranger. 
Next, an appointment to conduct a longer interview at a convenient time for 
the respondent was made. In the case of the low-ball technique, an appointment 
for an interview on various personal issues was first made, then the respondent 
was called and told that the subject matter would be slightly broader as the 
organization designing the survey had added some questions about intimate mat-
ters to the survey. Further conditions involved combining the two techniques 
while changing their order. It turned out that all of the techniques proved effec-
tive. In every case, the percentage of people responding to questions in the 
primary interview was greater than in the control group, to which the request to 
answer intimate questions was made directly. The most effective technique, how-
ever, was one based on the sequence of low ball + foot-in-the-door (in these 
conditions 83% of study participants consented to give the interview). When the 
order of the aforementioned techniques was reversed, their effectiveness was 
slightly reduced (77.4% compliance). It also turned out that, similarly to many 
other studies (e.g. Burger & Petty, 1981; Joule, 1987), the low-ball technique was 
more effective than foot-in-the-door. The former technique achieved 70.1% 
compliance, while the latter only 59.7% (in the control group 46.7% of respondents 
agreed to the interview). 
A similar pattern of results was recorded by those authors in their other studies, 
which concerned obtaining agreement to a 20-minute interview concerning 
behaviours associated with a healthy lifestyle (Hornik & Zaig, 1991). The sequence 
of low ball + foot-in-the-door again proved the most effective in these studies. 
A range of other studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of such techniques 
as touch and gaze (Hornik, 1987), touch and vocal intensity (Rembland & Jones, 
2001), labelling and foot-in-the-door (Goldman et al., 1982), and dialogue involve-
ment and even a penny will help (Dolinski et al., 2005). It is worth devoting a bit 
more attention to the combined effects of dialogue involvement with other social 
influence techniques. 
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Catalysts of social influence
Chemists use the term “catalyst” to define a substance that speeds up a chemical 
reaction. One may posit the theory that the establishment of dialogue by an 
individual with a person whom he is seeking to influence is a sort of psychological 
catalyst. As I have already discussed in Chapter 4, dialogue is a typical element of 
our conversations with acquaintances, and social norms demand that we help those 
we know, particularly when such assistance is of little cost to us. Taken by surprise 
by a stranger who involves us in a dialogue, we automatically activate the “dealing 
with an acquaintance script”. It could be assumed that a social influence technique 
being applied after engaging someone in dialogue finds fertile ground, and by 
the same token should prove exceptionally effective. To put it differently, the dialogue 
serves as a catalyst for the workings of that technique. One example of this can 
be found in studies we conducted involving a charity drive held for victims of 
leukaemia (Dolinski et al., 2005). In these studies we tested the effectiveness of the 
legitimizing a paltry contribution technique, which you are familiar with from 
Chapter 4. In asking for a donation, we placed a collection box in front of a passer-
by and in half of the cases we said “even a penny will help”. Before the request to 
make a donation was formulated, however, we informed participants about the 
purpose of the charity drive. In half of the cases we did this in the form of a 
monologue, describing how leukaemia is a serious problem and how important it 
is to support institutions that work to treat it. A dialogue was used in relation to 
the other participants. We asked if they felt leukaemia was a serious social problem, 
and what they thought about institutions engaged in the fight against it. We 
recorded both the number of people in each condition who placed money in the 
box, as well as the average sum of money donated. The technique of legitimizing 
a paltry contribution was particularly effective when participants had previously 
been engaged in dialogue. A similar pattern of results was noted in our other 
studies, including one where the request was not to donate money, but rather to 
distribute flyers.
Much would seem to indicate that connecting dialogue with various social 
influence techniques is often a natural thing to do, and at times even difficult to 
avoid. Let us observe that the initial phase of interaction with a person applying 
some technique to exert social influence (in psychological research this person is 
the experimenter) usually involves posing a question to the person being influ-
enced, then listening to his answer. However, in the control conditions of studies 
on influence techniques we are dealing with a situation in which the experimenter 
addresses the participant directly (without engaging him in dialogue). For example, 
the door-in-the-face technique assumes that a difficult request should first be 
made, then rejected by the participant, after which the easier target request should 
be immediately presented. It is impossible to even conceive of a situation in which 
the interaction between the researcher and participant would not take on the form 
of a dialogue. In the control conditions, the experimenter begins at once with the 
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target request, and the monologue format is not only possible, but simply natural. 
I am not making the suggestion that the techniques described in this book are 
simply variations of the dialogue engagement technique – this is most certainly not 
the case! For example, the door-in-the-face technique requires that the second 
request be easier than the first. If the rejection of the initial request is followed by 
another one which is very similar and equally difficult, the technique ceases to be 
effective (Cialdini et al., 1975). Dialogue engagement can thus be both a stand-
alone social influence technique (as you have read about in Chapter 4) and a catalyst 
for the workings of other techniques.
Phenomena that can serve as such catalysts are explored in even greater detail 
by Jerry Burger together with his collaborators (Burger et al., 2001; Burger et al., 
2004; for review see Burger, 2007). They treat dialogue engagement as one of the 
means of evoking fleeting attraction towards a stranger. Engaging in dialogue 
with another person leads us to begin liking that individual. This, in turn, pro-
vides an obvious boost to the chances that we will agree to requests he makes of 
us. Another means of increasing one’s own attractiveness in the eyes of our partner 
may be simply being present in the same space. Here we are taking advantage of 
the phenomenon of mere exposure, which consists of being more favourably 
disposed to stimuli (including social stimuli, and thus people) we are familiar 
with than ones that are unknown to us. Thus if a request is addressed to a study 
participant by someone he already knows in some way (he has seen or heard 
him), the chances are greater that the request will be carried out. Yet another way 
of boosting one’s own attractiveness in the eyes of a partner in an interaction is 
to discreetly draw his attention to the fact that we share some similarities (as I 
have already discussed in Chapter 3, these need not necessarily be real simi-
larities, they can be made up by the individual seeking to exert social influence). 
Interestingly, the similarity may even relate to matters that are trivial and of no 
consequence from the perspective of the request, such as a supposedly excep-
tional fingerprint. In such conditions people are more inclined to fulfil the 
request of a student to take part in a research project he needs to get a grade 
(Burger et al., 2004), as well as to purchase various products presented to them 
(Jiang et al., 2010) . 
Another particular catalyst of social influence techniques is the condition of 
cognitive exhaustion that can be experienced by an individual to whom we are 
addressing a request. Bob Fennis, Loes Janssen and Kathleen Vohs (2009) present 
results of research that indicate the depletion of cognitive resources leads to less 
attentive and less critical acceptance of information, which in turn makes the indi-
vidual more susceptible to social influence (see also Fennis & Aarts, 2012). That 
said, the issue of the link between ego-depletion and susceptibility to social influ-
ence techniques seems to be a complex one. Slawomir Spiewak (2002) demonstrated 
that some techniques (door-in-the-face and fear-then-relief) become ineffective in 
conditions of cognitive resource depletion. This is an area which undoubtedly 
requires further exploration.
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Unethical social influence
Readers of this book have most certainly noticed that I have primarily addressed 
how to convince people to make a donation to a charitable cause, to complete 
psychological questionnaires, to attend a laboratory experiment, give blood or sign 
a petition to improve road traffic safety. It would be difficult to find something 
immoral in any of these activities. In essence, psychologists examine social influence 
primarily as it relates to the possibility of convincing people to behave in ethically 
positive or neutral ways. 
This does not, however, mean that the psychological literature is totally devoid 
of research concerning the effectiveness of social influence techniques involving 
an attempt to convince people to do things that are clearly unethical. Examples 
are delivered by experiments on the “Imagine that . . .” technique described in 
Chapter 4. Let us recall that many studies have shown how successfully inducing 
people to imagine certain events with their participation (e.g. leaving for a holiday 
to another continent), we increase the chances that they will behave in that 
manner (in this case, they go on holiday). What happens if we convince someone 
to imagine engaging in an unethical manner? In two of her experiments Barbara 
Weigl (1990) demonstrated that if one suggests to children that they imagine 
cheating, and then they are exposed to the temptation to do so, they will engage 
in this moral transgression with far greater frequency and intensity than children 
exposed to an analogical temptation but without being previously induced to 
imagine themselves behaving unethically. However (thankfully!), we can use social 
influence techniques to achieve the opposite effect, meaning a reduction in the 
likelihood of cheating. Eric Spangenberg and Carl Obermiller (1996) asked their 
study participants if they could resist the temptation to cheat. As we remember 
from Chapter 4, people asked to state the probability of their engaging in a par-
ticular behaviour demonstrate a tendency to overestimate the likelihood of acting 
in a moral and socially desirable manner, while underestimating the frequency of 
immoral and undesirable actions. It thus comes as no surprise that in this case they 
estimated the likelihood of their own dishonesty as very low. The subjective 
certainty of overcoming temptation then led to participants less frequently taking 
advantage of the chance to cheat on a quiz compared to those in the control 
group. Very interesting studies exploring means of influencing the likelihood of 
unethical behaviours, described in Chapter 2 of this book, have also been conducted 
by Magdalena Paska (2002).
How to study social influence techniques. A short  
guide for students and novice researchers
A key element in all psychological experiments is randomization – the chance 
assignment of study participants to particular experimental conditions. Of course, 
this is equally crucial in research on social influence techniques. In studies that 
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involve addressing people with a request (which is the case with social influence 
techniques) it is very important to eliminate the influence of the researcher’s 
expectations regarding the reaction of the participant. If someone operates 
under the theory that people will be more inclined to agree to requests 
addressed to them than in other circumstances, at times the researcher can – 
entirely unintentionally – behave either more or less pleasantly, look straight into 
the eyes of participants in certain situations while avoiding their gaze in others, 
etc. In professional experiments the standard procedure is to engage people who 
are blind to the hypotheses tested, and to practise the course of the interaction 
with study participants beforehand so as to make their behaviours as similar as 
possible in comparable conditions. 
What if an experiment of this nature is to be conducted by students of social 
psychology as part of their course work? And what if everyone knows the hypoth-
esis that is being tested in that experiment? There is a way around this as well. Let 
us use a certain example. We may assume that the experiment concerns certain 
aspects of the sequential techniques you have read about in Chapter 2. We wish to 
explore a situation in which the first (initial) and second (target) requests are for-
mulated by different people. In order to exclude the undesired effects described 
above, we should organize the experiment so that the individual formulating the 
target request does not know if he is addressing someone from the control group 
(i.e. people who did not hear the initial request) or from the experimental group 
(people who have already been exposed to a request). Of course, if the experiment 
plan is more complicated, such a person should not know which condition he is 
involved in. How to do this? The simplest way is to find the right place. Let us 
imagine that we are in the hallway of a building shaped like the letter ‘L’, or on a 
path of a similar shape. The experiment can be conducted by three people. Let us 
assume that they are occupying the positions shown in Figure 7.1 
This allows person X to maintain eye contact with person A and person B, but 
persons A and B do not see each other. Let us assume that there is relatively little 
foot traffic along the hallway or the path, and we have decided to engage every 
fifth person passing by who appears to be an adult and is walking in such a way 
that he first passes person A, and then person B (but not B then A). Only experi-
menter X possesses a piece of paper with the results of the randomization 
determining which conditions a given participant will be assigned to; when 
experimenter X sees that a participant is approaching experimenter A, he gives him 
the appropriate signal. This signal could be something like removing his glasses, 
taking off his hat, or touching his hair using either his left or right arm. Every 
gesture is a different command issued to experimenter A. X can also communicate 
with A by mobile phone, giving him the necessary instructions. When a participant 
completes his interaction with person A, he heads towards person B (passing X 
along the way). X now communicates with B, telling him to approach the study 
participant. B does not know if this person is from the control conditions (thus 
already approached by A) or from one of the experimental conditions. 
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Let us consider for a moment what experimenter B will ask the participant for. 
If it is money for a charitable purpose, then we may interrupt the experiment in 
the moment when the participant reaches for his wallet and explain that he is in a 
psychological experiment designed to examine if people in such conditions are 
inclined to help those in need. However, it seems to me that it would be better to 
make contact with some charity and really collect money for it. We can enrich our 
knowledge of psychology while directly helping people who can benefit from it. 
And what if the target request involves completing a long survey? From our 
perspective, the only important thing is whether participants agree to complete it 
and how many questions they respond to. But perhaps one of our colleagues is in 
the process of a survey-based study? Maybe we could help him gather some important 
data? And maybe – in exchange – he will agree to help us with our experiment? 
He says that he has no idea what we’re exploring? He’s not familiar with such 
studies? He’s never done it before? That’s even better!
*
Just a moment ago I received a phone call from a radio journalist. He wanted to 
discuss social influence techniques. He began by asking how many such techniques 
have been discovered by social psychologists. When I told him that I didn’t know, 
he was surprised. After all, I should know. In reality, there is no way to answer 
this question. Human ingenuity is virtually unlimited. Practitioners of social 
influence are constantly inventing new tricks; psychologists are constantly engaging 
B
X A
FIGURE 7.1 A, X, B – experimenters
Source: Image by author
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in experiments and presenting their results in scientific journals. Unfortunately, 
there is not a large amount of empirical studies dedicated to social influence, nor 
articles and books on the subject. Research by psychologists on people’s real 
behaviour – as I wrote in the Introduction – is becoming less and less common. In 
writing this book I wished to acknowledge those psychologists who go against the 
grain conducting incredibly time-consuming and unfashionable experiments 
(computer and neuropsychological experiments are all the rage now). It is my hope 
that you will agree with me: what is unfashionable can, however, be interesting.
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